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Preface
Cost accounting furnishes management with much of the input
required in order that management may make proper decisions. Per
haps one of the prime reasons that a business entity maintains a cost
system is to provide some guidance for determining the adequacy
of pricing and distribution policies.
The intelligent analysis of relevant cost data will go a long way
toward determining the essence of profit planning—what to produce
and what price to charge.
Cost analysis for pricing and distribution policies is the second
effort in this series of technical studies in management services.
The contents of this technical study are divided into two sections:
(1) textual material concerning the type of analysis covered by the
study, and (2) four case studies describing engagements performed by
CPAs in that area. All of the case studies are based on actual situations,
although the names, locations, and, in some cases, minor details have
been changed. In a few instances the figures also have been changed.
Where this has been done, every effort has been made to avoid dis
torting significant relationships.
Each case study consists of two parts: (1) a description of the
client situation as it unfolded to the practitioner, and (2) a description
of how the practitioner dealt with the situation. The cases are pre
sented in this format to enable readers to use them as a self-teaching
device.
Several questions are asked at the end of part one: questions re
quiring quantitative analysis of the data in the case; questions about
how the job should be approached; questions about fee estimates or
man-day requirements; and so forth. It is suggested that the reader
should plan to read part one carefully and prepare answers to the
questions presented before proceeding to part two. Part two then
provides an opportunity for the reader to compare his analysis with
that prepared by the practitioner.
vii

Most management decisions do not have just one obviously right
answer. Therefore, the reader’s solution to a case may frequently, and
perhaps appropriately, differ from the approach taken by the practi
tioner. Working through the series of cases over a period of several
weeks the management services student should find increasing con
fidence in his ability to size up a situation and devise an approach for
dealing with the particular problem area discussed in this bulletin.
This is the second in a series of five technical studies prepared under
the general supervision of Professor Richard F. Vancil, D.B.A., CPA,
Harvard Business School. Assistance in the field research and case
writing was provided by Dr. James S. Hekimian, Dr. Charles J. Chris
tenson, Dr. David F. Hawkins, Dr. Robert C. Deming, Dr. Robert C.
Hill, and L. Paul Berman.
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Cost Analysis for Pricing and
Distribution Policies
As CPAs continue to increase the scope of management services
offered to their clients, the practitioner’s ability to render competent
advice on pricing policies and distribution costs becomes increasingly
essential. Determining intelligent and profitable pricing policies is one
of management’s more important responsibilities. As an advisor to
management, the CPA is in a position to make a unique contribution
to management’s analysis of pricing problems. This is a unique posi
tion because the CPA (1) can frequently analyze the company and
its environment in a more objective and dispassionate manner than
management itself, (2) is intimately familiar with the cost structure
and other characteristics of his client’s organization that relate to
pricing problems, and (3) approaches the problem in a professional
and analytical manner rather than relying on intuition as management
frequently does in its pricing actions.
The purpose of this bulletin is to describe and illustrate the types
of analyses that CPAs may be called upon to perform in the pricing
area. First, this text will discuss some of the useful theoretical con
cepts that are applicable in dealing with pricing problems; then, the
series of case studies will illustrate the application of these concepts
and some of the problems of applying them in actual situations.
The first bulletin in this series, Cost Analysis for Product Line De
cisions, provides a useful introduction to pricing decisions. The first
bulletin deals with the subject of cost behavior and prediction, and
examines some of the problems that arise in determining a useful
measure of product costs. The cost concepts developed in Bulletin
No. 1 are helpful in an analysis of pricing problems. In particular, the
1

concept of contribution to overhead, derived from an analysis of fixed
and variable costs, is frequently useful in making pricing decisions.
Bulletin No. 1 deals with a fairly simple class of problems involving
the determination of product costs in order to identify low-profit items
and permit more effective utilization of existing facilities. In contrast,
this bulletin is concerned with distribution costs and pricing policies,
a somewhat more complex area because it involves not only the
analysis of selling and promotional costs but also the analysis of
changes in the price and quality of a product offered for sale.

COST-PRICE-VOLUME RELATIONSHIPS
Most discussions of price determination begin with the assumption
that the characteristics of a product have already been determined.
This is a crucial assumption, and one that will be explored in the third
section of this text. This and the following section accepts this as
sumption and thus restricts attention to the effect that prices and other
demand creating costs have on profits.
A simple example involving a firm that manufactures only one
product facilitates discussion. The Radnor Corporation, a manufac
turer of household vacuum cleaners, had the following operating
results for 1964.
Exhibit 1
RADNOR CORPORATION
Statement of Income
For the Year Ended 1964
Total Amount Amount Per Unit
Sales (50,000 units)

$2,000,000

$40.00

Cost of goods sold:
Materials
Direct labor
Factory overhead

$ 700,000
500,000
400,000

$14.00
10.00
8.00

Total factory cost

$1,600,000

$32.00

Manufacturing profit
Selling, general, and administrative
expenses

$ 400,000

$ 8.00

250,000

5.00

Profit before taxes

$ 150,000

$ 3.00

2
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The importance of price in determining a company’s profitability is
illustrated in Exhibit 1. In general, from that exhibit it is noted that
there are three major ways in which price influences profitability:
1. Unit price has a direct effect on total revenue. In Radnor’s case,
the sales revenue of $2,000,000 is a result of selling 50,000 units at $40
each. Since the profit per unit is only $3, the company would have
lost money for the year if it sold the 50,000 units below $37 each.
2. Selling price will influence the volume sold. The quantity sold
is another factor which determines sales revenue, and for most prod
ucts—particularly competitive ones—the quantity that can be sold is
determined to some extent by the selling price.
3. Volume in turn will influence costs. Radnor’s total costs in 1964
amounted to $1,850,000, but this figure would have been higher or
lower depending on the number of units sold.
The interrelated variables (cost, price, and volume) are easier to
consider if the conventional income statement is recast into a format
which recognizes the differences between fixed and variable costs.
Bulletin No. 1 describes the analytical techniques involved. The re
sult of applying this analysis to the Radnor Corporation is illustrated
in Exhibit 2.
Exhibit 2
RADNOR CORPORATION
Statement of Income
For the Year Ended 1964
Total Amount

Amount Per Unit

Sales (50,000 units)

$2,000,000

$40.00

Variable costs
Materials
Direct labor
Variable overhead

$ 700,000
500,000
50,000

$14.00
10.00
1.00

Total variable costs

$1,250,000

$25.00

Contribution to fixed costs and profit

$ 750,000

$15.00

Fixed costs for factory overhead
Selling, general, and administrative
expenses

600,000

Profit before taxes

$ 150,000
3

Exhibit 3
RADNOR CORPORATION
Breakeven Chart
Thousands
o f dollars

In this example, the total overhead costs for factory, selling, gen
eral, and administrative expenses amount to $650,000, of which only
$50,000 are identified as variable costs, resulting in a total variable
cost of $25 per unit. One of the greatest advantages of a fixed-variable
costs analysis is that it permits the determination of a contribution
per unit—the difference between selling price and variable cost per
unit. The contribution per unit of $15.00 incorporates two (price and
cost) of the three profit factors mentioned above, thus making it much
easier to observe the influence of volume on profits. In applying the
contribution concept to the Radnor Corporation, this analysis shows
that the company made a profit of $150,000 because it earned a con
tribution of $15 per unit on 50,000 units, or $750,000. From this con
tribution, Radnor Corporation must recover $600,000 of fixed costs,
4
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leaving a profit of $150,000. A change in price might influence the
quantity sold and the total amount of variable costs, but not the
variable cost per unit. These effects can be measured in terms of the
total contribution earned.
A familiar way of presenting the results of a fixed-variable cost
analysis is through the use of a breakeven chart as illustrated in
Exhibit 3.
Units Produced and Sold
Given only the two facts that Radnor’s total fixed costs were
$600,000 and the contribution per unit was $15, the Radnor Corpora
tion’s breakeven point can also be determined by the following
computation:
Fixed Costs
Breakeven Point = -------- -------------------Contribution per unit
$600,000
Breakeven Point = ----------$15
Breakeven Point = 40,000 units
Radnor’s profit performance for 1964 is therefore a result of the
10,000 units sold above the breakeven point of 40,000 units multiplied
by the contribution of $15 on each unit for a total profit of $150,000.
These several ways of analyzing cost, price, and volume deal with the
same data and yield the same profit result in any given situation.
Nevertheless, it is useful to have several alternative ways of consider
ing a company’s profit structure.

Breakeven Point Analysis
The main reason that breakeven point analysis is so widely known
is that it is an extremely useful pedagogical device for explaining
the relationship between fixed and variable costs. More important,
perhaps, breakeven point analysis has several practical advantages:
1. The concept is a simple one to comprehend. Many highly
effective businessmen may be salesmen or may be production orien
tated, but are not able to comfortably deal with accounting and
statistical data. A great advantage of the breakeven point is that the
uninitiated can easily grasp it in concrete terms. The danger is that
managers may place more faith in the breakeven point than it de
serves, thus overlooking the limitations listed in (A) and (B) below.
5

2. The breakeven point is a useful diagnostic tool. Theoretically,
knowing where a company’s breakeven point is is not relevant in an
evaluation of alternative courses of action. Any specific action that
management is considering should be evaluated in terms of its effect
on the profits of the firm, and there is no logical reason why this
evaluation should be influenced by whether or not the firm is oper
ating at a loss. As a practical matter, however, a knowledge of where
the breakeven point lies can be quite helpful to management in de
termining the need for action. Businessmen are neither completely
rational nor are they persistently logical. Certain desirable expendi
tures (particularly programmed or managed costs such as advertising
and promotion, preventive maintenance, and research and develop
ment) are often incurred during a period of profitable operations, but
are curtailed in opposite situations. To the theoretician, drastic re
visions in the level of programmed costs may appear irrational, but to
the businessman it is simply a matter of survival. Business manage
ment involves more than making a series of discreet, optimal decisions.
Data on which decisions are based are often hazy projections at best,
and the wise manager employs the cautious test of overall profitability
in determining whether or not a company can “afford” to undertake
certain programs.
3. Breakeven analysis is a useful method for considering the risk
implications of alternative actions. Careful quantitative analysis of
alternatives is an extremely useful way of comparing the net effect on
profitability of those factors which can be measured. Alternatives,
however, involve not only different expected profits but also different
degrees of risk—an elusive, almost unmeasurable factor that must be
considered in reaching a final decision. One way that a businessman
can approach the problem of risk evaluation is to observe the effects of
the alternatives on his breakeven point. One alternative may lower
the variable costs and thus widen the contribution per unit on sales,
but only at the expense of incurring higher fixed costs. Another alter
native might permit lower fixed costs but only through increasing
variable costs and narrowing the contribution margin. The relative
attractiveness of the two alternatives cannot be measured in terms of
profit alone. The first alternative may be more profitable, although it
entails more risk. Comparing alternatives in terms of their effect on
the breakeven point of a firm is useful in making a decision.
4. Breakeven point analysis provides the basic data for further
profit-improvement studies. This last point may be the most important
6
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advantage, even though it has nothing to do with the usefulness of
preparing a breakeven chart. A breakeven chart cannot be prepared
until the total costs of the firm have been broken into their fixed and
variable components. Even though the resulting chart may be of
little specific value, the detailed analytical data required are a useful
starting point for subsequent investigations. Viewed in this way, a
breakeven chart is not the end product of a fixed-variable cost anal
ysis but merely a presentation of the revised cost data.
Against these advantages, two important limitations of breakeven
point analysis should be noted:
A. The breakeven chart is a static measure of a dynamic process;
that is, it is a picture of the cost and profit structure of a company at
a given point in time. While it may present a true picture of a situa
tion at a specific point in time, the chart may not be very useful for
predicting what the situation will be like in future time periods. For
example, the revenue line on a breakeven chart illustrates how the
total sales revenue grows as the number of units sold increases. For
example, Exhibit 3 (page 4) indicates that Radnor’s $2 million sales
volume was the cumulative effect of selling 50,000 units, one-by-one,
at a price of $40 each. However, there is usually a relationship between
price and volume, and the chart does not recognize this relationship.
It does not, for example, indicate what the effect would be of selling
55,000 units at $38 each ( although the effect of such a change could
easily be measured by drawing another revenue line). The cost lines
on a breakeven chart are also static; they show what the variable cost
per unit and the total fixed costs were during one historical time pe
riod. These lines do not necessarily predict what the cost will be in
the future. Costs are almost sure to change either because of the un
expected effects of changing volume or because of the planned action
of management to improve profit results by spending more or less
money for certain expenses.
B. The breakeven point is difficult to determine for multi-product
firms. Few companies produce only a single product such as the
Radnor Corporation. For multi-product firms, the breakeven point is
hard to determine because the base line on the chart cannot be in
terms of number of units. It must deal in terms of equivalent units
(with some factor for converting units of one product into units of
another) or in some measure of plant capacity such as direct labor
hours. Further, different products earn different profits. The pin
7

pointing of a breakeven point must therefore assume some specific
product mix. For a two-product firm it may be possible to measure
the breakeven point in terms of the combined sales of both products,
but the breakeven point would be lower if more of those sales were of
a higher-profit item, or it would be higher if the product mix assump
tion were weighted in favor of a lower-profit product. The product
mix assumption is another example of the danger of using static, his
torical analysis to extrapolate a future situation, particularly when the
product mix is almost certain to change.
In summary, breakeven analysis is frequently a useful place to
begin an examination of the cost-price-volume relationship of a par
ticular company. For the CPA-advisor, a breakeven chart may be the
first tangible product which can be shown to management as a result
of his analysis. The ultimate value of this analytical tool depends
primarily on how well management understands the assumptions
built into the determination of the breakeven point, and the subse
quent use that it makes of the detailed data in evaluating the alterna
tive courses of action.

Contribution Pricing
The value of variable cost information for pricing purposes may be
illustrated by observing the way that Radnor Corporation’s manage
ment might evaluate an offer from an exporting firm to buy 5,000 units
for shipment to South Africa at a price of $30 each. (The ordinary
competitive considerations of upsetting the price structure in a do
mestic market, and the potential legal problems of discriminatory
pricing, may be ignored in this situation.) Radnor Corporation must
decide to accept or reject the offer based primarily upon its effect on
profitability. The cost data shown in the Income Statement in Exhibit
1 (page 2) are not useful in evaluating such a proposal. Factory cost
of $32 per unit is a mixture of both fixed and variable costs, and would
be an inaccurate measure for predicting the cost of accepting the order.
The variable cost data shown in Exhibit 2 (page 3), however, are in
dicative of the effect of accepting the order.
Selling price of foreign order
Variable cost per unit
Contribution per unit
Total contribution (and increase
in net profit) on 5,000 units
8

$

30.00
25.00

$

5.00

$25,000.00
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Profits would be increased by $25,000 with the special order because
each of the 5,000 additional units earns a contribution of $5.00.
Pricing based on variable costs, sometimes called “contribution
pricing,” has been widely discussed in accounting literature.1 The
general theory of contribution pricing is that it will be more profitable
for a firm to accept an order which yields a contribution than to reject
the order. This theory is logical, and is also extremely simple to illus
trate. However, this theory is difficult to apply in practice.
Perhaps the most common argument against contribution pricing is
the equally irrefutable, and eminently practical, observation that if all
products are priced to yield only a contribution to overhead, there may
not be a sufficient profit margin to cover all of the fixed costs of the
business. Stated in terms of a single product, the selling price must be
higher than the total cost per unit if the company is to generate a
profit. Both statements, the theoretical and the practical, are true;
neither by itself is of much specific value in reaching a decision on a
specific pricing action. For special order, such as Radnor’s sale to
South Africa, contribution analysis is a valuable tool for handling the
costs and revenues that would be affected by the decision. This simple
analysis, however, does not reveal whether or not it would be wise for
Radnor to hold out for a price of $31 or $32 per unit. Ways of dealing
with this question, and other problems involved in pricing special
orders or custom products, are discussed in the last section of this text.
The immediate concern of this section lies in the pricing of “proprie
tary” products, products designed by the manufacturer and sold
through traditional marketing channels. Suppose that the proposal
that Radnor Corporation received had come from a wholesaler in one
of its regular domestic markets—a proposal in the form of an implica
tion that if Radnor did not wish to fill the order at the $30 price, the
wholesaler would find another manufacturer who would accept the
order. In terms of the economics of contribution analysis, this proposal
is no different from the South Africa proposal. As a practical matter,
however, the situation differs radically because the wholesaler’s pro
posal strikes at the very roots of Radnor’s $40 domestic price. Al
though the theory of contribution pricing is not inoperative in evalu
ating the wholesaler’s proposal, it is much harder to apply in such
situations. The difficulty arises not because of any weaknesses in
theory, but because of the difficulty of taking into account all of the
ramifications of granting a special price to one customer. First, such a
1References 4 and 7 in the Bibliography discuss this subject at some length.
9

pricing action might be construed as a violation of the RobinsonPatman Act, or other legislation prohibiting discriminatory pricing.
Even if the price concession took the form of a quantity discount that
was made available to all large volume purchases, the new pricing
policy could trigger a chain reaction of events. For example, other
wholesalers and distributors may decide to bulk their purchases in
order to qualify for the discount; Radnor’s competitors may feel
compelled to meet Radnor’s lower price; at lower prices, consumers
would probably buy more vacuum cleaners, if only because it would
be relatively less attractive to hire repairmen to maintain their existing
cleaners; and finally, Radnor’s plant capacity may prove to be inade
quate to meet the requirements of an expanded market, with the
result that additional facilities would have to be built. The net effect
of this complex series of events would be extremely difficult to predict.
The point is that a simple contribution analysis is not all inclusive in
determining whether a special quantity discount policy should be
initiated.
The value of contribution pricing as an analytical tool is no greater
than the adequacy and validity of the predictions which must be made
about the future. It is difficult to predict how competitors and con
sumers will react to a price change. It is also difficult to predict what
the variable costs of production will be in the future, particularly if
the pricing action being considered requires a change in the quantity
of productive facilities required. One of the dangers of contribution
pricing is that it may not be explicit enough in requiring a considera
tion of the important indirect effects that result from a pricing decision.
One way to overcome this potential disadvantage is to use the clas
sical approach (discussed below) of comparing marginal revenue to
marginal costs.

The Price-Volume Relationship
After deciding to reject the South African order, Radnor’s manage
ment decided to evaluate the advisability of reducing its price by $1.00
per unit, w hich represents a price cut of 2 ½ per cent. A fter allowing

for the possibility that some or all of their competitors will match the
price reduction, Radnor’s executives believe that the lower price will
be sufficiently attractive to consumers to increase Radnor’s volume by
4 per cent to 52,000 units per year. The various ways that Radnor’s
management analyzed this pricing action are described below.
The possibility of selling 2,000 additional units at a price of $39
might appear attractive when compared to variable costs of $25 per
10
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unit. However, it must be recognized that it will not be possible to
grant the price reduction solely to new customers. Existing customers
will also share in the lower price. Exhibit 4 summarizes the relevant
figures in terms of cost and revenue per unit.
Exhibit 4
RADNOR CORPORATION
Marginal Analysis of a One Dollar Price Reduction
Marginal revenue
Revenue at a $40 price (50,000 units)
Revenue at a $39 price (52,000 units)

$2,000,000
2,028,000

Added revenue

$

$28,000 additional revenue
Average marginal revenue: -------------------------------------- =
2,000 additional units
Marginal cost —Variable cost (from Exhibit 2)

28,000

$14
$25

Although the price cut will increase sales revenue by $28,000, this
amounts to only $14 per unit on the additional 2,000 units sold. The
increase in revenue, when compared to variable costs of $25, indicates
that the price reduction would not increase Radnor’s profits.
In reaching this conclusion, a careful analysis of variable costs and
the effect that a 4 per cent volume change might have on the utiliza
tion of productive facilities must be made. As noted in Bulletin No. 1,
labor costs are not always strictly variable. Possibly, Radnor’s existing
labor force could generate a small increase in production without a
proportional rise in costs. On the other hand, at some point the in
crease in production costs might be more than proportionate because
of the necessity of adding increments to certain fixed elements of
expense in the plant.
At this point the primary concern is the effect of the pricing action
on revenue. The $28,000 increase is the net effect of two opposing
forces:
Revenue from added sales: 2,000 units @ $39
Less: loss in sales revenue on existing volume
50,000 units sold for $1 per unit less
Net increase in revenue

$78,000
50,000
$28,000

Since the net additional revenue is inadequate to cover marginal
costs, the price reduction should not be implemented. In terms of
11

classical economic theory, the optimal price is the price at which
marginal revenue equals marginal cost; that is, neither a price reduc
tion nor a price increase would yield an average marginal revenue
higher than marginal cost.2 A lower price for Radnor yields no profit
improvement, but suggests that the company explore the effect of a
small price increase.
Analyzing the expected effects of a potential price change in terms
of marginal revenue has the important advantage of forcing an
explicit consideration of the change in volume that will occur as a
result of the price change. The price-volume relationship (the
“demand function”) is the most critical factor to weigh in evaluating
a pricing decision. Making such an estimate is frequently difficult,
and an alternative approach is to determine the breakeven volume
that will be necessary if the company is to earn the same amount of
profit at the new price as it earned at the old price. In Radnor’s case,
the company earns a $750,000 contribution at a $40 price. If the price
were cut to $39, the contribution per unit would be $14.3 The company
would then have to sell 53,571 units

$750,000 total contribution
$14 contribution per unit

in order to earn the same profit. It might be difficult for Radnor’s
executives to specify just what the effect of a 2½ per cent price cut
would be, but they might find it easier to make a decision if they
realized that such a price cut could increase profits only if it resulted
in an increase in volume of more than 7 per cent.

Summary
Changing the price of a proprietary product is a subject that has
received a great deal of attention both from theoretical economists
and practical businessmen. The reason for this attention is obvious:
Management’s pricing actions on such products have an appealingly
direct impact on profits. But the impact is not always favorable, and
the results of a price change may be so difficult to predict that pricing
decisions are one of the most risky types of decisions that manage
ment may be called upon to make. Careful cost analysis is a manda
2 The reader wishing to review his knowledge on economic theory is
referred to item 6 in the Bibliography.
3 This $14 is the $15 shown in Exhibit 2, reduced by the $1 price cut; it
is only coincidental that the marginal revenue in Exhibit 4 was also $14.
12
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tory step in evaluating pricing actions, but the problem of predicting
the price-volume relationship still remains. Because of the risk and
difficulty in initiating intelligent price changes, many businesses, par
ticularly smaller businesses, try to avoid direct pricing actions as a
form of competition in the sale of proprietary products or services.
Competition today takes the less direct forms of customer service,
advertising and promotion, and product design. As the discussion
of these topics in the next two sections will illustrate, the type of
economic analysis that is essential for intelligent decision making in
these areas is quite similar to that illustrated above in the evaluation
of direct pricing actions.

DISTRIBUTION COSTS
The critical importance of the effective management of selling and
distribution costs in a successful business requires little documenta
tion. The fact that businesses in the United States spend $13 billion
a year on advertising is fairly conclusive evidence that many business
men believe these expenditures are justified in improving the profit
ability of their companies. But how does a company decide how
much to spend on advertising? To some extent, as with direct pricing
actions, decisions regarding advertising expenditures are influenced
by the competitive situation; a cigarette manufacturer who did no
advertising might never be able to build a market for his product.
But the variation in the practices of individual competitors is much
greater in the area of advertising expenditures than in the area of
product prices. One company might spend significantly more or less
for advertising than one of its competitors; although it is almost im
possible to justify this difference and to observe its impact on corpo
rate profits.
Theoretically, of course, it is possible to determine with great
precision the optimal amount that a company should spend for its
advertising. The advertising budget should be increased to the point
where the last dollar spent will sell just enough additional units
to produce an additional contribution of $1; that is, marginal revenue
will equal marginal cost. The fact that this convenient rule is not
widely used in evaluating advertising expenditures is not due to
ignorance on the part of advertising executives. It is due to the im
possibility of getting precise measurements of the effectiveness of
most advertising expenditures.
13

Despite these problems, the degree of sophistication in the manage
ment of distribution costs is rapidly increasing. Although the analyt
ical tools to be used may never be applied with the same precision
as in the management of manufacturing costs, the value of better
decisions is just as important in one area as it is in the other. The
CPA who acts as an advisor to management is expected to bring a
high level of technical skill to the analysis of manufacturing costs.
But the need for analytical skill may be even greater in the distribu
tion cost area, and the CPA should not retreat from this challenging
problem simply because less precision is possible. Competent, pro
fessional analysis may be of great help to management in this area by
narrowing the range of feasible alternatives, and by focusing manage
ment’s attention on the critical factors that influence their decisions.
The professional advisor who can do no more than this still has
contributed greatly.

Types of Demand-Creating Costs
Using a term such as “demand-creating costs” rather than “distribu
tion costs” permits a broader definition of the costs considered to be
relevant for management analysis and action. Demand-creating costs
include all the traditional distribution costs such as salesmen’s salaries
and commissions, advertising and promotional expenses, samples and
premiums, entertainment, and so forth. However, another group of
costs, frequently of greater importance, may not appear on the Income
Statement at all: the costs (and profits) charged by wholesalers,
distributors, and retailers for performing the function of selling the
product to the ultimate consumer.
An example of the magnitude of a company’s demand-creating
cost can be illustrated in terms of the Radnor Corporation. The
Radnor Corporation’s expenditures for selling, general, and adminis
trative expenses amounted to $250,000 in 1964. This consists of
$150,000 of selling and promotional costs and $100,000 of plant over
head and other fixed costs. Radnor’s distribution network involves
selling vacuum cleaners to wholesalers for $40. Wholesalers, in turn,
sell to retailers at a price of $47, and retailers typically charge con
sumers a price of $80. Thus, the retail value of Radnor’s sales is $4
million, of which $2,150,000 is “spent” for demand-creating costs. It
is easy to overlook the $2 million in distribution margins paid by this
company on the grounds that Radnor’s management has no control
over prices charged by wholesalers and retailers, that Radnor Cor
14
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poration is a manufacturer and that its customers are the wholesalers.
Such statements are true in terms of the way the company currently
markets its products, but blind acceptance of the status quo is not
the most suitable way to begin an analysis of distribution costs. For
example, one of Radnor’s more successful competitors, the Electrolux
Corporation, receives the full retail price on its sales by distributing
the product through company employed door-to-door salesmen. The
management of Electrolux recognizes that demand-creating costs are
its greatest area of expense; why should Radnor’s management not
admit that the same situation exists?
Viewed in this manner, marketing and distribution costs become
more important than manufacturing costs for many businesses. As
with manufacturing costs, some demand-creating costs are fixed over
wide ranges of volume while others are variable, depending upon
the quantity of product sold. In the case of the Radnor Corporation,
the fixed costs amount to $150,000 per year while the variable costs
amount to $40 per unit. The question that management must ask
itself about these costs is the same question asked in the more techni
cal area of manufacturing costs: Are these costs being spent in an
efficient manner which yields more than a dollar of contribution for
each dollar of cost incurred?

The Cost-Volume Relationship
As the above question implies, a useful way to approach the
analysis of demand-creating costs is in terms of the impact on profits
that would result from changing certain elements of expense. The
Radnor Corporation serves as an example (Exhibit 2) to explore the
three general kinds of action that management might undertake to
improve profits through better utilization of its demand-creating
expenditures.
Changes in programmed costs. One way that Radnor might improve
its profitability would be to change the level of fixed costs incurred
by the company. Actually, the costs incurred for salesmen’s salaries,
advertising, and so forth, are not irrevocably fixed; rather, they are
controlled, or programmed, by management decision. One action that
Radnor’s management might take would be to increase its advertising
expenditures with the expectation that the resulting increase in
volume would fully cover the additional costs involved. An analysis
of the profit effects of this action is shown in Exhibit 5 (page 16).
15

Exhibit 5
RADNOR CORPORATION
Effect of Increased Programmed Costs
1. Assumptions: A $50,000 advertising campaign would result in the sale
of 5,000 additional units at the regular price of $40.
2. Contribution Analysis:
Additional contribution (50,000 units at $15 each)
Additional programmed costs
Net increase in contribution and profit

$75,000
50,000
$25,000

3. Breakeven Point Analysis:
a. Effect on company breakeven point
Total fixed costs $600,000 plus $50,000 = $650,000
Contribution per unit (no change) $15
$650,000 total
Breakeven point
----------= 43,333 units
$15 per unit
b. Additional volume required to
breakeven on this proposal
$50,000 added costs
$15 contribution per unit
3,333 units

The wisdom of an increased advertising expenditure is determined
by (1) the additional volume generated, and (2) the contribution
per unit on the additional volume. If Radnor assumes that a $50,000
expenditure would result in the sale of 5,000 additional units, the
campaign would produce a profit increase of $25,000. In terms of
the company’s breakeven point, 3,333 additional units would have to
be sold in order to cover the costs of the campaign. Management
should not initiate the campaign unless it believes that such a new
volume can be obtained.
Changing variable costs. As an alternative proposal, Radnor’s man
agement might consider a change in its variable costs. There are
many ways to do this, but the proposal analyzed in Exhibit 6
assumes that the company would give its retailers an advertising
allowance of $1 per unit sold.

16
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Exhibit 6
RADNOR CORPORATION
Effect of Increased Variable Costs
1. Assumptions: An “advertising allowance” of $1 per unit, given direct to
retail dealers, would result in the sale of 5,000 additional units at the
regular price of $40.
2. Contribution Analysis:
New contribution per unit of $14 ($40 less $26)
times 55,000 units
Old contribution per unit of $15
times 50,000 units
Net increase in contribution and profit
3. Breakeven Point Analysis:
a. Effect on company breakeven point
Total fixed costs (no change)
Contribution per unit ($40 less $26)
$600,000 total
Breakeven point
-----------—
$14 per unit
b. Additional volume required to breakeven
on this proposal
Units required to earn $750,000 contribu
$750,000
= 53,571
tion at $14 per unit
$14
Units required to earn $750,000 contribu
tion currently (at $15 each)
50,000

$770,000
750,000
$ 20,000

$600,000
$14
42,857 units

Number of new units required to earn the
same profit
3,571

Superficially, the cost of this program appears to be the same as that
of the advertising campaign because the advertising allowance would
also amount to $50,000 based on the volume sold in 1964. As Exhibit
6 shows, however, the economics work out differently for this
proposal.
If the advertising allowance to dealers produces an additional
volume of 5,000 units, the profits of the company would be increased
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by $20,000. Again, the breakeven analysis is a useful way to put the
problem into perspective. Initiating an advertising allowance would
increase Radnor’s breakeven point, although not quite as much as
a $50,000 advertising campaign. In this sense, the advertising allow
ance involves less risk because it increases the variable costs rather
than the fixed costs. On the other hand, Radnor would have to sell
a few more units under the advertising allowance program in order
to make the same profit as it made in 1964.
Which of these two proposals is the more attractive? Certainly
the analyses shown in Exhibits 5 and 6 (pages 16 and 17) do not pro
vide a precise answer. Management’s decision must be based on more
than a careful examination of the cost-volume relationships of the two
proposals. An effective advertising campaign, for example, may create
additional sales revenue, and also create longer lasting effects by estab
lishing the company’s brand name more firmly in the minds of con
sumers. The advertising allowance program, on the other hand, may
endear Radnor Corporation to its retailers with resulting beneficial side
effects that cannot be measured in terms of sales volume alone. The
final decision, would, no doubt, be highly subjective, but the analyses
shown in Exhibit 5 and 6 would be of value to management as it
approaches this difficult decision.
Trade-offs of fixed and variable costs. Another way of improving
the efficiency of demand-creating expenditures is to substitute fixed
costs for variable costs, or vice versa. For example, Radnor might
consider the advisability of using company-owned branch offices
instead of wholesale distributors. The analysis shown in Exhibit 7
(page 19) assumes that the branch offices would entail an annual fixed
cost of $250,000, plus variable costs of $1 per unit sold, but that the
company would be able to avoid “paying” the mark-up of $7 per unit
which its wholesalers now receive.
As the analysis indicates, this proposal seems attractive. At exist
ing volume levels, the company would earn an additional profit of
$50,000 per year. The project has Only a negligible effect on the
company’s breakeven point; in fact, the total volume sold could
decline by 2,381 units without decreasing the company’s profit below
the level realized in 1964.
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Exhibit 7
RADNOR CORPORATION
Effect of Substituting Fixed Costs for Variable Costs
1. Assumptions: A group of company-owned branch offices could be
established to replace the existing independent wholesale distributors.
Vacuum cleaners could be sold direct to retailers for $47 (the same
price wholesalers now charge). The branch offices would cost $250,000
per year for fixed expenses, plus $1 per unit sold.
2. Contribution Analysis:
New distribution system:
Contribution per unit ($47 less $26) = $21
Total contribution on 50,000 units
Less fixed costs ($600,000 plus $250,000)
Profit before taxes
Old distribution system:
Profit before taxes
Net increase in profit

$1,050,000
850,000
$ 200,000
150,000
$

50,000

3. Breakeven Point Analysis:
a. Effect on company breakeven point:
Total fixed costs ($600,000 plus $250,000)
$ 850,000
Contribution per unit ($47 less $26)
$
21
$850,000
40,476
Breakeven point
units
$21 per unit
b. Additional volume required to break even on
this proposal:
New units required to earn contribution of $150,000 in
$850,000 + $150,000
= 47,619
excess of fixed costs =
$21 per unit
Old units required to earn contribution of $150,000 in
$600,000 + $150,000
excess of fixed costs = ----------------—-------- =50,000
$15 per unit
units
Volume reduction possible without suffering loss of
profit
(2,381)
units

The interesting aspect of this proposal is that it assumes that there
will be no change in the number of units sold. Such an assumption
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might be valid, but if the existing distributors are well entrenched
there might be a temporary loss in volume. In addition, this proposal
involves substantial risks about the accuracy of the cost estimates.
Establishment of a series of branch offices involves more than merely
spending money. New personnel to staff the branch offices must be
found and trained. The program could not be accomplished over
night, and during the interim period the existing wholesalers might
lose interest in selling Radnor’s product. Furthermore, if all of these
hidden costs were taken into account, the proposal might be rejected.
However, the proposal could make a good long-term objective for
the company. Once again, quantitative analysis in the distribution
cost area is rarely conclusive.

Summary
The efficient utilization of expenditures intended to stimulate
product demand is a subject of increasing importance for manage
ment. While direct pricing actions are an obvious form of competition,
such actions may be extremely hazardous. Nonprice methods of
competition, including advertising and promotion, salesmen’s com
pensation, channels of distribution, and all the other aspects of a
company’s “marketing mix,” can also be effective ways to improve
profits. The above analyses illustrate that the analytical techniques
appropriate for evaluating either price or cost changes are virtually
identical; in order to evaluate either type of change, it is necessary
to explicitly estimate the effect that the change will have on volume.
Holding the selling price at a constant (or competitive) level does
not actually simplify the analytical problem; the inexorable profit
equation described by the interrelationship of costs, prices, and vol
ume must still be solved.
Discussion of “demand-creating” costs has encompassed a rather
broad group of business expenditures. However, the most significant
factor in the creation of demand, the product itself, has been ignored.
This is the subject of the next section.
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PRODUCT DESIGN AND
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO DEMAND
One important class of product pricing problems frequently cannot
be solved by even the most sophisticated cost analysis. A broader
view of the problem may indicate that the trouble is not in an in
efficient manufacturing process, but in a product design that is not
closely tailored to the market being sought. The best example of
the importance of product design is probably the automobile industry,
in which a manufacturer first selects a price category in which the
car will compete, and then designs a product which can be produced
to yield a profit at the “target price.” The theoretical solution to this
problem is essentially the same as the solution previously described
for products in which the characteristics of the product were fixed
and the price was the controllable variable which would determine
the volume sold. For products designed to meet a target price, how
ever, product costs become the controllable variable, based on the
assumption that the greater the value of the product, the greater the
demand will be. The analyst working on a pricing problem should
carefully consider management’s ability to vary the design of its
product as a way to influence demand and improve profitability.
As with product design, the quality of a product can have a
significant influence on product costs and on the demand for the
product in the marketplace. The illusive nature of cost classifications
is illustrated as follows. No one would disagree that the cost of a
steering wheel is a part of the “product cost” of a car, or that advertis
ing is a “demand-creating” cost; but what about the chrome-plated
horn ring on the steering wheel? And how should the cost of the
horn ring be classified if management decides to use stainless steel
rather than chrome? While there are many situations in which factors
of design and quality are largely controlled by the marketplace, the
analyst should be aware that there are also many situations in which
these two factors may be even more important than price in determin
ing the profitability of a given product.
Viewed in this manner, product design, which includes the elements
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of style, quality, and quantity, is actually another major form of non
price competition. There are few competitive products that are
absolutely identical. Most manufacturers will endeavor to differentiate
their product one way or another. Some differences may be only
negligible (style or finishing differences), while others may be of a
more substantial nature. The important matter is that these product
differences, which often involve differences in the cost of creating
the product, are not always reflected in the price charged to the
consumer. Thus product cost, which is an important element in the
cost-price-volume relationship, is adaptable to the same type of
analysis illustrated previously for product price and distribution costs.

The Marginal Cost of Design Changes
The analysis of product costs can be illustrated by the example
of the Radnor Corporation. Radnor’s management is considering the
advisability of approving a change in the product design which would
result in increased variable costs of $1 per unit. If the change were
adopted, Radnor would not increase its price; but it would expect
that the higher quality product would find better market acceptance
and that an additional 2,000 units per year could be sold. Exhibit 8
(page 23) analyzes the profitability of this proposal.
Exhibit 8 requires no explanation, although two points should be
noted. First, there is an analogy between the calculation of marginal
cost in this example and the calculation of marginal revenue for the
proposed price change analyzed in Exhibit 4 (page 11). The design
change cannot be incorporated only into the additional 2,000 units that
will be sold; the extra $1 per unit must also be spent on the present
volume of 50,000 units. Thus, the marginal cost of the additional 2,000
units is not simply the $25 of variable costs shown in Exhibit 2 (page
3) plus an additional $1 for the design modification. Rather, the
marginal cost is $51: $26 per unit because the entire $52,000 cost of
the design modification must be charged against the 2,000 additional
units which may be sold, plus the regular $25 per unit manufacturing
costs for those 2,000 units. As shown in Exhibit 8, this design modifica
tion would not be profitable for Radnor.
The second interesting thing to note from Exhibit 8 is that the
analysis there is similar in almost every respect to the analyses of
previous proposals in Exhibits 4 and 6 (see pages 11 and 17, respec
tively). Superficially, these three proposals are radically different: The
first involves a price reduction of $1 per unit; the second increases
22
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R adnor’s distribution costs by granting retail dealers an advertising
allowance of $1 per unit; and the third involves a $1 per unit increase
in the direct m anufacturing costs of th e product. H ow ever, each of
these proposals is essentially the same; R adnor proposes to reduce its
contribution per unit by $1 w ith the expectation th at the resulting in
crease in volum e will im prove the com pany’s profitability. Each of
these proposals has the same effect on R adnor’s breakeven point, and
each requires the same increase in volume in order for R adnor to earn
the same am ount of profit it earned in 1964. A lthough it w ould be
possible for R adnor’s m anagem ent to adopt all three proposals at the
same tim e, m anagem ent m ight (appropriately) consider th at such a

Exhibit 8
RADNOR CORPORATION
Effect of a Design Change Involving Higher Variable Costs
1. Assumptions: A design modification resulting in substantially higher
product quality could be incorporated into the existing model, increas
ing variable costs by $1 per unit. Better consumer acceptance would
result in additional sales of 2,000 units per year.
2. Contribution Analysis:
New contribution per unit of $14 ($40 less $26)
times 52,000 units
Old contribution per unit of $15 times 50,000 units
Net decrease in contribution and profit
3. Breakeven Point Analysis:
a. Effect on company breakeven point
Total fixed costs (no change)
Contribution per unit ($40 less $26)
$600,000 total
Breakeven point
$14 per unit
b. Additional volume required to break even on this
proposal
Units required to earn $750,000 contribution at
$750,000
$14
Units required to earn $750,000 contribution cur
rently (at $15 each)
$14 per unit

Number of new units required to earn the same
profit

$728,000
750,000
$(22,000)

$600,000
$
14
42,857 units

53,571

50,000
3,571 units
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radical shift in its cost-price-volume structure would be an undesirable
risk. But analysis of the three proposals in a consistent manner might
make it much easier for Radnor’s management to select the one that
was most likely to succeed in terms of realizing the greatest volume
increase.

The Cost-Price Relationship
Differences in product design and product costs are frequently
passed on to the consumer in the form of price differentials. In fact,
the Sears Roebuck and Company catalog is a veritable textbook on
the economics of pricing product design differentials. Sears’ policy
is to offer “good,” “better,” and “best” items in many of its product
categories. The design features of each product are described in
great detail so that the careful, rational buyer may select the pricedesign combination that best suits his needs. It is worthwhile to
reflect how difficult it must be for Sears to price these items in such
a way as to yield the greatest profit for the company.
Such pricing decisions are really just another exercise in the analysis
of cost-price-volume relationships. The Radnor Corporation will serve
to illustrate the point. The engineering department has proposed that
a new feature be added to Radnor’s vacuum cleaner. Research and
development necessary to refine the idea into a workable feature and
to re-tool the production line will cost $100,000. The modified prod
uct (incorporating the feature) will not cost any more to manufac
ture. Radnor would not be able to patent the idea; thus its manage
ment expects that their competitors will also adopt the featu re within
a year. The advantage in developing the idea is that during the year
before its competitors perfect the same innovation, Radnor’s product
would be unique; thus the company may (1) either charge a higher
price, (2) sell more units, or (3) some combination of the two. Exhibit
9 (page 25) analyzes this proposal with the assumption that this prod
uct advantage would be reaped in the form of a small price increase to
$41 per unit plus a volume increase to 52,000 units.
Using these assumptions, the proposed new feature does not appear
profitable. But knowing the company’s fixed and variable cost struc
ture makes it a simple matter to evaluate alternative ways of using
this product innovation. For example, Radnor’s management might
find it useful to try to “price out” the value of this new feature to a
consumer. Would the consumer be willing to pay 5 per cent more
for a vacuum cleaner incorporating this feature? If so, Radnor could
24
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Exhibit 9
RADNOR CORPORATION
Effect of Adding a New Feature to the Product
1. Assumptions: The engineering department has an idea for a new prod
uct feature. It will cost $100,000 to develop the idea and re-tool the
production line, but the modified product (incorporating the feature)
will not cost any more to manufacture. Competitors will probably copy
the feature within a year. During that year a rise in price to $41 per
unit and an increase of 2,000 extra units is expected.
2. Contribution Analysis:
With new feature:
Contribution per unit ($41 less $25) = $16
Total contribution on 52,000 units
Less fixed costs ($600,000 plus $100,000 )

$832,000
700,000

Profit before taxes
W ithout new feature:
Profit before taxes

$132,000
150,000
$ 18,000

Net decrease in profit
3. Breakeven Point Analysis:
a. Effect on company breakeven point
Total fixed costs ($600,000 plus $100,000)
Contribution per unit ($41 less $25)
$700,000 total
Breakeven point
-----------------------$16 per unit
b. Additional volume required to break even
on the proposal:
Number of new units required to earn
$150,000

$850,000 total

$16 per unit
Number of old units required to earn
$150,000

$750,000 total
$15 per unit

$700,000
$16
43,750 units

53,125 units

50,000 units
3,125 units

raise its price to $42 and pay for the cost of developing the new
feature without requiring any increase in volume. In effect, $42 is a
breakeven price for this feature; it is the price that Radnor would
have to receive in order to breakeven on the development of the
feature without benefiting from any increase in volume. On the other
hand, Radnor could hold its price at $40 and attempt to capitalize
25

on the feature through a substantial volume increase. In any event,
the proposal is a risk because the $100,000 for development must
be spent against only an expectation that the feature will be suf
ficiently attractive to consumers to permit Radnor to recover its costs.
As in almost every such analysis, the prime value of the figure work
is in helping management obtain a better grasp on the profit require
ments and risks that the proposal entails.

Summary
Discussion thus far has been restricted to pricing and profitability
analyses of proprietary manufactured products, products for which the
manufacturer determines the product specifications, marketing
methods, and price which he will use in competing against similar
products offered by other manufacturers. This discussion is also
applicable to certain types of service industries. A retail laundry
service, for example, is analogous in many respects to a proprietary
manufacturer. Prices for certain high-volume items such as men’s dress
shirts may be established rather rigidly by local competition. Product
(service) differentials may be difficult to achieve, but such factors
as the quality of laundering, one-day service, free pickup and delivery,
and so forth, may involve cost differentials that can be justified only
in terms of the cost-volume relationship. As with a manufacturer,
useful profitability analyses for a service activity can be made only
after a careful investigation and classification of fixed and variable
costs.
Through a series of simple examples, the pervasive importance of
the inter-relationship between costs, prices, and volume has been
illustrated. Competition for the profitable manufacture and distribu
tion of proprietary products and services takes many forms. The CPA
whose client says to him that he “has a pricing problem” cannot ac
cept the client’s diagnosis. A CPA can help management to improve
product profitability only after a careful analysis of all three factors
in the profit equation.

PRICING CUSTOM PRODUCTS AND SPECIAL ORDERS
In contrast to the complex analysis that is almost unavoidable in
pricing proprietary products, there is one important class of problems
26
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in which the price of the product is the single most important vari
able. Competitive bidding is the most common example of this type
of pricing problem, but stated in more general terms, price assumes
paramount importance in any situation in which the customer specifies
the product characteristics (quantity and quality) and the major ser
vice requirements (delivery time). This definition is intended to be
broad enough to cover not only custom products, such as those pro
duced by machine shops, job printers, and building contractors, but
also to include special orders for proprietary products, such as Radnor’s
opportunity to sell their vacuum cleaners in South Africa, in which
the price quoted is the major factor in determining whether or not
the order is received.
The determination of product price is more important for custom
products than for proprietary products for at least two reasons. First,
because custom products are not standardized, management itself
must arrive at a new price for each product; prices cannot be set
simply by meeting the price offered by competitors for similar prod
ucts, because the competitor’s prices are not known. Second, price
is the most important method of competition in the manufacture of
custom products; competing by means of extremely effective distribu
tion policies or through product differentiation is impossible because
the physical characteristics and service requirements for the product
are specified by the customer. Similarly, manufacturing costs of cus
tom products are primarily determined by the customer, not by
management. With one element of the cost-price-volume equation
thus determined, management’s primary tool for influencing profit
ability is through its manipulation of the price-volume relationship.
Another important characteristic of pricing custom products is the
frequency with which such decisions must be made. A small machine
shop or job printer, for example, may find it necessary to prepare a
dozen or more price quotations every day, and the sheer volume of
work precludes the possibility of making a detailed analysis before
reaching each decision. Instead, pricing policies, or bidding formulas,
are established as a way of routinizing the task of determination.
The discussion below, therefore, is divided into two parts. The first
part deals with the type of analysis that would be theoretically appro
priate for the determination of optim al prices for custom products,
and the second part deals with the practical problems of establishing
pricing policies which may be used to arrive at individual pricing
decisions with a minimum amount of analysis.
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Competitive Bids
In order to illustrate theoretically the proper way to determine a
competitive bid, a simple example of a small, job-order machine shop
will be utilized. The Robinson Company employs half a dozen
machinists who use general-purpose equipment to turn out small
metal parts according to customer specifications. A potential customer
has asked Robinson to quote a price for manufacturing 30 steel pipefittings of a unique design, as specified by the blueprint submitted.
W hat price should Robinson quote?
Contribution pricing. It is a fairly simple matter to determine the
minimum price that Robinson should charge for this order: The price
must exceed the variable costs that would be incurred in manufactur
ing the parts. Thus, as in most types of pricing decisions, the first
step involves cost analysis. By examining the blueprint, Mr. Robinson
determines that the fittings will require $10.25 worth of raw materials
and that the machining will take about 1½ hours. The wage rate
(including payroll taxes) for the machinist is $2.50 per hour, indicat
ing a total labor cost of $3.75 and a total variable cost for labor and
materials of $14 per unit. Frequently, labor costs are relatively fixed
expenses because of the difficulty of hiring and firing skilled workers,
but in Mr. Robinson’s case one of his machinists is employed on a
part-time basis as needed.
As in the case of the Radnor Corporation’s South African order, it
is easy to prove that at any price exceeding $14 the Robinson Company
would be better off (more profitable) with this order than without it,
if the capacity could not be used more profitably on other jobs. A
price of $15, for example, would contribute $1 to overhead and profit
that the company would not otherwise receive. But it is also obvious
that Robinson would be better off having this order at a price of $16
than at $15. The question that Mr. Robinson must answer is not,
“What is the minimum price?” but rather, “What is the most profitable
price to charge?” While this latter question is very difficult to answer,
it is unfortunately true that finding an answer to the first, easier ques
tion is not very helpful. In the Robinson Company, as in most com
panies, variable costs are usually substantially lower than selling
prices. While variable costs are important, they are only one element
in the determination of a profitable price.
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The price-volume relationship. W hat is the most profitable price
for Robinson to quote on this order? The answer, of course, is the
highest possible price (above $14) that would still be successful in
getting the order. A $30 price would be much more profitable than a
$20 price, but Mr. Robinson knows that one of his competitors would
almost surely bid less than $30. Thus a price quotation of $30 would
yield no profit at all because Mr. Robinson would lose the order. In
theory, nevertheless, the solution to Mr. Robinson’s complex problem
is quite analogous to the solution found earlier for the manufacture
of a proprietary product: The most profitable price is the price that
yields the largest total contribution to overhead and profit. For the
proprietary manufacturer, this means setting a price at which the
contribution per unit times the number of units that can be sold at
that price yields a larger total contribution than any other combination
of contribution and volume. For the manufacturer of a custom product
like the Robinson Company, the best price is that price at which the
contribution per order received times the number of orders received
yields more total dollars of contribution than any other combination
of contribution and volume. The important distinction between these
two types of manufacturers is that the price-volume relationship is
much more explicit for standardized products. The proprietary manu
facturer who raises his price by 3 per cent may see his volume fall by
5 per cent, but the custom product manufacturer who raises his price
by 3 per cent will either win the order at a more profitable price or
lose it completely. Analyzing the effect of the price-volume relation
ship for a custom producer, therefore, requires the utilization of the
analytical technique described below.
The concept of expected profit. One way of developing the pricevolume relationship on custom orders is to make explicit estimates of
the likelihood of winning the order at any given price. For example,
Mr. Robinson might believe that he is “almost certain” to receive the
order for the steel fittings if he quotes a price of $16. If the Robinson
Company wins the order at a price of $16, it will earn a contribution
of $2; if it loses the order, it will earn no contribution. In Exhibit 10
(page 30) we have taken a weighted average of these two possibilities
on the assumption that there is a 95 per cent chance that the $16 price
would be successful.
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Exhibit 10
ROBINSON COMPANY
Evaluation of $16.00 Bid
Probability
of Event

Contribution at
a $16 Price

Win the order
Lose the order

.95
.05

$2.00
0

Totals

1.00

Event

Expected Profit
$1.90
0
$1.90

The “expected profit” of $1.90 at this price is not very meaningful
by itself, but it assumes added meaning when that profit is compared
with the profit expected at higher prices. Mr. Robinson knows that,
as he raises his price, the chances of his getting the order decline. The
CPA might ask Robinson to be explicit about what he thought his
chances would be at a variety of higher prices. Exhibit 11 then per
mits a profit comparison of the alternative bids.
Exhibit 11
ROBINSON COMPANY
Evaluation of Alternative Bids

Price
$16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
20.00
21.00
22.00

Probability of
Getting the Order

Contribution

Expected Profit

.95
.75
.60
.50
.40
.30
.20

$2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00

$1.90
2.25
2.40
2.50
2.40
2.10
1.60

What is the most profitable price for Mr. Robinson to quote on this
order? The answer, according to Exhibit 11, is $19.00. The reason that
$19.00 is a more profitable price than any other is that it offers the best
combination of (1) profit if the order is received, and (2) likelihood
that the order will be received. A $20.00 price would be more profit
able than an $18.00 price, but there is less chance that Robinson will
receive the order at that price; the chances of receiving the order at
an $18.00 price are greater than receiving it at a $20.00 price but
Robinson would not earn as much profit at the $18.00 price. The
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price-volume relationship is an important profit determinant, and the
analysis in Exhibit 11 is an attempt to measure the profit implications
of this interrelationship.
At this point it might be pointed out that, even though Exhibit 11
is designed to deal with the price-volume relationship, the result of
this analysis is importantly determined by product costs. The best
price was the one that yielded the largest expected contribution, not
the largest expected revenue. Thus, if the variable costs on this
order were $15.50 rather than $14.00 (and assuming that Mr. Robin
son’s probability estimates were not changed by this fact), the most
profitable price would be $20.00 rather than $19.00.
The use of mathematical probabilities as an aid to business decision
making has received increasing attention in recent years. The reader
who wishes to pursue the matter further might begin with Probability
and Statistics for Business Decisions by Schlaifer listed in the bibli
ography. Two further observations, however, are made here:
1. It is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain “accurate” probability
estimates that can be used for analytical purposes in the manner shown
in Exhibit 11. Likewise, it is also impossible to obtain accurate data
on the price-volume relationship for proprietary products. Neverthe
less, management must make pricing decisions. Subjective probability
estimates, based on management’s judgment and experience rather
than on historical “facts,” are just as useful for analytical purposes as
similar subjective estimates of the quantity of a proprietary product
that can be sold at various prices. Making such subjective, unprov
able estimates is an inevitable part of managerial decisions.
2. The great advantage in making explicit estimates, either about
the probability of receiving an order or of the quantity that will be
sold at a given price, is the improvement that such estimates permit
in the analysis and evaluation of alternative pricing actions. In the
simple example of the Robinson Company, Mr. Robinson might have
arrived at a $19.00 price without going through the analysis shown in
Exhibit 11, but in more complex situations, and particularly in situa
tions where the analysis of variable costs is complex, intuitive decision
making may be dangerous. The two-step decision process in which
management first estimates demand (or the probability of demand),
and then combines this estimate with the other economic factors in
order to evaluate the profitability of alternative pricing actions may
be more useful than the familiar intuitive approach.
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Pricing Policies
The analytical technique illustrated above, while theoretically ap
propriate, is too complex and detailed to be used for routine pricing
decisions. Instead, the usual approach is to develop a pricing formula
to calculate prices, with management occasionally intervening to
change the calculated price based on its experience and judgment.
In businesses where a large number of price quotations must be pre
pared, management’s most important pricing action is not the de
termination of individual prices but the determination of the formula
by which prices are computed.
Most pricing formulas for custom products involve an attempt to
measure the total cost of manufacturing the order and add a desired
mark-up for profit in order to arrive at a selling price. For example,
the pricing formula for the Robinson Company might look something
like the following:
Materials
Labor: 1½ hrs. @ $2.50

$10.25
3.75

Variable costs
Overhead @ 100% of labor

$14.00
3.75

Total costs
Profit @ 7% of total costs

$17.75
1.25

Selling price

$19.00

Pricing formulas involving an allocation of fixed costs to a specific
order are commonly known as full-cost pricing formulas. The argu
ment most frequently offered in defense of such formulas is that “each
order must bear its share of the fixed overhead in order to recover
overhead costs and earn a profit.” This argument is fallacious because
total fixed costs will not change as a result of volume fluctuations.
However, contribution pricing (using variable costs alone) is also
inadequate for pricing most custom products. The rationale for fullcost pricing, therefore, is not th a t it will in some m agical w ay insure

that the business covers its fixed costs, but rather that it is an extremely
practical tool for arriving at a competitive price quotation.
Suppose Mr. Robinson were bidding against only one competitor.
If he knew what the competitor’s bid was, it would be very easy for
Robinson to establish his own quote. Assuming a customer would
place an order with the lower bidder, Robinson should bid one cent
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lower than his competitor, and would have a 100 per cent chance of
receiving the order. That price would yield the highest “expected
profit” and Mr. Robinson would not need to make any elaborate
calculations to reach this conclusion. However, the competitor’s price
quotation is not usually known, and a full-cost pricing formula may
yield a reasonable approximation of the competitor’s bid.
The logical defense of full-cost pricing is based on the premise that,
over the long run in a free enterprise economy, an efficient producer
is able to make a reasonable profit by charging a price high enough
to more than cover his fixed and variable costs. When a producer uses
a full-cost pricing formula, therefore, he is implicitly assuming two
things: (1) that times are “normal,” that is, that there is neither a
shortage nor a surplus of capacity in his industry which might have a
short-run impact on profits, and (2) that his productive efficiency is
equal to that of his average competitor. The validity of both of these
assumptions may be subject to frequent and rapid revision, but when
they are valid, and when fixed costs are appropriately allocated to
products, a full cost formula will be sufficiently successful to win
enough orders at a competitive price to permit the producer to earn a
reasonable profit.
The following theoretical base on which full-cost pricing rests per
mits a recognition of several key factors that must be kept in mind in
an attempt to develop useful and practical pricing formulas:
1. Information about the industry. Because competitive pricing
cannot be done in a vacuum, it is important for management, as well
as its advisors, to have solid, current information about the industrial
environment in which the company is operating. Several types of in
dustry data are necessary before a practical, competitive pricing
formula can be designed. Management must be aware of current
economic conditions, for both the national economy and their par
ticular industry, nationally and locally, including such data as current
prices and price trends, the existence of excess capacity in the industry,
and the current state and rate of technological change in the industry.
Using this information, management must decide whether or not the
current, short-term economic situation requires the (temporary) modi
fication of its full-cost pricing formula. Data about the industry will
also permit management to evaluate its own productive efficiency
against that of its competitors; an inefficient producer will not be able
to charge a higher price simply because he needs it in order to cover
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his greater costs.4 Finally, through trade associations in some indus
tries, it may be possible to obtain information about competitors’
prices and their pricing formulas. When such information can be
obtained, it may prove invaluable to a company trying to revise its
own pricing formula to reflect the current situation.
2. Selecting bases for allocation. One of the requirements of a
full-cost pricing formula is that the fixed overhead be assigned to
products using one or more bases of allocation. Realizing that one of
the main purposes of allocating fixed costs is to aid in the determina
tion of a competitive price may make it easier to select the most
appropriate bases for allocation. Essentially, the goal of cost alloca
tion is to load against each product an appropriate share of the fixed
costs of the capacity that an efficient producer would have to incur in
the long-run to manufacture a product. Machine operating hours, for
example, are frequently a good basis for allocating the costs of the
equipment and related plant facilities. Another way of viewing the
allocation process is as a crude measure of the opportunity costs of
devoting the plant capacity to the manufacture of a particular product.
This does not represent an attempt to achieve a “fair” allocation of a par
ticular company’s historical costs, but rather to estimate what the costs
would be for the average efficient producer in an industry. The cost
allocation task is easier in industries where a fairly traditional pricing
pattern has developed. Where an industry pricing formula is avail
able, it should be adopted without regard to the company’s own level
of fixed costs, because a pricing formula leading to any other price
would probably be too high or too low. When no industry pattern is
available, each company must do its best to measure long-run produc
tion costs through the cost allocation device, although chaos sometimes
results.5
3. The volume assumption. Allocating fixed costs requires not only
the selection of a basis of allocation but also an assumption regarding
the volume of production over which the costs are to be spread. The
appropriate volume assumption to use provides a clear example of the
4 For an interesting article on this subject see Robert S. Schultz, “Profits,
Prices, and Excess Capacity,” Harvard Business Review, July-August 1963,
pp. 68-81.
5 For a readable article on this point, see Louis E. Newman, “Diseases
that Make Whole Industries Sick,” Harvard Business Review, March-April
1961, pp. 87-92.
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dangers of using historical or actual information about a specific com
pany rather than information based on the current competitive situa
tion. If, for example, a company expects that worsening competitive
conditions will cause its volume to drop within the next few months
to only 50 per cent of its capacity, that prediction does not mean that
the company should attempt to allocate its fixed costs over a smaller
volume base in an attempt to cover those costs at the lower volume.
Such an action would only increase the prices that the company was
attempting to charge during a period when prices will probably be
dropping. Similarly, in a period of expansion, the fact that a company
is operating at 100 per cent capacity does not mean that lower prices
should be charged simply because the fixed costs can be spread over
more units; if anything, prices should probably be raised during such a
period. The result is that the actual volume currently or prospectively
enjoyed by a company should not be built into its pricing formula.
Instead, the formula should be based on some estimate of normal or
standard volume which represents the approximate utilization of
capacity that an average efficient producer could expect to achieve
in the long run. This concept of standard volume, which would
normally be between 75 per cent and 95 per cent of capacity, will
rarely be appropriate for the economic circumstances that exist on any
one date, but it is probably the best figure that is available. Clearly,
trying to change the volume assumption to reflect current economic
circumstances only causes the pricing formula to produce results
(prices) that move in the wrong direction.
4. Adaptation to changing circumstances. The most important
aspect of pricing formulas is that they are made to be changed. The
measure of the success of a pricing formula is whether it works or not,
i.e., whether or not the company is successful in receiving a volume
of business which, in the eyes of management, is appropriate under
the economic circumstances that exist at a given point in time. If
the formula is not successful when measured by these standards, it
should be changed. Perhaps the best, and certainly the easiest, way
to modify a pricing formula is in terms of the profit allowance that is
added to the total costs. The profit allowance can be easily raised or
lowered, and has the effect of an across-the-board price reduction or
increase, with the amount of the change reflecting the current eco
nomic situation. Recognizing this need for continually reevaluating the
success of a pricing formula returns to the first point mentioned above:
management’s continuing quest for information about its industry.
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Pricing formulas are imperfect tools at best, but when carefully
developed by well informed management they can be vital tools for
increasing profits. The CPA can be useful to management in develop
ing pricing formulas for custom products in three ways: (1) gathering
industry and other environmental data in order to assist management
in adapting its pricing formula to the current situation, (2) analyzing
product costs and devising useful ways for allocating fixed costs at an
appropriate volume level against products, and (3) developing report
ing systems to aid management in keeping informed about the success
of its pricing mechanism, thus helping management to anticipate the
inevitable need for modifications.

Summary
Traditionally, management actions in the area of pricing and dis
tribution policies have been made on the basis of judgment and
intuition. One of the greatest services the CPA can perform for his
client is to increase the extent and quality of analysis that is brought
to bear on such decisions. Analysis cannot eliminate uncertainty about
the future, nor is it possible to eliminate the crucial factor of manage
ment judgment in making decisions. Nevertheless, it is possible to take
some of the guess work out of decision making by breaking complex
problems into smaller pieces. Most pricing problems are complex and
involve two distinct phases: (1) estimating the effect that a change in
product price and/or product cost will have upon the quantity of the
product that the company will be able to sell, and (2) calculating the
effect that this realignment of the company’s cost-price-volume struc
ture will have on its profits. Using this two-step approach to decision
making should be both professionally rewarding to the CPA and finan
cially profitable for his client.
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LIST OF CASES
The remainder of this bulletin consists of four case studies. The
cases are arranged roughly in order of increasing complexity in terms
of the amount of analysis required by the reader using the cases for
staff training purposes.
1. Utility Equipment Company. Pricing a special order for a pro
prietary product.
2. Bartlett Lithographers. Evaluating alternative prices, through
modifying the bidding formula, for a job order printing company.
3. Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc. Pricing problems in a service
organization with a high proportion of fixed costs.
4. Industrial Heating Equipment Co. Designing a control system to
aid management in evaluating and changing its pricing policies.
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Utility Equipment Co,
On March 1, 1962, Fred Hosmer, the President of Utility Equip
ment Co., a private owned manufacturer of pumps and hoists, re
ceived the following letter from National Paint Products, a large dis
tributor of industrial paints.
Dear Mr. Hosmer,
From time to time over the last ten years, National Paint Prod
ucts has offered valuable and useful items to its customers in the
form of sales premiums. For instance, last year we gave a set of
wrenches to each customer placing an order for over $100 worth of
paint during the months of June and July. These promotions have
been enthusiastically received by our customers.
It is our intention to offer another sales premium to our cus
tomers during November and December of this year. For this pur
pose we have selected three items ranging in wholesale price from
$8 to $12 which might be suitable for this forthcoming sales pro
motion. Included among these items, only one of which can be
selected as the premium, is your pump.
If you would like us to consider your pump for the premium
would you please submit to us, by April 1, a firm price per pump.
This price should include the costs of shipping the pumps from
your plant to our customers, the vast majority of whom are located
in the Midwest.
Should we adopt your pump as our premium, we would adver
tise it as a premium in those magazines which regularly carry our
advertisements. You would be named as the pump’s manufacturer.
Also, the value of the premium that would be displayed in these
advertisements would be your regular listed retail price.
Our sales department’s research staff has estimated that the most
likely demand for your pumps would be 10,000 units. Therefore, if
your pump was selected as the premium, we would guarantee to
purchase 8,000 pumps for delivery to our customers during Novem
ber and December. For your part, you would have to guarantee
that these 8,000 pumps would be completed by November 1 and
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that an additional 4,000 pumps could be provided, if needed, dur
ing the months of December and January. For any additional
pumps we might need, beyond this initial 12,000, you would be
given two months lead time.
It is not our policy to divulge the names of the other items being
considered as premiums for our sales promotion. Nor is it our
policy to reveal the prices paid for past premiums. However,
should you require any other information before submitting a
quote to us please feel free to contact Mr. Alvin Cresm of our
Wichita sales office.
Yours faithfully,
Harold Sykes
President

After reading National Paint’s letter, Mr. Hosmer believed he might
be interested in National Paint’s proposition but he was in a quandry
as to what price he should quote.
On March 2, Fred Hosmer phoned Peter Jenkins, a partner of Smith,
Adams, and Jenkins, a local firm of certified public accountants who
prepared Utility Equipment’s tax returns. Hosmer read the National
Paint letter to Jenkins and then asked if he would be willing to help
him arrive at a firm price to quote to National Paint. Jenkins said that
he thought his firm might be able to offer some assistance and agreed
to visit Hosmer at the Utility plant the next day to discuss the matter.

Smith, Adams, and Jenkins
Smith, Adams, and Jenkins was a firm of certified public accountants
located in Wichita, Kansas. The firm consisted of three partners,
Albert Smith, Nick Adams, and Peter Jenkins, assisted by eight staff
men and three clerks. During 1961, the firm’s gross billings had been
over $250,000. Of this total, about $40,000 had come from manage
ment services work, most of which had been done for small manufac
turing companies located throughout Kansas. The firm did not have a
separate m anagem ent services departm ent. E ach partner directed any

management services work performed for his own clients, and drew
on the firm’s group of staff men for any assistance required. This
policy had been adopted because of the firm’s small size. It was hoped
that this policy would give all members of the firm an exposure to
management services engagements in addition to their regular audit
and tax duties, thus increasing their awareness of the potential services
the firm could perform for its clients.
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In preparing for his meeting with Hosmer on March 3, Jenkins re
viewed the office file on the Utility Equipment Company and spent
some time discussing the account with Alexander Ryan, the staff man
that had prepared Utility Equipment’s tax returns for the past three
years. The tax return for 1961 had been completed only a couple of
weeks before, and Jenkins knew that it had been prepared from data
provided by the client. The 1961 Income Statement and year-end
Balance Sheet as provided by Utility Equipment Co. are shown in
Exhibits 1 and 2 (pages 45 and 46). Mr. Hosmer had never requested
an audit of his accounts by Smith, Adams, and Jenkins, and Ryan told
Jenkins that Utility’s “minimal sort of an accounting system” was main
tained by a part-time bookkeeper. Ryan’s brief review of Utility’s
books, as he collected the data needed for the tax return, had satisfied
him that the records were adequate for tax reporting purposes, but he
told Jenkins that he didn’t think the accounting data would be of much
help in making an important management decision. Jenkins, too,
realized the limited value of Utility’s current system, and wondered if
Hosmer’s call might be a tangible symptom of a more fundamental
problem.

Jenkins’ First Meeting with Hosmer
At his meeting with Hosmer the next day, Jenkins started off by
suggesting that Hosmer give him a brief review of Utility Equipment
Co., its products, its personnel, and its method of operations. Although
the office file had contained an up-to-date series of notes about the
company, these did not go into any great detail, and Jenkins wanted to
hear Hosmer’s own description of the context in which he saw his
problem.

Utility Equipment Co.
Utility Equipment Co. was owned by the families of Fred Hosmer
and his two brothers who together formed the company’s management
group. The firm, which had been founded in Wichita in 1920, manu
factured pumps, hoists, pulleys, and blocks. Each of these items was
offered in one style only. Pumps and hoists together accounted for
over 95 per cent of the company’s sales volume.
Since its founding, Utility Equipment had sold its products to
farmers throughout the Midwest. Distribution of the products was
achieved through two channels: (1) a sales agency organization which
used door-to-door salesmen calling directly on farmers, and (2) cata
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log sales companies that specialized in the farm market. Sales made
through the door-to-door agencies were shipped directly to the cus
tomer from Utility’s plant; the catalog companies purchased in larger
lots and filled orders from their own warehouses. Utility had more
than a dozen small catalog sales companies as customers, but had
been unsuccessful in getting any large national catalog company to
stock its line.
Utility Equipment employed no regular salesmen, although Mr.
Hosmer made it a practice to try to visit each of his major customers
in both categories once a year. Nevertheless, to facilitate the sales of
its products to the ultimate user, Utility Equipment regularly placed
advertisements in farm journals. The company had made no effort to
have its products stocked by retail hardware stores or farm supply
stores. As for the future, Hosmer said he had no plans to expand the
market for his products beyond the farm group. According to Hosmer,
he “knew the farm market and had a good sales set up; to go after
any other market would be too much trouble.”
Utility Equipment’s pump was a simple portable hand pump. In all,
during 1961, Utility had sold approximately 20,000 of these pumps at
an average selling price of $12.60. The wholesale list price to door-todoor sales agencies was $12.75; sales to catalog companies on all orders
for 10 or more units were subject to a quantity discount of 20 cents
per unit. No cash discounts were given. The $12.75 price, Hosmer
believed, was in line with the wholesale prices for similar pumps
offered by Utility’s competitors.
Jenkins learned that the company employed about 20 persons, all
of whom worked in the company’s one-floor plant. The total area of
the plant was 16,000 square feet, of which about 70 per cent was
devoted to manufacturing and storage. The rest of the building was
used for office space, and was occupied by the administrative group
who divided their time equally between the two major product lines,
pumps and hoists.
As for the National Paint offer, Hosmer told Jenkins that he believed
he could meet the production schedule outlined in the National Paint
letter. However, since it was anticipated that Utility Equipment’s
one-shift pump production capacity would be tied up well into 1963
producing for regular customers, a second shift would be necessary to
meet the promotion’s needs. Consequently, a second foreman would
have to be hired as well as some part-time factory help. Finding
skilled part-time help would not be difficult, Hosmer said, as many of
the local farmers had previously worked for him and their productivity
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after several days on the job was usually as high as his regular help.
Hosmer thought he would have no problem hiring farmers, even dur
ing the late summer, to work on a second shift basis. All second-shift
factory help would be paid the same hourly rate as the regular
employees.
When questioned by Jenkins about the availability of reliable cost
data, Hosmer replied that neither he nor his brothers “have any time
for figures, except for tax purposes. My oldest brother, who died in
1959, used to pay quite a bit of attention to such things, and a year
or two before he died he set up some kind of a standard cost system.
I imagine we’re still using it, because I haven’t bothered to change it,
but the only thing I pay any attention to is the over-all profit figure
for the company.”
In response to Hosmer’s statement, Jenkins observed that the
absence of useful, detailed, and current cost data would make it much
more difficult to arrive at a price to quote on the National Paint con
tract. Jenkins suggested, however, that they defer a further discussion
of the costing problem until they had explored, in general terms at
least, the desirability of bidding for the National Paint order.
Jenkins explained that he was thinking of what might be called the
“marketing implications” of the potential new business. Both Jenkins
and Hosmer agreed that a National Paint promotion involving a Utility
Equipment pump would have little, if any, impact on Utility’s primary,
agricultural market. This belief was based on the following con
siderations:
1. National Paint’s promotion campaign would be limited primarily
to industrial concerns.
2. All of the advertising carrying the premium offer would be in
the trade journals which few farmers were likely to read.
3. The premium offer price to National Paint would have no im
pact on Utility’s price structure since the value of the pump displayed
in the premium advertisements would be Utility’s list price.
Jenkins did raise two points which Hosmer agreed should be investi
gated or thought about further: (1) Jenkins did not believe that there
were any Robinson-Patman problems in connection with this proposed
reduced pricing but he suggested that Hosmer should check the point
with his lawyer, and (2) the fact that National Paint thought that
Utility’s pump might make a good premium—with an expected volume
equal to half of Utility’s current annual volume—might indicate that
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the industrial market for the pump was important enough for Hosmer
to reconsider his marketing policy of selling exclusively to the farm
market. The two men agreed, however, that even if Utility subse
quently decided to enter the industrial market, taking part in Na
tional’s promotion would not restrict the effectiveness of Utility’s
future marketing efforts.
As the discussion about marketing drew to a close, Jenkins asked if
the company’s bookkeeper was working that day, and said that before
leaving he would like to spend some time with her to investigate the
operation of the cost system that Hosmer’s late brother had estab
lished. He arranged to meet with Hosmer the following day to make a
proposal to carry out the work he thought was needed to help Hosmer
solve his problems.
In the hour that he spent discussing the record-keeping system with
the bookkeeper, Jenkins learned that a simple standard cost system
was in use. By reviewing the general ledger and related workpapers,
Jenkins found that (1) standard costs per unit for labor and for ma
terials on each of the company’s four products had been established
in 1958, (2) cost variances against standard had been increasing each
year, amounting to about 18 per cent in 1961, apparently because the
standards had not been changed to reflect increases in materials prices
and wage rates, and (3) the system was a “direct cost” system, in that
factory overhead was not formally allocated to product lines. In
quiring into the availability of supporting detail, Jenkins also dis
covered that informal records were maintained by product line which
would permit a breakdown of sales revenue, materials, labor, selling
expenses, and postage and freight. The bookkeeper summarized these
breakdowns as shown in Exhibit 3 (page 47).

Questions
1. Is Jenkins in possession of sufficient facts to make a proposal?
If not, what further facts does he need for this purpose, and how
would you suggest that he obtain them?
2. What form should the analysis of Mr. Hosmer’s problem take?
What proposal should Jenkins make?
3. In the light of your views as to the proposal to be made, what
further information would you require to complete your analysis?
What analytical steps would you follow in your work?
4. Should Jenkins plan to prepare a lengthy written report for
Hosmer? If not, what should he do at the termination of the project?
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Exhibit 1
UTILITY EQUIPM ENT COMPANY
Statement of Income
For the Year Ended December 31, 1961
Gross sales
Less: returns and allowances

$417,247
2,966

Net sales
Cost of goods sold:
Materials
Labor
Burden
Factory supplies
Fuel, water, heat, etc.
Taxes—property
Insurance—property
Repairs—property
Depreciation—building
Depreciation—machinery
Foreman

$414,281

Total cost of goods sold

$239,900

Gross profit
Selling expense
Bad debts
Direct mail
Advertising
Printing and mailing
Postage

$174,381

Total selling
General and administrative expense
Management salaries
Administrative salaries
Stationery and supplies
Postage
Freight and express
Travel expense
Auto expense
Depreciation—auto
Depreciation—furniture
Telephone
Accounting and legal
Entertainment

$ 51,438
$ 35,300
15,673
1,161
8,539
6,006
152
477
747
1,369
610
600
2,459

Total general and administrative

$ 73,093

Income from operations
Less corporate taxes

$ 49,850
23,000

Net profit
Less dividends
Increase in retained earnings

$168,514
45,275
8,043
1,673
4,130
3,803
267
1,000
382
6,813

$

184
7,325
28,392
3,505
12,032

$26,850
25,000
$

1,850

Source: Smith, Adams and Jenkins file; prepared by Utility Equipment Company
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Exhibit 2

UTILITY EQUIPMENT COMPANY
Balance Sheet
December 31, 1961
Assets
Current Assets
Cash
Accounts receivable
Inventories

$14,976
25,111
18,618

Total current assets
Property, Plant and Equipment
Building
Less allowance for depreciation

$58,705
$36,123
29,123

7,000

Equipment
Less allowance for depreciation

$15,675
10,118

5,557

Other Assets
Loans to employees
Various other assets

3,900
8,038

Total assets

$83,200

Liabilities and Stockholders Equity
Current Liabilities
Accounts payable
Notes payable
Accrued wages
Total current liabilities
Stockholders equity
Capital stock
Retained earnings
Total liabilities and stockholders equity

$22,909
5,000
1,086
$28,995
30,000
24,205
$83,200

Source: Smith, Adams and Jenkins files; prepared by Utility Equipment Company

Establishing Objectives for the Engagement
Returning to Mr. Hosmer’s office the next day, Jenkins remarked
that he was sure that he could help Mr. Hosmer. He said he had spent
several hours considering the problem on the previous day, after re
turning to his office, and was now ready to discuss an outline of the
work he felt should be done.
Jenkins said that he saw Hosmer’s original question on what price to
bid as being split into two parts: (a) What would be the lowest ac
ceptable price, and (b) how much higher, if any, should Utility
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Exhibit 3
UTILITY EQUIPM ENT COMPANY
Revenue and Expense Analysis—1961
Total

Pump

Hoist

Pulley

Block

Gross sales:
$417,247
Less: returns and allowances
2,966

$252,788
714

$145,650
2,235

$3,454
17

$7,651
—

Net sales

$414,281

$252,074

$143,415

$3,437

$7,651

Materials—actual
Standard costs

$168,514
142,270

n.a.
$ 98,652

n.a.
$ 38,282

n.a.
$1,678

n.a.
$3,658

n.a.
$ 22,234

n.a.
$ 14,753

n.a.
$ 409

n.a.
$1,045

—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—
—
—

—
$60

—
$ 13

Excess
Labor—actual
Standard costs
Excess
Selling expense:
Bad debts
Direct mail
Advertising
Printing and mailing
Postage

$ 26,244
$45,275
38,441
$

6,834

$

184
7,325
28,392
3,505
12,032

$ 51,438
General and Administrative Expenses:
$ 8,539
Postage
6,006
Freight and Express

$

—
1,268
12,426
247
1,368

$

184
6,057
15,966
3,258
10,664

$ 15,309

$ 36,128

$

$$ 5,123
1,418

3,416
4,390

Equipment Co. bid? Jenkins explained that the lowest acceptable
price in his opinion was a price which would both cover costs and
provide a “satisfactory” profit, the latter being a quantity that Hosmer
himself would have to determine. However, Jenkins said that in addi
tion to price there were other related areas that needed analysis,
which he would propose to do along with his pricing analysis.
These areas were production scheduling and working capital require
ments, both of which were significant because the size of the potential
order was very large in relation to Utility Equipment Co.’s present
pump output—40 per cent to 60 per cent of the 1961 unit volume.
Jenkins pointed out that good cost information was essential in
determining the minimum price, since the actual costs to be covered
were a part of the price. His questions to Hosmer and the company’s
bookkeeper on the previous day had brought out that the company
possessed no data that could readily be used for this purpose. He
proposed, therefore, to undertake a study of all the elements of cost
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that would enter into the production of the pumps for National Paint.
The specific purpose would be to determine the production cost (per
unit) of an additional 8,000-12,000 units, but the study would nec
essarily cover many of the costs associated with the present ( continu
ing) production volume. Jenkins assured Hosmer that this type of
cost investigation was not a major undertaking. Alexander Ryan,
Jenkins’ staff man who had worked on Utility Equipment’s tax returns,
would be brought in to carry out the actual investigation; Ryan would
have to have an hour or two of Hosmer’s time, and probably two or
three times as much of the bookkeeper’s time, to answer questions and
assist in locating and refining data, respectively.
Jenkins said that he himself would of course also work on the
project. Once Ryan had finished his cost investigation Jenkins would
take over and work on the pricing question. On the latter he would
need to consult with Hosmer later in order to translate the latter’s
thinking into quantitative terms. Essentially this discussion would
amount to an informal verbal report (which Jenkins felt would be
appropriate because of Hosmer’s stated dislike of figures), but Jenkins
said that he would in any event follow up with a brief letter summar
izing his findings and opinions.
In terms of time Jenkins estimated that Ryan would require no more
than three days, and he himself no more than two. He told Hosmer
that his billing rate on management services work was $25 per hour,
and Ryan’s, $15. There was little doubt that the job could be com
pleted within the proposed time, unless Ryan’s investigation turned up
results requiring extended work, which would be known within a day
or two of the beginning of the project. Jenkins concluded his presen
tation by saying that if Hosmer approved the proposal, work could
be begun at the beginning of the coming week.
Hosmer accepted the proposal, stating that he knew a successful
bid would pay for the cost, and that even an unsuccessful bid would
not mean consulting fees wasted, in that Jenkins would have looked
into the areas of the company’s operations that probably needed some
study in any event, particularly cost standards.

Ryan’s Investigation
On the following Monday, Alexander Ryan arrived at Utility Equip
ment’s offices to begin his investigation. His objective, as Peter Jenkins
had expressed it to him, was to “survey the pump line’s costs and
specifically establish the costs that would be incurred in producing
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the 8,000-12,000 units called for by the potential contract with Na
tional Paint.”
Ryan’s first move was to see Mr. Hosmer, as he needed some facts
about the pump manufacturing operation. In answer to Ryan’s ques
tions, Hosmer provided the following information:
1. During 1961, pump (and all other) production had been on a
single shift, all year. There had been no significant variations in
monthly pump production, which was to all intents and purposes as
close to single shift capacity as was practicable.
2. The company’s manufacturing labor force totaled eleven men,
including two men engaged in packaging the finished units, and ex
cluding the foreman. Five men worked on the pump line more or less
full time, although there was some interchanging of manpower alloca
tions between lines from time to time.
3. As previously mentioned to Jenkins, production of pumps for the
National Paint order would take place on a second shift, for which
additional labor would be engaged, at the same hourly rate as first
shift employees.
In response to another question Hosmer indicated that his late
brother, Herbert, who had prepared the material and labor standards
in 1958, had maintained files with his notes and working papers rela
tive to the standards. These files had been kept after Herbert’s death,
and Hosmer turned these over to Ryan with the remark that he hoped
they made some sense to him.
Before proceeding any further Ryan noted that his problem was
in a sense simplified by the fact that all he was concerned with was
the cost of operating a second shift. Since pump production in 1961
was approximately 1667 units per month (20,000 ÷ 12) Ryan decided
to assume that second shift production would be 1,600 units per month,
and that production would have to start on June 1 if 8,000 units were
to be ready by November 1 as required by National Paint. Continued
production at the same rate through mid-January would provide the
additional 4,000 units that could be called for in December and Janu
ary. (Ryan noted that he should suggest that Jenkins point out to
Hosmer that second shift production beyond November 1 would essen
tially be speculative, at least until December when National Paint
could request further deliveries.) If they did not, Hosmer would have
additional inventory on his hands which would have to be disposed of
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either by increasing sales through present outlets, finding new markets,
or allowing the first shift production rate to slow down below the
regular sales rate.
Ryan then reviewed the late Herbert Hosmer’s files. He was pleased
to find that the 1958 standards had been based on detailed studies
that Herbert had made of production time and labor productivity
and detailed bills of materials. After familiarizing himself with what
Herbert Hosmer had done, Ryan next spent several hours with the
production foreman. He later reported to Peter Jenkins as follows:
“I decided to start with the assumption that Herbert’s basic calcu
lations were correct, and only needed updating for variables that had
changed. If this were so, I would save a great deal of time that
would otherwise have been required to go into basic detail. A full
check on this approach would be whether revised standards calculated
for all product lines accounted adequately for actual material and
labor costs in 1961. I did not in fact make this check since I restricted
myself to pump standards only, which I am satisfied are now very
much more accurate. I did not think that our client would wish us to
revise material and labor standards for the other lines at this time,
although I believe that it would be in his interest if this were done,
perhaps after this engagement is completed.” (Jenkins nodded his
concurrence, and Ryan continued.) “I established the following facts
from my discussion with the foreman.
“1. There has only been one minor design change in the pump since
1958. This simplified the manufacturing process somewhat, and re
duced process time by perhaps 2 per cent and material content by 3
per cent.
“2. Subject only to the 2 per cent I have just mentioned, there have
been no changes in the manufacturing procedures from those noted
by Herbert Hosmer. The foreman wrote down his estimate of the
time presently required for each step in the manufacturing process as
listed by Herbert, and came up with a total of 39 minutes of labor per
unit, including 8 minutes for packaging, compared to 41 in 1958. Al
lowing for the 2 per cent design change (0.82 minutes) this meant
that productivity had increased by 1.18 minutes (41-39-0.82), or 2.8
per cent, which the foreman said seemed reasonable to him. On the
basis of these estimates I computed that second shift production of
1,600 units per month would require 827 hours of manufacturing
labor and 213 hours of packaging labor. Since we are dealing with a
completely new second shift, we have to talk in terms of whole men;
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on the basis of a 40 hour work-week and a 4 ⅓ week month, an em
ployee works 173 hours per month, so Utility Equipment will need
five manufacturing labor employees (865 hours) and two packaging
labor employees (346 hours). This allows an excess of 4 per cent in
manufacturing labor hours and 61 per cent in packaging labor hours.
I think that Utility Equipment ought to be conservative and expect
less efficiency or productivity on the second shift, but the appropriate
figure is undoubtedly higher than 4 per cent and less than 61 per cent.
On a total basis, 1,040 hours per month are required and 1,211 will be
provided by seven men, or an excess of 16 per cent. This is probably
more than enough, provided that one of the men on packaging can be
assigned to manufacturing for part of the time. In essence, what I am
saying is that the second shift will require seven men: five manufac
turing, one packaging, and one floating to fill in where required.
“As far as material usage is concerned, the foreman reviewed
Herbert Hosmer’s calculations and stated that the only change that
needed to be made was the 3 per cent adjustment for the design
change which I have already referred to. He specifically stated that
Herbert’s scrap and spoilage allowance of 5 per cent was still a fair
estimate.”
[Ryan next worked with Utility Equipment’s bookkeeper to investi
gate relevant costs. The next portion of his report to Jenkins ran as
follows.]
“My first line of inquiry with the bookkeeper was to price out the
labor and material quantities I had just established with the foreman.
“By examining the general ledger account for labor expense I found
that, as I had suspected, it included payroll taxes and employee bene
fits. By examining payroll records I found that the average hourly
rate for production employees was $1.80 for manufacturing labor and
$1.55 for packaging labor. I investigated further and established that
state and Federal payroll taxes amount to 5.2 per cent of wages and
benefits, about 14.7 per cent. I compared these figures with Herbert
Hosmer’s calculations for 1958 and confirmed that the total hourly
labor costs had risen about 20 per cent since then, which fits with a
2.8 per cent productivity increase and the 18 per cent wage variance
for 1961 based on the 1958 standards. The bookkeeper confirmed that
there had been no wage increase this year so far, and when I doublechecked with Hosmer, he said that none was in sight for this year.
“Based on the figures I have just quoted, the incremental labor cost
for the second shift can be estimated as follows:
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Manufacturing
Base wage
Benefits —14.7 %
Taxes —5.2%

Packaging

$1.80
.265
.094

$1.55 /hour
.228
.081

Total

$2,159

$1,859

( Rounding)

$2.16

$1.86

Assume that a differential of 10¢ is
paid to the “floating” laborer,
which will increase the packaging
average rate by

/hour

.05
$1.91

Hours per month

865

$ cost per month

$1,868.40

Total per month

346
$660.86
$2,529.26

No. of units per month

1,600

Labor cost per unit

$1.58

“On materials, I asked the bookkeeper to pull the latest invoices
from her files for raw material purchases, and I priced each item on
the bill of materials. The material cost per pump came out at $5.79,
as against the old standard of $4.95. Again, I compared price changes
since 1958 and noticed an average increase of about 22 per cent. Sub
tracting the 3 per cent material usage saving through change in de
sign leaves a net increase of about 19 per cent, which is close enough
to the total material variance for 1961 of 18.4 per cent.” ( Ryan added
that a schedule showing his calculations of the revised standard ma
terial cost was included in his working papers; it is not reproduced
here.)
“I next considered what items of factory burden expense would be
incurred in the operation of a second shift. I checked off the items
in the 1961 Income Statement as follows:
Yes
‘‘F actory supplies
Yes
Fuel, water, heat
No
Taxes—property
Yes
Insurance—property
No
Repairs—property
Depreciation—building
No
Depreciation—machinery No
Yes
Foreman
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“Depreciation on manufacturing equipment might increase because
of increased usage, but the absolute amount of this expense ($382 in
1961) was so small that I decided to ignore it. On each of the other
items, this is what I found out.”
“Factory supplies: In the foreman’s opinion these vary in proportion
to both material and labor cost although there is no way to check or
confirm this. I decided to relate this cost to the total of the two, as
follows:
“Factory supplies cost, 1961
Materials expense, 1961
$168,514
Labor cost, 1961
45,275
Total

$8,043

$213,789

Factory supplies cost % = 3.76%
Material standard
$5.79
Labor standard
1.58
Total

$7.37

3.76% of $7.37 = $0.28
“Fuel, Water, and Heat: Although all the bills were available to
support the 1961 expense under this heading, there is no way to deter
mine, without considerable study, just how much of each item is
attributable to each product. We do know that the bulk of the expense
is for heat and light; the amount of power used by manufacturing
equipment is nominal. Since the 1961 expense is relatively so small, I
do not feel the detailed study would be worthwhile at this stage. As
we know, manufacturing and storage occupy about 70 per cent of the
building. When the second shift is in operation, the whole of this space
will have to be heated and lit. I therefore assumed that the monthly
expense will be 70 per cent of the 1961 average, i.e.,
70% x

1,673

, or $97.58

On the basis of 1,600 units per month, the per unit cost is 6.1 cents—
call it 6 cents. Since the proportion of cold to warm months in the 7½
month (maximum) period in which the second shift will be operating
is about 50:50, I do not think it necessary to load this estimate with a
seasonal factor for heat. I’m no engineer, but I imagine any additional
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cost to keep out the cold of winter nights will be offset by the fact that
the building will be somewhat warmer in the morning to start with.
“Property insurance: This expense amounted to $3,803 in 1961, and
would increase if the National Paint contract is received because the
inventory would be higher during the months until shipments begin.
The insurance contract covering inventory requires a report at the end
of each month about the amount of inventory on hand. Based on this
report, an adjustment in the premium is computed. I estimated
that this adjustment would amount to about $400 for the first six
months of the contract, or about 5 cents per unit on the guaranteed
8,000 units. If the number of units is increased, the inventory turnover
will be faster, but 5 cents per unit is still a pretty fair figure.
“Foreman: A foreman will obviously be needed for the second shift.
I discussed this with Hosmer and he anticipated no difficulty in ob

taining one. He said he would approach one of the senior first shift
employees, and replace him temporarily with a new employee.
Hosmer anticipates that the second shift foreman will have to be paid
$3.00 per hour, inclusive of benefits. With taxes at 5.26% that comes
to $3.16. Multiply this by 167 hours per month and divide by 1,600
units, and the unit cost comes out at 33 cents.
“No selling, or general and administrative expense will be incurred
as a result of the operation of the second shift, with the exception of
two items—shipping expense and interest. Hosmer says that he and
his regular office staff will be able to handle the extra purchasing and
payroll chores, and that he will be able to store the inventory until
shipped without renting any extra space. According to the letter from
National Paint, Utility Equipment Co. will have to ship the pumps
direct to National Paint’s customers. These are located in the Midwest,
which is also the area served by Utility Equipment’s sales agency
organization, and they, too, ship individually. With the assistance of
the bookkeeper, I sampled shipping records for a three month period,
and found that the average shipping cost was 37 cents. The dispersion
around this average was very close; two thirds of the values were in
the 32 cents to 42 cents range, and they were evenly split on either
side. I think 37 cents is a fair estimate to use.
“In order to approximate what the interest cost might be for carry
ing the inventory until it is shipped, I assumed that production for the
contract would start on June 1, and continue at the rate of 1,600 units
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per month. I also decided to assume that Utility Equipment Co. would
have to pay its labor and supervisor costs in the month incurred, and
that other costs would be paid on 30-day credit terms, i.e., one month
after being incurred. Shipping expense would be paid when shipping
took place. I then constructed a cash flow table, which appears on
page 56.
“Next, I assumed that Hosmer could get a 6 per cent bank loan to
carry this inventory, once he had the contract in hand. The loan would
amount to $3,000 at the end of June, rising to $72,000 at the end of
November just before he collects for the first 8,000 units. Thus, inter
est at ½ per cent per month on each month’s loan balance would
amount to a little over $1,000, or about 13 cents per unit on the
minimum quantity.
“To summarize my work, Mr. Jenkins, I have ascertained the follow
ing as the likely costs to be incurred in the monthly production of
1,600 pumps on a second shift:
Per Unit
Labor
Material
Factory supplies
Fuel, water, heat
Property insurance
Foreman
Shipping
Interest
Total, per unit

$1.58
5.79
0.28
0.06
0.05
0.33
0.37
0.13
$8.59

“Perhaps the most interesting aspect of my study was the realization
that if Utility Equipment gets the contract, all the costs it incurs will
be variable. While it is true that, for example, the cost of employing
a foreman will not be incurred at the rate of 33 cents per unit, the fact
is that this expense will only be incurred if the contract is obtained
and, if it is, the production can be stated with confidence at 1,600 units
per month. This being so, this cost can be expressed in per unit terms.
In my opinion nothing would be gained by introducing a fixed dollar
cost element into any analysis you make for Mr. Hosmer.”
Jenkins thanked Ryan for his excellent presentation and after re
viewing Ryan’s work papers immediately arranged to have another
meeting with Hosmer.
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56
$3,056
$3,056

12,864
15,920

$9,808
3,056

3,200

1,600
$3,056

July
1,600

June
1,600

12,864
28,784

$9,808
3,056

4,800

Aug.
1,600

12,864
41,648

$9,808
3,056

6,400

Sept.
1,600

12,864
54,512

$9,808
3,056

8,000

Oct.
1,600

$9,808
3,056
4,400

Nov.
1,600
8,000
1,600

17,264
71,776

*Assume contract for 12,000 units, manufactured at rate of 1,600 per month, starting in June.

Units—Production
Shipment
EOM inventory
Cash outflow
June: Labor & supv.
(1,600 X [1.58 + .033])
July: June exp.
(1,600 X [5.79 + .28 + .06])
July Labor & supv.
August: July exp.
August L & S
September: Aug. exp.
September L & S
October: Sept. exp.
October L & S
November: Oct. exp.
November L & S
Ship 8,000 units (55¢)
December: November exp.
December L & S
Ship 2,000 units
January: December exp.
January L & S ( ½ mo.)
Ship 2,000 units
February: Jan. exp. ( ½ mo.)
Month’s outflow
Cumulative outflow

Inventories and Cash Outflow on Contract*

Table 1

13,964
85,740

$9,808
3,056
1,100

Dec.
1,600
2,000
1,200

12,436
98,176

$9,808
1,528
1,100

Jan.
800
2,000

$4,904
4,904
103,080

Feb.

UTILITY EQUIPMENT CO.

Jenkins’ Second Meeting with Hosmer
Exactly one week after his first meeting with Hosmer, Jenkins re
turned to review the results of his investigation with him. After the
usual round of pleasantness, Jenkins began: “Mr. Hosmer, this morn
ing I plan to tell you what we have found out about your potential
costs on the National Paint contract, and to be of as much help as I
can in setting a price for you to bid on. I would also like to review
with you an important consequence of your getting the order—if you
do, you will have a need for working capital quite in excess of the
company’s apparent resources. As I said to you a week ago, I plan to
follow up this meeting with a letter to you describing what we have
done and repeating my findings, which we will be discussing in a
minute. That part of the letter you can skip, if you want to. I would
urge you, however, to take a look at the second part of the letter be
cause there I am going to list some areas of your operations where I
believe we might be able to do additional and valuable work for you.
“Coming back to the matter at hand, I would like to start by saying
that the absolute rock-bottom price for your bid is $8.59 per pump,
which is the best estimate of the total additional costs, including
shipping, without any allowance for profit. Why don’t we concentrate
on that area, profit, for a minute? Is there a minimum total dollar or
dollar-per-unit profit figure which you would want to feel certain of
securing if you had the contract? Or would you take it if it were avail
able at, for instance, a nickel more than projected cost per unit?”
“My feeling,” Hosmer replied, “is that I am not really interested in
the deal unless I make a before-tax profit of about $5,000. This would
be about 10 per cent of our 1961 profit. I just don’t see how it would
be worth our while to do it for less. After all, the second shift won’t
just materialize out of thin air. There has to be something in the deal
for top management’s time and effort too.”
“Is that $5,000 figure really your minimum? You wouldn’t put in a
bid that allowed for a profit of only $4,000 for instance?”
“Don’t try to pin me down by getting those numbers too close.
$4,000 is just not really enough. No, I wouldn’t do it for that price.”
“Very well, then. National Paint has talked of a minimum order of
8,000 units, a likely order of 10,000, and a possible total of 12,000.
Which do you think is the safest ‘base’ to use to calculate the desired
profit per unit?”
“Oh, the 8,000 minimum,” Hosmer replied. “If I’m talking about a
sure $5,000 profit, then I want it to be a sure profit.”
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“In that case,” said Jenkins, “your profit objective is 62½ cents per
unit, and your total minimum revenue per unit is $9.22 ($8.59 cost +
62½ cents profit). Go lower than this and you miss your profit target.
On the other hand, if the order exceeds 8,000 units you will make an
additional profit of $625 per thousand at a price of $9.22. Being an
‘odd’ number, the cost figure of $8.59 might give you the impression of
being the result of a very precise calculation. I would just like to
caution you, therefore, to realize that while $8.59 has been arrived at
by what I consider to be the best and most precise means appropriate
to your situation, it is impossible for me to guarantee its accuracy.
I’m sure you realize that. The best statement I can make about the
figure of $8.59 is that it is the most likely outcome of a series of con
tingent future events. It is quite possible that the ‘correct’ figure,
determined after the completion of the contract, will be something
different. I am also quite sure that any such difference will not be
major.”
Hosmer replied that he understood the necessity of using the $8.59
figure with caution, but nevertheless would appreciate Jenkins’ advice
on what price to charge. He followed the argument that $9.22 should
be the minimum, but felt that he might well be able to go higher, and
make more profit.
Jenkins remarked that setting a figure above $9.22 was a matter for
the most delicate business judgment, and in the last analysis would
have to be Hosmer’s decision alone. He said that Hosmer ought to
bear several facts in mind:
1. At $9.22 Utility Equipment would make a “satisfactory” profit,
even on a minimum order (8,000 units).
2. National Paint would be evaluating Utility Equipment’s bid,
along with others, and each bid would of course state only one price.
This was important because the final result would be an “all or noth
ing” affair, at the bid price.
3. At a high enough price, possibly $12.00, Utility Equipment’s
chance of getting the contract was probably minimal.
4. From a strategic point of view, Utility Equipment’s chance of
winning the contract would probably not vary with small variations in
price. For example, if the next bid above Utility Equipment’s possible
bid of $10.00 were $10.40, Utility Equipment’s chances would prob
ably not have been adversely affected had their bid been $10.25.
Jenkins said he doubted whether National Paint would be able to
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trade-off any supposed difference in the drawing power of different
premiums with minute differences in their prices.
5. What it all amounted to, in Jenkins’ opinion, was that Hosmer
ought to pick a price somewhere between $9.22 and $12.00 that he felt
would be competitive with other, necessarily unknown, bids. Jenkins
said he favored a bid of $10.00 because it straddled National Paint’s
stated range of $8.00 to $12.00 and, therefore, he felt, stood a good
chance of success without being “too low.”
Hosmer said that Jenkins’ analysis had been very helpful, and added
that he would give the matter of pricing some serious thought before
making his decision. He said that Jenkins’ very clear analysis had
helped him to realize that there was no neat formula that could be
used for pricing, and that it was a matter that involved a high degree
of business judgment.
At this point Jenkins told Hosmer that he would like to take a few
minutes to discuss the working capital problem that would arise if the
bid were successful. He gave Hosmer a copy of the cash flow schedule
he had prepared (See Table 1, page 56), and explained the
assumptions on which it was based. Hosmer was most intrigued with
this schedule, and remarked that although it could not in any way
be described as profound, it set things out in a way he had never en
visaged them, and very clearly as well. He said that he had known that
the contract would call for working capital above the firm’s resources,
but had not realized that the amount would reach $54,500 by Novem
ber 1; he assumed that money would begin to come in from National
Paint soon after that date. He felt that perhaps $5,000-$10,000 of
Utility Equipment’s existing resources could be applied to this need;
he doubted, however, that he would be able to defer dividend pay
ments unless the situation were desperate, so that he would need
external financing of up to $50,000. Jenkins suggested that a line of
credit at the local bank could solve the problem. Hosmer agreed that
this was one alternative, and said that he was very glad that Jenkins
had drawn his attention to this potential problem far enough in ad
vance for it to be solved before it really became a problem.
Before leaving, Jenkins mentioned to Hosmer that it had occurred
to him that there might be an opportunity for savings in material costs
if Hosmer could obtain price reductions from his suppliers by virtue of
his doubling his purchases of materials for the pumps line, as he would
do, starting June 1, if he obtained the contract. Jenkins said he had
not taken account of any such potential saving in his calculations.
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Jenkins’ Letter to Hosmer
The following day Hosmer received a letter from Jenkins, which
read in part as follows:
Dear Mr. Hosmer:
It was a pleasure to work with you on the National Paint pricing
problem. There follows a summary of the work we performed on
this engagement, and the results which I discussed with you in
your office yesterday. Our bill for services is attached. [Section of
letter summarizing work and results omitted here as repetitious.]
In the course of our work on this engagement we became aware
of several areas in your company’s operations where we feel we
could be of further assistance to you, and where we feel that you
would benefit by having the work done. These are listed below
for your reference.
1. Revise material and labor standards on hoist, pulley and
block lines.
2. Institute a system for continuous updating of material and
labor standards for your staff.
3. Design and install an improved chart of accounts and cost
accounting system which would provide more accurate informa
tion on product line costs on a continuing basis than we were able
to develop for the pump line where in many instances we had to
rely on historical records. Accurate cost information will enable
you to measure product line profitability by channel of distribu
tion, either those presently used or those which you might want to
consider in the future.
We would be glad to discuss any of the above with you at your
convenience if you are interested in pursuing this further.
Very truly yours,
s / Peter Jenkins
Smith, Adams and Jenkins
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Bartlett Lithographers
Bartlett Lithographers was one of the larger job printers in the
metropolitan Boston area. In 1961, it employed approximately 100
persons, and for several years its sales volume had been approximately
$2,000,000 annually. Bartlett was known as a “city firm” that catered
primarily to Boston companies; very little of its regular printing vol
ume was done for customers beyond a 100-mile distance from Boston.
The printing jobs that it handled ranged all the way from very small
to very large volume runs. A high premium was placed on providing
good, dependable service, and roughly half of Bartlett’s volume came
from regular, long-time customers.
Bartlett Lithographers was a closely held, family corporation. Top
management were members of the owner group and were actively
engaged in running the business. The two most important executive
positions were filled by Joseph Donovan, president, and George Peters,
Jr., executive vice president. The owner-manager structure preceded
both Mr. Peters and Mr. Donovan; a generation earlier Amos Hopkins
and George Peters, Sr. had operated Bartlett as its founding partners.
Hopkins and Peters established a thriving business that was, in time,
incorporated. At Mr. Hopkins’ death, his wife inherited majority con
trol of the corporation, and Mr. Peters, Sr. ran the shop. His son,
George, Jr., joined the organization and progressed in capability to
the point where he assumed responsibility for the printing shop at his
father’s death. Later, Joseph Donovan married Mrs. Hopkins’ daugh
ter, and assumed the presidency of the corporation. Mrs. Mildred
Hopkins treated both Donovan and Peters as equals, and in the opinion
of the two executives, she had contributed immensely to the effective
ness of their joint activities. In 1959, a third generation had joined
management; Roger Peters had succeeded his father in supervision of
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shop activities. As a result, George Peters, Jr. said that he now had
more time to devote to upper-level management matters, including
sales and pricing problems.

James & Pearce, CPAs
For more than twenty years, James & Pearce—a large national firm
of certified public accountants—had conducted audit and tax work for
Bartlett Lithographers out of their Boston offices. Thus, in March 1962,
it was with considerable background that James Turner and John
Schmidt sat down to review the 1961 annual audit report that had been
prepared for the principals at Bartlett. In 1961, Turner was partner-in
charge of the Bartlett account. Schmidt, formerly the senior ac
countant, was now manager of the account. It was customary at
James & Pearce for those directly involved to study the audit report
and all associated information in preparation for a review session
with the client.
During the course of their discussion, which covered all of the usual
routine matters, both Turner and Schmidt found their conversation
turning frequently to the area of costs, pricing, and the adequacy of
Bartlett’s internal accounting system. They saw several symptoms
that suggested to them conditions that should be investigated. For
one thing, Turner was concerned about the large volume of adjusting
entries that were required annually. He wondered if that condition
might be indicative of an unnecessarily weak basic accounting struc
ture. He questioned whether or not the general accounting system in
use at Bartlett was adequate, and he hypothesized that if the basic
system was inadequate, it might follow that the cost data used in
pricing would also be highly suspect.
As the two men reviewed what they knew of Bartlett, and studied
the information that was available to them, they became more and
more convinced that management should be alerted to a potentially
undesirable situation. They knew, for instance, that the quarterly
reports that were prepared for management’s guidance were outdated
by more than a month when they were issued. They also knew that
the standards used in costing production were several years old, and
had been “adjusted” to current conditions by the application of a
flat-rate percentage adjustment factor. They suspected that these
costs might be quite inappropriate in the current competitive market.
Turner and Schmidt were also keenly aware that the cost system in
use at Bartlett did not effectively contribute to the pricing and bid
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costing procedures. Frequently, job-cost estimates that were compiled
on the basis of existing accounting data were discarded in favor of
“intuitive” quotes. That fact, in itself, caused both men serious con
cern. They were firm in their belief that an accounting system could
—and should—provide useful information for pricing, and that a
properly devised system of cost accumulation should prove itself
superior to purely intuitive procedures.
When they reviewed industry conditions in late 1961 and early 1962,
it appeared all the more necessary to these men that Bartlett should
look more closely at its costing procedures. For one thing, a large por
tion of customer potential had “dried up”—the result of technological
advances that had made it economical for large consumers of printed
material to run their own in-plant printing operation. Bartlett, for
example, had suffered the loss of a major customer who decided to
operate what was referred to in the trade as its own “captive print
shop.” It was possible that as much as one-third of Bartlett’s volume
was lost when that customer invested in its own printing facility.
At the other end of the line, many short-run, relatively simple jobs
were being successfully bid away from established printers by low-cost
“basement shop” operators. Again, technological advances had made
it possible for these operators to obtain relatively inexpensive equip
ment which was quite adequate for turning out small jobs that did not
impose rigid quality specifications. As a result, competition—in the
form of lower prices—for these jobs had increased sharply.
Thus, established print shops with relatively high capacity potential
found themselves faced with a demand situation that had been con
fined, effectively, to the middle of the customer range that had ex
isted previously. This created severe problems, not the least of which
was constructing sensible, competitive, profit-generating bids to cap
ture as much of the available market as was possible, consistent with
sound business operations.
With demand off, Mr. Turner knew that a large number of critical
pressures were being felt by the management of Bartlett Lithog
raphers. In an attempt to maintain a reasonable level of production,
he knew that it had become necessary for management to submit
bids on marginal, low-profit business that, under more favorable con
ditions, would scarcely have been considered at all.
Turner and John Schmidt saw two dangers here. One was, of
course, that profit margins tended to be thinned as marginal business
was added. Consequently, sustained dollar volume might quite pos
sibly provide much smaller profit than had been the case under more
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favorable demand conditions. Reviewing the financial data for sev
eral earlier years, both men agreed that the influence of slackened
demand and consequent trimming of profit margins was clearly to
be observed. The following summary figures for 1959, 1960 and 1961
demonstrated the point:1

Year

Sales
(In thousands)

Before-tax
profit

1959
1960
1961

$1,992
2,084
1,917

$87
97
11

There was another side to the problem, too. James Turner observed
that although many of the marginal jobs did not carry with them re
turns that were, under normal conditions, considered to be satis
factory, there was real danger of misappraising the value of marginal
opportunities. In a severe cost-price squeeze, such as faced Bartlett
in 1961, both Turner and Schmidt feared that inadequate accounting
data—particularly production cost information—could seriously in
terfere with maximizing the effectiveness of profiting from marginal
opportunities. Also, both men knew that Bartlett was dependent on
a number of highly skilled personnel; it was imperative that adequate
volume be maintained in order to retain the basic skills that had
come to be considered characteristic of the Bartlett organization.
Many of Turner and Schmidt’s apprehensions had been presented to
Bartlett’s management in the past. However, management at that
time was not responsive to the client review sessions or the manage
ment letters sent by James & Pearce, CPAs.
Since the new management, under the direction of George Peters,
Jr., had become more management-minded, Turner and Schmidt de
cided to present all of their findings to their client at the forthcoming
review session.
In mid-March of 1962, both Turner and Schmidt met with Joseph
Donovan and George Peters to review the 1961 audit report and
present their analysis of the situation. The Bartlett executives were,
of course, aware of the deterioration of their profit position. They
understood quite clearly the change that had taken place in the
competitive situation as well. Thus, Mr. Turner’s discussions made
some sense to them and raised many questions for their consideration.
1 See Exhibit 1 ( page 65) for Bartlett’s 1961 income statement.
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Exhibit 1
BARTLETT LITHOGRAPHERS
Statement of Income
For the Year Ended December 31, 1961
( In thousands)
% to Sales
Sales, less discounts and allowances
Less: Commissions and brokers’ fees

Manufacturing costs:
Direct materials
Direct labor
Charged factory overhead

Manufacturing profit
Less: Unabsorbed factory
overhead
Gross profit
Operating expenses:
Selling expenses
General and administrative
expenses

$1,916.9
185.4

100.00
9.67

$1,731.5

90.33

$ 770.0
226.6
391.1

40.16
11.82
20.40

$1,387.7

72.38

$ 343.8

17.95

46.2

2.42

$ 297.6

15.53

$ 138.8

7.24

133.2

6.95

$ 272.0

14.19

Profit from operations
Other income ( expense)

$

Profit before federal income taxes

$

25.6
(14.0)
11.6

(

1.34
.73)
.61

Discussion of the internal accounting system consumed a major
portion of the meeting, and the appropriateness of the accounting
data for purposes of costing and quoting also received extensive con
sideration. At the end of the conference all four of the men agreed
that further study was clearly desirable, and that they should, with
out question, meet again to consider specifically what might be done
to assist Bartlett’s management in its new, uncomfortable, and highly
competitive environment. As they left the meeting, Turner remarked
to John Schmidt, “Well, we have been thinking in the right direction;
I suspect that a good job of variable cost analysis is what will do
the most good.”
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BARTLETT LITHOGRAPHERS
Engagement Confirmation Letter
March 16, 1962
Mr. Joseph Donovan, President
Mr. George Peters, Jr., Executive Vice President
Bartlett Lithographers

Boston
Gentlemen:
We thank you for the opportunity of meeting with you last
Thursday to discuss the study you wish made of your present
cost system and related pricing practices. We are writing this letter
to summarize the main points covered in our conversation.
As you pointed out during our discussion, the broad purpose of
the engagement is to establish a working method for pricing anal
ysis which takes into consideration the relationship between a
series of possible prices and product costs in competitive bid
situations. This is particularly important in view of the highly
competitive situation which exists in the printing industry today.
As we see it, the major purpose of our work will be to make a
general review of the present cost accounting system to make cer
tain that your management has a firm basis for evaluating available
alternate pricing possibilities. While all aspects of the present
system will be covered, we will concentrate our effort in those
areas which you have indicated required review. Specifically this
would include:
1. Reviewing the present system in terms of the accumulation,
flow, accuracy and reporting of cost information.
2. Evaluating the cost system structure in terms of the number
of cost centers and the allocation of manufacturing burden
to those cost centers.
3. Identifying the variable and fixed expense components of
costs in each cost center and department.
4. Providing variable and fixed machine hour burden rates for
quotation purposes.
In addition, our efforts will be directed toward providing you
with a method that will aid in determining the financial effects
of a series of alternate prices, taking into consideration:
1. The present volume of business in relation to plant capacity.
2. The desirability of accepting or rejecting additional business
based on breakeven calculations.
This engagement will be directed by a member of our Manage66
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Exhibit 2 continued

ment Services Department. We estimate that this work will re
quire approximately two days a week over the next 12 to 14 weeks
for completion.
We will keep you advised of our progress during the course of
the engagement and will prepare a final report covering findings
and recommendations at the conclusion of our work.
Very truly yours,

/s /
James & Pearce

The Management Services Engagement
Once he had presented the problem areas for his client’s consid
eration, James Turner returned to his office and discussed the situation
with Joseph Quinn. Quinn was functionally responsible for the man
agement services phase of James & Pearce’s Boston operation. Turner
briefed Quinn on the problems at Bartlett and brought him up to date
on the meeting with the client. Together they surveyed the needpotential and agreed that an early meeting with Donovan and Peters
would be desirable.
In late March, Quinn and Turner met with the two officers from
Bartlett and discussed quite thoroughly the problems of costing and
pricing, of meeting competition, of maintaining adequate productive
volume, of retaining the basic work force, and of earning satisfactory
profits. All were agreed that the cost data that were provided by
the existing system were neither current nor useful; further study of
the situation was agreed upon.
Thus, on the basis of their meeting with Donovan and Peters,
Turner and Quinn decided to formalize the project, and to proceed.
Essentially, the late March meeting established the basis on which a
management services engagement would be conducted. Accordingly,
Mr. Quinn took care of the arrangements incident to commencing
the study; he sent a confirmation letter to the company (see Exhibit
2, page 66) and he assigned John Burns, a member of his management
services staff, to the project.
In rapid order, John Burns was introduced to the officers at Bart
lett, James Turner handling the introductions personally, and the
study commenced. Burns spent one or two days at the Bartlett plant
each week, and prepared a weekly written report for Mr. Quinn. He
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studied the cost accumulation and reporting system intensively, and
compiled an extensive file of work papers and analyses, developing
data on current cost and production relations. (See Exhibit 3 below
for a typical weekly progress report filed by John Burns.) By late June,
Burns’ study was completed and the task of drawing conclusions and
making recommendations began.
Exhibit 3
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Turner, Quinn and Burns focused their attention on four main
sections of Burns’ work. First, Burns had reviewed Bartlett’s pro
cedures for preparing price quotations. Next, he had studied current
manufacturing cost relationships and recalculated departmental man
ufacturing expense rates. Beyond that, as a third phase of his work,
Burns endeavored to reclassify the departmental expense rates into
their fixed and variable components. Finally, Burns had gathered
production performance and capacity utilization data so that he might,
if appropriate, relate cost information to the volume of activity ac
tually planned or attained. A brief review of his findings in each of
these four areas is presented below.
The quotation system. Price quotations at Bartlett were prepared
by combining basic data for the several categories of cost that ap
plied to each order. First, direct materials and purchased outside
services were calculated. To those costs were added the in-plant
charges for direct labor and other manufacturing expenses. The la
bor and manufacturing expense charges were determined by extend
ing the units of measurement (man-hours, press-hours, or weight of
material) by the appropriate departmental cost rates to obtain dollars
of cost. (See Exhibit 4 for the separate departmental rates used in
1961 for costing and quotations.) No separate charge for selling and
administrative expenses was made since the departmental rates in
cluded an allowance for selling and administrative expenses. How
ever, commissions and brokers’ fees were computed separately and
all costs were then added to develop total costs for the order under
consideration.
The addition of a desired profit amount to the total cost figure
provided a selling price which might or might not be quoted to the
customer. The calculated price, including profit, was used as a bench
mark to determine pricing strategy; the final price quoted depended
upon prevailing conditions. Such factors as size of the order backlog,
the desirability of obtaining the business, and existing competitive
conditions had much to do with the degree of departure from the
calculated company price.
Burns noted two significant points about this system. The first was
that certain costs were literally “pulled out of the air” without con
sideration of the cost rates established for individual departments.
For example, the time required to process art work varied depending
upon the complexity of the job and the type of art work required. To
save time, it had become normal practice to estimate an overall
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dollar cost for complex art work without attempting to establish the
time required for the actual operation. In several instances the final
cost of the work had exceeded the estimated cost, resulting in a re
duction in the profit realized on the order. Here, of course, the va
lidity of the expense rate for the Art Department had little bearing;
this type of situation, Burns pointed out, could be corrected only by
electing to quote such operations on a more detailed basis using
more explicit cost estimates.
Also, Burns cautioned that the merging of selling and administra
tive rates with the manufacturing rates obscured the cost quotation
picture by burying selling and administrative expenses in the com
bined rates. Frequently, when comparisons were needed between
actual and estimated costs, company analysts had to separate and
identify the several types of costs incorporated into the overall de
partmental rates. Such a process had proved to be slow and ex
cessively time-consuming.
Departmental manufacturing expense rates. Manufacturing ex
penses (costs of production) were applied through 17 separate pro
duction departments or cost centers. (See Exhibit 4, page 71.) Burns
analyzed the manufacturing, selling, and administrative costs for each
month of 1961 in order to ascertain the nature and behavior of costs
incurred in each of the operating cost centers. He considered, as
well, changes in cost structure that were anticipated in 1962; such
changes as determination of current labor rates, increased charges
for depreciation, and redistribution of general (service) cost center
expenses were involved. (See Exhibit 4 for a comparison, by manu
facturing cost center, of the cost rates in use at Bartlett, and the
rates developed by the Burns’ study.)
James Turner was not surprised to see the spread between the
company’s rates and those developed in the study. Tentatively, he
believed, the study had confirmed his original judgment that the pres
ent rates used for quoting and cost purposes were severely out of
date. The study seemed to indicate that the cost center quotation
rates did not reflect current conditions. Two obvious reasons for the
differences, of course, were (1) the elimination of unabsorbed factory
overhead by spreading overhead costs on the basis of 1961 actual
volume, and (2) the different treatment of selling and administrative
expenses proposed by Burns. But all the cost center rates had not
changed by the same proportion, indicating that the “adjustments”
made in prior years had been inaccurate.
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Exhibit 4
BARTLETT LITHOGRAPHERS
Comparison of Current and
Proposed Manufacturing Rates

Cost Center
Art
Camera
Photo composing
Vacuum frame
Deep etch
Presses #1 and #9
Press #4
Press #5
Press #6
Press #7
Press #8
Cutting
Bindery
Paper handling
Shipping
Packaging
Delivery

Rates Used in 1961
for Costing and
Quotations
$ 6.29
8.72
15.55
11.08
10.47
6.73
12.74
11.49
16.33
26.29
19.94
6.13
4.10
.77
.78 skids
2.21 other
.09
.55

Proposed
Rates*

Increase
(Decrease)

$ 7.88
9.11
16.64
19.98
9.42
7.90
14.97
15.21
16.00
25.83
22.41
6.33
3.85
.48
1.03

$1.59
.39
1.09
8.90
(1.05)
1.17
2.23
3.72
( .33)
( .46)
2.47
.20
( .25)
( .29)
Not comparable

.40
.26

.31
( .29)

* Rates include direct labor and total manufacturing expenses only; sell
ing and administrative expenses are excluded.
Note: See Exhibit 5 (page 73) for unit of measurement on which the
rates are calculated.

Fixed and variable cost analysis. While the revision in manufac
turing expense rates would be helpful for cost accounting purposes,
Burns decided to extend his analysis to cover fixed and variable com
ponents. He felt that the job of pricing (preparing bids) required
more detail than was contained in the aggregate departmental ex
pense rates. He developed new variable and fixed manufacturing
expense rates for production cost centers based upon units of measure
ment such as man-hours of direct labor, press-hours utilized, and
weights of material. As shown in Exhibit 5, Burns calculated separate
costing rates for:
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Direct labor
Variable expenses
Total variable costs
Fixed expenses
Total costs.
As noted in the exhibit, the rates as calculated were based on 1961
cost and volume levels. In addition to the manufacturing expense
rates, Burns also calculated new percentages for the selling and ad
ministrative expenses, showing the variable and fixed components of
cost where applicable. Burns expected that use of the new rates, con
sidering the fixed and variable factors separately, would be far more
realistic than pricing by the old, single-rate system.
To summarize the results of his fixed-variable cost analysis, Burns
prepared a new version of the company’s 1961 income statement (see
Exhibit 6, page 75). This statement indicated that, on the basis of most
recent experience, variable costs approximated 80.19 per cent of sales
revenue at the 1961 prices and product mix.
In reviewing his analysis with Turner and Quinn, Burns suggested
that these average cost rates might be used to facilitate the task of
preparing quotations on small items or orders which did not require
the detailed analysis that was necessary for larger or more important
orders. The average cost rates, he pointed out, could also be used to
measure the profit content of orders which had already been priced
and which were ordered repeatedly on the basis of the original price
quotation.
In order to illustrate his point, Burns used the data in Exhibit 6
to develop average manufacturing costs expressed in terms of their
percentage relationship to direct labor dollars:
Variable manufacturing expenses
Fixed manufacturing expenses

128.03%
65.06%

These average cost rates could then be used, Burns said, to estimate
total manufacturing costs for a particular job, as shown on page 74:
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$ 3.34
3.36
3.60
3.63
3.75
3.40
6.28
6.52
6.60
9.30
8.34
3.10
1.56
*
*
*
*

$ 2.41
4.98
10.63
12.85
4.15
2.83
4.80
5.43
5.15
9.18
8.20
1.52
.68
.36
.76
.35
.24

Variable
Expense Rate
$ 5.75
8.34
14.23
16.48
7.90
6.23
11.08
11.95
11.75
18.48
16.54
4.62
2.24
.36
.76
.35
.24

Total Variable
Cost Rate

Total

Selling (excludes all commissions and fees for brokers)
Administrative

10.14

------

10.14

31.13

11.07
20.06

Fixed %

$ 2.13
.77
2.41
3.50
1.52
1.67
3.89
3.26
4.25
7.35
5.87
1.71
1.61
.12
.27
.05
.02

Fixed
Expense Rate

Supplementary Rates for Selling and Administrative Expenses:
Department
Variable %

*Included in determination of department variable expense rates.

Art
Camera
Photo Composing
Vacuum Frame
Deep Etch
Presses #1 & #9
Press #4
Press #5
Press #6
Press #7
Press #8
Cutting
Bindery
Paper handling
Shipping
Packaging
Delivery

Cost Center

Direct
Labor Rate

41.27

21.21
20.06

Total %

$ 7.88
9.11
16.64
19.98
9.42
7.90
14.97
15.21
16.00
25.83
22.41
6.33
3.85
.48
1.03
.40
.26

Unit of Measurement
Man hrs. of direct labor
Man hrs. of direct labor
Man hrs. of direct labor
Man hrs. of direct labor
Man hrs. of direct labor
Press hrs.
Press hrs.
Press hrs.
Press hrs.
Press hrs.
Press hrs.
Man hrs. of direct labor
Man hrs. of direct labor
Cwt. of paper handled
Cwt. of shipments
Number of packages
Cwt. of deliveries

Ratio of class expenses to
the total of direct labor and
total manufacturing
ex
penses.

Basis

Total
Manufacturing
Expense Rate

Composition of Manufacturing Expense Rates
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Estimated
Costs
Materials
Direct labor
Variable manufacturing expenses
Total variable cost

$1,500
500
640

($500 x 128.03%)

$2,640

Fixed manufacturing expenses

$ 325

Total manufacturing cost

$2,965

($500 X 65.06%)

The addition of selling and administrative expenses to the manufac
turing costs would complete the cost analysis and would provide a
basis for comparing the estimated total cost with the previously es
tablished sales price; thus, the company could predict the profitability
for each order going through the shop, and could evaluate the neces
sity of changing its prices on some of its reorder business.
Burns stressed that the use of this short form of estimating should
be confined to those instances where the price had been established
in the past, and repeat business was contingent upon quoting the
original price. He observed that the use of average cost rates pre
vented meaningful analysis of costs because the costs of the individual
operations, by cost center, would not be available for comparative
purposes. In addition, the use of averages implied that operations
and costs are similar throughout the plant, and applied equally to
all printing materials processed. Such implications were incorrect, he
believed, as evidenced by the differing cost center rates for direct
labor and expenses as he had determined them.
Plant capacity. The last major area investigated by Burns was the
availability and utilization of Bartlett’s plant facilities. As Burns said
to Turner and Quinn when they were reviewing his work, “If the
plant were running full with work that covered its full cost, a vari
able cost or contribution analysis would be purely academic.” In
consultation with company management, Burns had quickly ascer
tained that production facilities were available to handle a sizeable
increase in sales volume. Printing capacity (i.e., the capacity of the
seven printing presses) was the limiting factor in determining plant
capacity. Management agreed that all other production and service
centers would be capable of functioning at levels determined by press
requirements, even if the presses were run around the clock.
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Exhibit 6
BARTLETT LITHOGRAPHERS
Pro Forma Statement of Income
For the Year Ended December 31, 1961
(In Thousands)
% to Sales
Sales, less discounts and allowances

$1,916.9

100.00

Variable costs:
Direct materials
Direct labor
Variable manufacturing expenses
Variable selling expenses
Commissions and brokers’ fees

$ 770.0
226.6
290.0
65.3
185.4

40.16
11.82
15.13
3.41
9.67

Total variable cost

$1,537.3

80.19

Variable gross profit

$ 379.6

19.81

$ 147.3
73.5
133.2

7.69
3.83
6.95

Total fixed costs

$ 354.0

18.47

Profit from operations

$

Other income or (expense)

$ (14.0)

Profit before Federal income taxes

$

Fixed costs:
Fixed manufacturing expenses
Fixed selling expenses
Fixed general and administrative expenses

Breakeven point

1.34

25.6

11.6

(

.73)
.61

$1,787.0

Note: The breakeven point is determined by dividing the fixed costs by
the 1961 variable gross profit from operations ($354.0 ÷ 19.81% =
$1,787.0).
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2
1
1
1
1
1

Productive
Hours
1 Shift

2,845
1,422
1,422
1,422
1,422
1,422

1 &9
4
5
6
7
8

Press
No,

1 &9
4
5
6
7
8

5,690
2,844
2,844
2,844
2,844
2,844

Productive
Hours
2 Shift

254
254
254
254
254
254

Working Days
in Year

8,535
4,266
4,266
4,266
4,266
4,266

Productive
Hours
3 Shift

14
7
7
7
7
7

Hrs. Oper
ated Per Day
1 Shift Basis

4,933
2,361
2,824
2,707
3,527
2,942

Hours Reported
for Year 1961
Operations

3,556
1,778
1,778
1,778
1,778
1,778

Maximum Hrs.
Per Yr.
1 Shift Basis

1.73
1.66
1.99
1.90
2.48
2.07

Equivalent
Shift Ratio

711
356
356
356
356
356

20% Allowance
For Repairs &
Down Time

Note: 1-shift productive hours are determined by subtracting the 20% down-time allowance from the maximum hours
per year on a 1-shift basis. 2-shift and 3-shift productive hours are straight multiples of 1-shift productive hours.

No. of
Presses

Press
No.

Press Hour Capacity
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Statistics gathered by company personnel for each press, when
compared with potential press hours available, showed that the presses
had operated at substantially a two-shift level during 1961. (The de
tails of the plant capacity study are shown in Exhibit 7, page 76.)
Bartlett executives considered that sufficient press capacity existed to
increase sales volume by an additional $1,000,000 at the 1961 price
level. However, they observed, an increase in volume could be realized
only through accepting additional business at reduced prices.

Questions
1. Evaluate the analysis done by John Burns on this engagement.
Do you agree with the decisions he made that are reflected by Ex
hibit 5? W hat other areas would you have investigated if you had
been assigned to this job?
2. W hat type of pricing formula do you believe Bartlett should use
in preparing price quotations?
3. Using the data available in the case, compute the effect that a
price decrease might have on profit. From your examination of this
company’s cost-price-volume structure, what recommendations would
you make to Bartlett’s management about their pricing policies?
4. Prepare, in outline form, a final report to the client as promised
by James and Pearce in their confirmation letter (Exhibit 2, page 66).

Commentary on Bartlett Lithographers
James Turner decided that the best way to utilize the cost data
developed by his assistant, John Burns, was to attempt to project
what effect alternative pricing policies might have on Bartlett’s prof
itability. As he saw it, the company’s major concern was to reverse
the obvious profit decline. Three alternate courses of action seemed
to be available. They were:
1. Reducing costs;
2. Increasing prices at current or reduced volume levels; and
3. Increasing volume at current or reduced prices.
As Turner saw it, the company was continuously reviewing costs
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and reducing them whenever cost reduction opportunities presented
themselves. Increasing prices, in Turner’s opinion, was not consistent
with the economics of the printing market at the time; strong pres
sures were being exerted upon prices by Bartlett’s competitors. Tra
ditional practices of requesting competitive bids probably meant that
printing custom ers w ere fairly “price conscious,” and if this w ere true,

raising prices might result in rather substantial reductions in volume.
Although short-run profits might not suffer as a result of such an ac
tion, Turner was more pessimistic about the longer-run implications
of losing customers during the current, hopefully temporary, period
of over-capacity in the printing industry.
A more positive program, in Turner’s opinion, would be one aimed
at increasing Bartlett’s market share now by seeking higher volume
through lower prices. Such a course of action also held out the pros
pect of increasing short-term profits as well as the longer-run market
position of the company. The first step in evaluating this course of
action was a careful examination of the capacity utilization data that
Burns had collected.
After studying the data contained in Exhibit 7 (page 76), Turner
surmised that, except for presses #5, 7 and 8, there was room for addi
tional volume even on a two-shift basis. Further, an entire third shift
of plant capacity was available if work could be priced at a level that
would bring it into the plant. Turner believed that the establishment
of available plant capacity defined the limits within which alternative
sales targets could be evaluated. Then, each targeted volume of
sales—and the costs of those sales—could be analyzed to determine
the profitability of the additional business being considered. The
profitability of additional volume could be determined fairly easily
using the variable cost data from John Burns’ analysis.
In order to test the effect of price and volume changes on Bart
lett’s profits, Turner selected four possible price reduction levels that
could be handled without exceeding Bartlett’s capacity, even though
“fixed costs” might increase as more of the available capacity was
utilized. Analyzing these four price levels illustrated the possible
effects of lowering prices for additional business, and suggested a
floor below which prices could not be set without experiencing
losses. Turner’s four illustrations, as presented below, were subse
quently included in the report which James and Pearce submitted
to Bartlett Lithographers.
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Example Number 1:
Assumptions: 1) A three-shift operation producing $1,916,900
sales on two shifts, and a potential of $1,000,000
on the third shift.
2) A price reduction of 5 per cent applied to the
$1,000,000. (This would reduce the additional
revenue to $950,000.)
3) Variable costs will not exceed 1961 experience.
(80.19 per cent of sales)
4) No increase in fixed costs.

Sales
Variable cost

1st and
2nd shifts

3rd
shift

Total

% to sales

$1,916.9
1,537.3

$950.0
801.9

$2,866.9
2,339.2

100.00
81.59

379.6
354.0

148.1
0

527.7
354.0

18.41
12.35

25.6

$148.1

$ 173.7

6.06

Variable gross
Fixed costs
Profit

$

Comments: 1) The variable cost per cent to sales has increased from
80.19 per cent to 81.59 per cent. This increase is due
to the reduction in sales prices of the additional vol
ume. Company experience has shown that variable
costs are 80.19 per cent of net sales after discounts
and allowances. The variable costs of $1,000,000 in
sales would be $801,900; if the same units are priced
5 per cent less (at $950,000) the costs would still be
$801,900.
2) Fixed expenses in this illustration have been charged
to operations on the first and second shifts only, be
cause the example assumes no increase in fixed costs
for the third shift.
3) The results are self-evident; if the assumptions are
valid, operating profits would increase by $148,100.
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Example Number 2:
A more conservative assumption might recognize that fixed costs
would increase on the third shift and the Company, after appraising
the increase, might decide that $35,000 should be added for new fixed
costs. In this example, prices will be reduced by 10 per cent and
fixed costs increased by $35,000.

Assumptions: 1) A three-shift operation producing $1,916,900 on
two shifts and a potential of $1,000,000 on the
third shift.
2) A price reduction of 10 per cent applied to the
$1,000,000. (This reduced the additional rev
enue to $900,000.)
3) Variable costs do not exceed the 1961 level.
4) Fixed costs increase by $35,000.

Sales
Variable cost

1st and
2nd shifts

3rd
shift

Total

% to sales

$1,916.9
1,537.3

$900.0
801.9

$2,816.9
2,339.2

100.00
83.04

379.6
354.0

98.1
35.0

477.7
389.0

16.96
13.81

25.6

$ 63.1

88.7

3.15

Variable gross
Fixed costs
Profit

$

$

Comment: 1) In this illustration, the reduction in prices and the ad
ditional fixed expenses would return $63,100 in addi
tional profits if the assumptions concerning prices and
costs are valid.
Example Number 3:
The company might find that prices would have to be reduced by
15 per cent in order to obtain the additional volume. These forecast
conditions are incorporated into this third illustration.
Assumptions: 1) A three-shift operation producing $1,916,900
sales on two shifts and a potential of $1,000,000
on the third shift.
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2) A price reduction of 15 per cent applicable to
the $1,000,000. (This reduces the additional
revenue to $850,000.)
3) Variable costs do not exceed the 1961 level.
4) Fixed costs are increased by $35,000.

Sales
Variable cost

1st and
2nd shifts

3rd
shift

Total

% to sales

$1,916.9
1,537.3

$850.0
801.9

$2,766.9
2,339.2

100.00
84.54

379.6
354.0

48.1
35.0

427.7
389.0

15.46
14.06

25.6

$ 13.1

38.7

1.40

Variable gross
Fixed costs
Profit

$

$

Comment: 1) The profit increase under these conditions would be
$13,100 assuming that the price-cost-relationships fol
lowed the forecast.
Example Number 4:
It is evident from the preceding illustrations that prices on the
increased volume cannot be reduced by as much as 20% without
showing losses at the variable gross profit level. The reason for this
is that variable costs, based upon company history, equal 80.19%
of the sales dollar. If prices were set at 20% below 1961 prices for
the $1,000,000 additional volume, the loss at the variable gross profit
level would adversely affect the profit of the two-shift operations.
Thus:
1st and
2nd shifts

3rd
shift

Total

Sales
Variable cost

$1,916.9
1,537.3

$800.0
801.9

$2,716.9
2,339.2

Variable gross

$ 379.6

($

1.9)

$ 377.7

After he had reviewed the entire study with John Burns and Joseph
Quinn, Turner undertook to prepare a brief written report to the
executives at Bartlett Lithographers. The report was followed by an
oral presentation.
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Basically, Turner’s proposed quoting procedure recommended that
the company:
1) use the manufacturing cost rates that had been developed in
the study;
2) determine separate quotation costs for selling and administrative
expenses;
3) compare the desired selling price to the total variable costs in
order to determine the variable gross profit (contribution to
fixed costs) contained in each price; and
4) compare the desired selling price to total costs (variable plus
fixed) to check the net profit after the absorption of allocated
fixed expenses (net profit from operations).
Turner advised that provision should be made for testing quota
tions against more than one price so that profit potentials of alternate
prices could be compared before settling on a final price. He designed
a new form for quotation purposes which incorporated his recom
mended changes. (See Exhibit 8, page 84). The new quotation form
revealed two important control figures: (1) the variable gross profit,
and (2) the final profit from operations. The two profit figures, Turner
explained, would point out the profit impact of alternate prices for in
dividual orders, and would also show how much of the fixed costs
would be absorbed by that order.
In his report, Turner pointed out that he had illustrated the selling
price, sales volume, and cost relationships for Bartlett Lithographers
as a whole. The same concepts, he said, were applicable to individual
quotation and pricing situations. If a potential order could be priced
lower than competition, and the lower price used as a selling point
for increasing the order’s size or getting the order if it would otherwise
have been lost, the effects upon profit could be evaluated before making
a final price commitment. Conversely, using the new quotation form,
the effect of higher prices could be analyzed, and the price-cost-profit
relationships of these prices could be related to other prices being
considered.

The Client’s Reaction
The James and Pearce report was mailed to Messrs. Donovan and
Peters on July 13, 1962. The last paragraph in the transmittal letter
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stated, “We will be pleased to meet with you in the near future to
discuss these recommendations in greater detail.” In a meeting with
Bartlett management in early October 1962, Mr. Turner found the
executives to be considerably less receptive to the report proposals
than he had anticipated. One of the reasons for the client’s negative
reaction was simply that, during the last few months, Bartlett had en
joyed an upswing in its business. In Mr. Turner’s opinion, the addi
tional gross margins provided by this upswing had dampened man
agement’s interest in going after additional dollars of profit through
adopting a contribution concept of pricing. Discussing the matter a
few days later with his colleagues, Messrs. Schmidt, Quinn and Burns,
Turner observed, “This is another example of the way management’s
interests change. As we’ve all seen before, it’s difficult sometimes to
hold its attention on a particular problem long enough to get it re
solved. In this case, we will have to wait until the next cycle—that
is, until profits drop off again—to make another major thrust at this
approach. Fortunately, our continuing relationship with this client
will permit us to stay on top of the situation, so that we can raise
the pricing issue again at the appropriate time. In fact, this con
tinuing relationship is a unique capability which CPA-consultants
possess, and we must be sure that the client receives the benefit of it.
“There’s perhaps an even more fundamental reason why our pro
posals to Bartlett have been ineffective,” Turner continued, “and that
is simply management’s resistance to change. The reasons given by
Donovan and Peters for not adopting our proposals were: (1) an
unwillingness to enter into any pricing arrangement that did not re
cover 'full costs,’ and (2) a fear that committing part of their capacity
to marginal jobs at less than total cost might mean that they would
have no room for more profitable work if it should come along. Both
of these objections can perhaps be best understood if we try to view
the proposed change through the eyes of Donovan and Peters. Re
covery of 'full costs’ has been ingrained in this generation of Bartlett’s
management since the beginning, and the current upswing just pro
vides a convenient excuse for maintaining the status quo. In order to
implement our suggestions, greater utilization of capacity, and there
fore closer scheduling, w ould be required. At present, all scheduling

in done by George Peters in the back of his mind, and without a
compelling reason to revise his practices, the easiest thing to do is
just to carry on as in the past.
“There’s no easy way to lick this problem,” Turner concluded,
“but it does make it easier to tackle if we define the problem for what
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it is. Our approach really has to be an educational one, and hope
fully, by continuing to work with this client during the months and
years ahead, we can improve their own knowledge and ability to
manage their business.”
Exhibit 8
BARTLETT LITHOGRAPHERS
Proposed Quotation Analysis Form
Comparison of Costs and Selling Prices
Price Levels
( 3)

(1 )

(2 )

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

xxxx

xxxx

xxxx

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

Total variable costs
Variable gross profit
Fixed expenses

xxxx

xxxx

xxxx

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

Profit from operations

xxxx

xxxx

xxxx

Desired selling prices
Commissions and broker’s fees
Total selling price
Variable manufacturing costs
Variable selling costs
Commissions and broker’s fee

% variable gross profit to
total selling price
% profit from operations to
total selling price
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—

%

—

%

—

%

—

%

—

%

—

%

Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc.
Kingsbury, Chase & Co., CPAs, was a large New England firm with
headquarters in Boston, Massachusetts, and offices in Hartford,
Connecticut; Providence, Rhode Island; and Augusta, Maine. The
firm had a total of 10 partners. Its practice comprised mainly audit
and tax work, and most of its clients were medium-sized business
establishments in the southern New England area. The firm’s part
ners were, however, well aware of the fact that they were in a position
to render valuable advisory services to many of their clients, and had
therefore established a Management Services Department in 1960.
In July that year Robert Chase, the senior partner in the Boston office,
appointed Kenneth Morrison, a young CPA who had just completed his
M.B.A. degree, as the firm’s first specialist in management services.
Mr. Morrison had been on a two-year leave of absence from the firm
to undertake graduate study. The firm’s arrangement with Mr.
Morrison was that he would be located in the Boston office, and would
temporarily be assigned to audit work but would primarily be avail
able for work on management services assignments. Mr. Chase hoped
that within a year Mr. Morrison would be specializing almost ex
clusively in management services work, and would eventually become
the firm’s partner in charge of the Management Services Department.
The new department proved to be very successful. By 1963 Mr.
Morrison had been formally appointed Manager of the department,
and had a staff of 4 people, two CPAs and two recent business school
graduates. Mr. Morrison still reported to Mr. Chase, but had con
siderable autonomy in the operation of the department.
In March 1963, David Edwards, partner in charge of the Augusta
office, received a telephone call from one of the firm’s oldest clients,
Leonard Vogel, President of Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc., of
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Greenville, Maine. Mr. Chase and Mr. Vogel had met while serving
in the same unit of the Army Air Corps during World War II. After
the war Mr. Vogel and two other Air Force friends had set up a small
seaplane harbor and service establishment in Greenville, on Moose
head Lake. One of Mr. Vogel’s partners had been killed late in 1946
when his seaplane crashed on a mountainside in northern Maine, and
the other left to set up his own business in California a year later.
From late 1947, therefore, Mr. Vogel had operated the business as
sole owner. He had incorporated as Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc.,
shortly after his second partner had left him. The business had be
come one of Kingsbury, Chase & Co.’s first clients when the CPA firm
was established on Mr. Chase’s return to Boston in 1946. For the first
few years Mr. Chase personally had handled the work on the account,
but it was transferred to the Augusta office when that was set up in
1950. However, Mr. Vogel and Mr. Chase had maintained contact
with each other.
When Mr. Vogel telephoned Mr. Edwards in March, 1963, he ex
plained that he was preparing plans for the spring, when his busy
season started, and needed some help for a review of his prices and
pricing policies. He said that Mr. Chase had told him about Mr.
Morrison and the new Management Services Department and won
dered if they could handle the assignment. Mr. Edwards said he
would be glad to have Mr. Morrison call Mr. Vogel and explore the
question further.

Morrison’s Meeting With Vogel
Mr. Morrison arranged to meet with Mr. Vogel the following week
at the firm’s Boston office, as Vogel had been planning to fly down to
Boston on other business. Prior to the meeting, Mr. Morrison re
viewed Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc.’s 1962 and 1961 financial
statements, which Mr. Edwards had mailed to him. (See Exhibits 1
and 2, pages 87-89.) Mr. Edwards had also included a short memo
randum in which he described Greenville’s five “activities” in the
following terms:
1. Charters. The company offers a charter service to fishermen and
hunters wishing to travel to northern Maine, New Brunswick
and Quebec. The company’s charter services are also often used
by wealthy individuals desiring fast transportation to their sum
mer homes in the same area. In addition, other charters of a
miscellaneous nature are sometimes requested.
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Exhibit 1
GREENVILLE SEAPLANE SERVICE, INC.
Comparative Balance Sheet
December 31, 1962 and 1961
December 31,
1961
1962

Assets
Current Assets
Cash
Accounts receivable
Merchandise inventory
Prepaid expenses
Total current assets
Fixed assets
Flight equipment, tools, fixtures,
automobiles and furniture—at cost
Less: accumulated depreciation
Building at cost
Net fixed assets
Total assets

Liabilities
Current Liabilities
Accounts payable
Notes payable (bank)
Greenville Marina
Income taxes
Accrued taxes (Other)
Total current liabilities
Leonard Vogel—Note payable

$ 1,082
21,967
6,906
4,519
$34,474

$12,261
6,300
17,359
4,994
$40,914

$50,118
15,528

$45,335
21,816

$34,590
20,230
$54,820

$23,519

$89,294

$23,519
$64,433

December 31,
1961
1962

$31,916

$ 7,062
1,000
(1,161)
169
2,286
$ 9,356
—
$ 9,356

Earned surplus

$50,000
7,500
$42,500
14,878

$50,000
7,500
$42,500
12,577

Total equity

$57,378

$55,077

$89,294

$64,433

Total liabilities
Stockholders’ equity
Capital stock
Less: treasury stock

Total liabilities & equity

$ 5,582
9,000
4,799
2,082
3,453
$24,916
$ 7,000
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Exhibit 2
GREENVILLE SEAPLANE SERVICE, INC.
Comparative Statements of Income
For the Years Ended December 31, 1962 and 1961
December 31,
1961
1962
Sales of merchandise
Parts—shop
Parts—other
Gas and oil
Airplanes

$22,811
16,512
9,935
4,500

$11,052
20,123
8,261
18,475

Total sales

$53,758

$57,911

$40,646
972

$49,341
5,583

$39,674

$43,758

Gross profit on merchandise

$14,084

$14,153

Service revenue
Flight instruction, dual
Flight instruction, solo
Charter
Tutoring, aircraft rental, etc.

$12,401
12,779
23,495
2,285

$17,353
18,342
19,807
1,450

$50,960
1,781

$56,952
3,616

$49,179
37,111
6,175

$53,336
34,085
5,964

$92,465

$93,385

Other income
Gain on sale of used aircraft
Commissions
Miscellaneous

$ 7,179
3,290
2,111

$ 5,705
3,867
3,816

Total other income

$12,580

$13,388

$119,129

$120,926

Less: cost of sales
Purchases
Less: inventory increase
Cost of sales

Total flight revenue
Less flight expense
Net flight revenue
Labor (shop)1
Moorage
Total service revenue

Total gross profit, service & other income

1 Labor hours charged to customers were 9,664 in 1962 and 8,458 in 1961.
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Exhibit 2 (continued)
1962

1961

$ 1,378
48
433
865
7,555
65
105
5,419
694
6,850
2,967
736
3,028
540
1,223
2,400
1,090
15,148
9,358
29,272
1,123
3,077
1,974
1,233
671
800

$ 1,362
48
541
846
11,487
136
43
6,685
559
7,400
3,503
751
263
301
1,346
577
3,576
12,886
5,485
25,546
1,234
2,446
3,592
1,376
193
845

$98,052

$93,027

$14,400
1,576
971

$14,400
1,839
1,865

Total other expenses

$16,947

$18,104

Total operating and other expenses

$114,999

$111,131

Income before Federal income taxes

$ 4,130

$ 9,795

Operating expenses
Advertising
Bank charges
Building repairs and maintenance
Car expense
Depreciation2
Donations
Dues and subscriptions
Gas and oil—Aircraft
Equipment repairs
Rent
Insurance
Laundry
Legal and audit
Licenses and permits
Office supplies and postage
Outside labor
Ramp and ground maintenance
Salaries—Flight
Salaries—Office
Salaries—Shop
Shop supplies
Taxes—payroll
Taxes—other
Telephone and telegraph
Travel and entertainment
Utilities
Total Operating Expenses
Other expenses
President’s salary
Interest paid
Miscellaneous

2 Includes $2,000 depreciation on nonflying equipment each year. The
balance is for depreciation of various aircraft owned for part or all of
each year.
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2. Maintenance Service. The company provides maintenance for
seaplanes regularly moored in its harbor, and also for seaplanes
specially flown in for that purpose. Seaplane owners from upper
New England and the Eastern provinces of Canada often fly
their planes several hundred miles to Greenville for service.
3. Moorage. The company rents storage space in a small hangar
it has constructed, and also provides outside storage on land
that it has rented at the shore of the lake. (Mr. Vogel is the
owner of the land.)
4. Flight Instruction. Mr. Vogel and the other pilots on his payroll
offer flight instruction in any of the company’s airplanes. These
include a Cessna 180, a Piper Super Cub, and a Champ.
5. Sales of Merchandise. The company operates a general seaplane
supply store that stocks gas and oil, seaplane parts, charts, log
books, and miscellaneous items all the way down to soda pop.
In addition, the company acts as sales representative for many
of the manufacturers of light airplanes, and usually handles the
sale of at least two light planes per year. Airplane sales are not,
of course, as predictable or as regular as general merchandise
sales.
When he arrived, Mr. Vogel told Mr. Morrison that he had been
wondering recently whether the prices that he charged for the com
pany’s various services were correct. He had started thinking about
this because, as he put it to Mr. Morrison, “We’re usually pretty busy,
and at the end of the year it seems as though we’ve done an awful lot
of hard work and yet we sometimes don’t seem to come out with
enough profit.” In effect, Mr. Vogel was wondering whether chang
ing any of his prices would improve his profitability. He told Mr.
Morrison that the prices that he was charging had been set several
years ago, and had not been changed at all except in recognition of
some cost increases over the years. He said that it had now occurred
to him that it might be advantageous to have someone like Mr. Mor
rison review his price structure, and perhaps come up with some
recommendations that would hopefully lead to increased profits.
Mr. Morrison replied that he thought that he and his staff could
handle this type of assignment. He told Mr. Vogel that it was his
practice to ask prospective management services clients to spend some
time with him describing their operations and the nature of their
problem so that he could form an opinion as to the amount of work
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which would be required.
visit he would try to give
ville. Mr. Vogel said that
gested he start by giving
affecting each part of the
reported below.

If Mr. Vogel had time to do this on this
him an estimate before he left for Green
he did have the time. Mr. Morrison sug
him a rundown on the important factors
business. The discussion which ensued is

1. Flight Charter
The two planes used for charters were the Cessna at $35 per hour
and the Super Cub at $16 per hour. Direct expenses incurred in
connection with charter flights were mainly gasoline consumption, at
the rate of 12 and 7 gallons per hour, respectively. Mr. Vogel said
that pilot’s salary was also one of the applicable costs, but when Mr.
Morrison questioned him on this point he admitted that the pilots’
terms of employment were fixed by contract, either 12 months or 6
months per year, and that in addition the pilots also doubled as flight
instructors when required. Mr. Vogel said that there were four or
five operators of charter flights in the area that he served, but that he
did not experience too much competition. He felt that the service
that he provided was far superior to that offered by his competitors
in that, for example, his service was more personalized, and his flights
were better, faster, and used more modern equipment. He said that
he did more charter business than his typical competitor and there
fore achieved some of the advantages of specialization.
2. Servicing
Shop labor was charged out at $6.00 per hour. Before charges were
finally billed, it was Mr. Vogel’s custom to review the total bill and
adjust it downwards, if necessary, depending on the value of the job to
the customer and on how well it had been done. Mr. Vogel said that
repair work on aircraft was mostly a question of labor time, rather
than expensive parts. The result was that the cost of aircraft repairs
was very high. He had known cases in which the cost of a repair job
exceeded the market value of the aircraft after the repair had been
carried out.
Repair work was one of the areas in which Mr. Vogel thought he
ought to increase his rates, but he said that repair work was so expen
sive that he did not feel it was possible for him to charge more for it.
He had no corporations among his repair clients, and he felt that the
individuals who came to him would lose their interest in flying if he
made repair work too expensive. He believed that his customers only
91

had a limited amount of money to spend on aircraft maintenance. Mr.
Vogel said that he had no competition in his repair service because
his company was the only establishment in the area that had the
specialized facilities necessary to take care of float aircraft. In addi
tion, he pointed out that many of his repair mechanics had been with
him for as long as 15 years, and were well known for the quality of
their work. These factors, he believed, were the primary reasons why
people often flew several hundred miles to bring their aircraft to
Greenville for repair work.
Mr. Vogel told Mr. Morrison that he had heard that very few repair
shops in the light aircraft service industry were profitable. However,
he said that he would never think of closing down his own shop,
because he needed its facilities to take care of the aircraft that he
operated himself. He estimated that the shop had worked about 1,500
hours on servicing his planes in 1961 and a somewhat lesser amount,
perhaps 1,300 hours, in 1962. In addition, having a well set up repair
shop often meant that additional profits could be obtained from the
rebuilding of wrecked aircraft which could be bought for a low price
and sold for a good profit after being rsetored to operating condition.
He felt that this kind of profit made up for the losses that were in
curred in the shop on routine jobs. Another variation on this idea
was to buy and use a new aircraft and then, after a few hundred hours
of flying time, renovate it and sell it at a price that was below the
new machine price at retail, but still above the company’s wholesale
cost.
3. Moorage
The company charged $15 a month for outside storage and $25 a
month for six of the eight inside stalls. The seventh inside stall was
rented at $30 a month, and the eighth was used to store the company’s
Cessna plane. Mr. Vogel was hoping to raise all inside rentals to at
least $30 per month. Mr. Vogel explained that he used a forklift truck
to move seaplanes from the lake shore ramp to the storage area be
tween the hangar and the repair shop. When a customer came to use
his plane, or a service or repair job was scheduled, the forklift truck
would then simply drive to the storage area and pick up the plane
in question.
In response to a question from Mr. Morrison, Mr. Vogel said that
while repair work did not bring much in the way of other types of
business with it except moorage, it was often the case that planes
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were brought in for moorage and that the owners would then later
request that Mr. Vogel have them serviced during the winter at any
convenient time. Apparently some repair shops that Mr. Vogel knew
about gave free moorage for airplanes brought in on repair jobs, but
it was Mr. Vogel’s practice to charge separately for moorage for all
the time that a moored plane was not in the repair shop. Because of
the protected position that the company’s premises enjoyed at the foot
of Moosehead Lake, it was quite safe for aircraft to be stored outside
during the winter. Theoretically there was danger from both high
winds and heavy snow, but in all the years that Mr. Vogel had known
Greenville, the southern portion of the lake had never been subject
to high winds at any time of the year, and it was a relatively simple
matter to prevent excessive amounts of snow from piling up on air
crafts’ wings when snow fell during the winter.
4. Flight Instruction
The company employed two instructors during the six summer
months, and kept one of them on for the six winter months as well.
The permanent instructor received $500 per month and the summer
instructors $450 per month. Mr. Vogel said that they averaged 80
to 90 hours a month chargeable time in the summer each, and 30 to 40
hours a month in the winter. The instruction charges and gas con
sumption rates for the three airplanes used were as stated below:

Champ
Super Cub
Cessna 180

Solo

Dual

Gallons of gasoline
per hour

$10
12
30

$15
17
35

5
7
12

Mr. Vogel told Mr. Morrison that he was fairly certain that flying
lessons were unprofitable. He said that the $5 differential between
solo and dual rates was “obviously not sufficient to cover the cost of
employing an instructor.” Mr. Vogel told Mr. Morrison that the
volume of flying instruction had declined steadily since the end of the
war, when many ex-servicemen had decided to take flying lessons un
der the GI Bill. In addition, his company experienced severe competi
tion for instruction business because they were at a considerable dis
advantage compared to the many land plane operators in the area.
Compared with these people, Mr. Vogel’s seaplanes required a larger
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investment and upkeep cost and involved a much greater risk in
providing flying instruction.
5. Merchandise Sales
There was about a 25 per cent average gross profit on the sale of
general merchandise and parts (the latter were sold mainly in connec
tion with repair work, but occasionally were delivered directly to the
customer). Mr. Vogel said that, of course, there was some expense
connected with the handling of parts sales. For instance, he estimated
that about 20 per cent of his full-time pilot’s time was spent on parts
sales activities. The gross profit percentage on gas and oil was about
30 per cent, and Mr. Vogel remarked that his company was selling
gas for 2 to 3 cents a gallon less than competitors.
As a final point, Mr. Vogel pointed out that it was not really strictly
necessary for depreciation to be charged in his annual income state
ments, although he had been doing so. With the exception of the
Cessna, which had depreciated somewhat, Mr. Vogel had found that
it was usually possible to sell used airplanes at approximately the
wholesale cost of the plane to the company, so that no loss in value
was ever sustained.
Mr. Vogel summed up by saying that he had flight equipment that
could be flown more than it was being flown, and facilities that could
be used more than they were being used. What he wanted to do was
to use this unused capacity and to do so in the most profitable way.
If, for example, a price reduction in charter flights would increase
total charter flight profits by adding more in volume than was lost
through the price reduction, then he thought that this was a sound
and constructive way to put his idle capacity to use.
By the time that this point was reached it was almost midday, and
Mr. Vogel mentioned that he was having lunch with Mr. Chase. He
said he would return after lunch to see whether Mr. Morrison had
been able to form any opinion about the project. As he left Mr. Vogel
made a casual comment that seemed to indicate that he was somewhat
apprehensive about the potential cost of the project. Mr. Morrison
replied, “Let’s talk about that when you get back from lunch.”

Questions
1. W hat type of fee arrangement do you think Mr. Morrison should
offer to Mr. Vogel? If Mr. Vogel requested some rough estimate of the
total billing, how would you respond?
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2. Do you think that Mr. Morrison should formalize this project
by sending Mr. Vogel a letter confirming the nature and the scope of
this engagement? Draft a letter that you think might be suitable for
this purpose.
3. Using the data available in the case, prepare an analysis of
product line profitability for Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc., for
1962 and and/or 1961. What comments can you make about Mr.
Vogel’s pricing policies as a result of your analysis?
4. What kinds of additional data could Mr. Morrison try to get from
a visit to Greenville in order to improve upon your analysis?
5. As Mr. Morrison, prepare a memorandum to Mr. Vogel reporting
your major findings and recommending the way that he might pro
ceed to modify his prices in order to improve his profitability.

Commentary on Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc.
When Mr. Vogel returned to Mr. Morrison’s office the latter was
ready with a suggestion. He told Mr. Vogel that he felt that there
were two interrelated elements in the problem—not only pricing as
such but also product profitability. For a multiproduct company an
analysis of these two elements could be quite a large job. He appre
ciated, however, that Mr. Vogel did not want a large and expensive
job done. He proposed, therefore, that the firm undertake a limited
review of the problem. This review would be exploratory rather than
decision-oriented, but would serve to open up the problem, and in all
likelihood indicate whether and where any additional work was
necessary. Mr. Morrison said that it was quite possible that some
preliminary conclusions might in fact be drawn from the review
he had in mind, but he cautioned Mr. Vogel against expecting too
much in the way of results. Nevertheless, he pointed out, the cost
would be limited in accordance with Mr. Vogel’s wishes, and yet some
useful results might be obtained. He said that to minimize the cost he
would assign Mr. Dexter Cleve, one of his staffmen, to do the bulk
of the work. Mr. Cleve, one of the two M.B.A. graduates on Mr.
Morrison’s staff, was billed at the rate of $12.50 per hour. Mr. Mor
rison said that Mr. Cleve would probably need to devote the better
part of a week to the project. He, himself, would supervise Mr. Cleve,
and bill his own time at his regular rate of $20 per hour. He further
suggested that his report be informally presented by way of an in
formal memorandum, to avoid unnecessary expenditure of time in
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presentation ( although he added that he would certainly be available
to discuss his findings if Mr. Vogel so desired). In total he estimated
the cost of the job at between $500 and $600. He pointed out that
the firm normally did not undertake jobs of such small size.
Mr. Vogel replied that Mr. Morrison’s proposal seemed to be in line
with his own wishes, particularly in the matter of cost, and authorized
him to proceed as soon as he was ready. Mr. Morrison promised to
start Mr. Cleve on the assignment within the next three weeks. Since
the assignment was defined as a review, Mr. Morrison expected that
Mr. Cleve would be able to do most of his work in the Boston office,
relying primarily on the firm’s files and the notes that Mr. Morrison had
made during his conversation with Mr. Vogel, and supplementing
these with a one-day trip to Greenville and telephone calls to Mr.
Vogel.

Mr. Cleve’s Investigation and Analysis
Later that week Mr. Cleve found an opportunity to begin his review
of the material that Mr. Morrison had given him, which included
the company’s 1962 and 1961 financial statements (Exhibits 1 and 2,
pages 87-89) which Mr. Edwards had mailed to Mr. Morrison. After
reviewing the material, Mr. Cleve’s first conclusion was that the
dominant characteristic of the company’s operating situation was the
fact that a very substantial portion of its total expenses was fixed. In
addition, many of the expense headings in the income statement were
items that could not be allocated to any of the business’ five areas of
operations. In other words, Mr. Cleve visualized the company’s total
annual operating expenses as being made up of the following three
types:
1. Expenses that varied more or less directly with the volume of
business in a particular operation.
2. Expenses which could be assigned to one of the company’s
operating activities, even though the expense itself was unlikely to
vary with volume.
3. Expenses which were fixed for the business as a whole, and
could not be assigned to any of the individual operations.
To Mr. Cleve, the importance of this breakdown was that under
pricing theory, any business operation should make a contribution over
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and above the directly variable costs associated with it, and that the
total of such contributions over variable costs should at a minimum
provide for the fixed costs of operating the business entity. If the
company’s cost framework had been the reverse of what it was (i.e., if
variable costs had been greater and fixed costs lower), Mr. Cleve
reasoned that it would have been relatively easy to gauge overall
profitability from individual product line profitability because the bulk
of the expenses could properly be allocated to individual operations.
If fixed overhead costs were small, then it would not be necessary for
the required contribution to rank large in comparison with the variable
costs per unit. In the case of Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc., how
ever, Mr. Cleve recognized that his problem was much more difficult,
as the two types of overhead “pools” which had to be covered were
very large in relation to the variable costs of running each operation.
Because of the large overhead factor, Mr. Cleve thought that here
indeed was a case where “direct cost” pricing could lead a firm into
financial difficulties.
Referring to Mr. Morrison’s notes, Mr. Cleve noted that Mr. Vogel
himself had been aware of this problem, although he had expressed
it in a different way, when he had pointed out that he had facilities
and equipment ready for use and that his problem was getting more
use out of them. The mere fact of having the equipment and facilities
available accounted for the bulk of the company’s costs, and these
costs had to be met by the margins over and above the variable costs
earned from providing services. As a first step in his analysis, there
fore, Mr. Cleve decided to identify as accurately as possible those
expenses which were fixed and those which varied with the volume
of business. Taking the 1962 and 1961 income statements, he pre
pared the schedule on page 98, which identified costs which could be
allocated, and which therefore provided a total figure for fixed “gen
eral overhead” costs.
Several of the items in the schedule on the following page gave Mr.
Cleve some difficulty which he eventually finally resolved by dis
cussing them with Mr. Vogel. The first of these was depreciation. Ac
cording to the notes that Mr. Cleve had received from Mr. Morrison,
there was no real decline in market value on airplanes, even though
Mr. Vogel’s books showed an item for depreciation expense, and this
statement was corroborated by the gain realized from the sales of used
aircraft in 1962 and 1961. For the purpose of his analysis, therefore,
Mr. Cleve decided to ignore all depreciation expense except the $2,000
per year depreciation on non-flight equipment.
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Computation of General Overhead, Years 1962 and 1961
1962

1961

Expenses per income statements:
“Operating expenses”
“Other expenses”

$ 98,052
16,947

$ 93,027
18,105

Total expenses

$114,999

$111,132

$ 5,555
5,419
2,740
736
15,148
29,272
1,123
2,534
2,400

$ 9,487
6,685
3,300
751
12,886
25,546
1,233
2,100
2,400

$ 64,927

$ 64,388

$ 50,072

$ 46,744

Less items not to be included in general
overhead (i.e., to be allocated)
Depreciation on flight equipment
Gas and oil
Insurance
Laundry
Salaries—flight
Salaries—shop
Shop supplies
Taxes—payroll
Officers’ salary1
Total to be allocated
General overhead

The next item requiring special consideration was insurance ex
pense. On inquiring into the nature of the policies held by the com
pany, Mr. Cleve found that the company’s insurance expense could be
allocated partly to general overhead and partly to the flight depart
ment and the repair shop. The amount listed in the schedule above
was the total that could be allocated to these two departments. Pay
roll taxes were similarly analyzed and allocated. (See departmental
analysis on the following pages.)
Finally, Mr. Cleve noted that Mr. Vogel’s salary was charged at
$14,400 per year. Mr. Cleve felt that it was reasonable to assume that
1 Officers’ salary at $1,000 per month included in overhead ( see text for
explanation). The $2,400 deduction is not actually allocated to a product
line; it is deducted only because general overhead is to include only a
$12,000 salary, as against $14,400 paid.
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a business of this sort would, in the absence of an owner-manager,
have to employ a manager at a substantial salary and that this salary
ought to be included in the general overhead pool. After some dis
cussion with Mr. Vogel, therefore, Mr. Cleve decided that a man
agerial salary of $1,000 per month would be appropriate to include
in the general overhead, and he accordingly deducted from the total
the excess over that amount that had actually been included in the
expense totals on the schedule on the previous page.
Having established the size of the general overhead pool, Mr, Cleve
then decided to compare the contribution rates being earned by the
different departments of the business. He decided to classify the
company’s operations into three groups for purposes of analysis. The
first was merchandise sales, the second was the flight department
i.e., instruction and charter), and the third was the repair shop. This
grouping omitted moorage as a separate income producing activity.
In Mr. Cleve’s opinion (substantiated by a discussion with Mr. Vogel),
there were no expenses at all that were directly allocable to moorage,
and so he decided to credit moorage income against the general pool.
Mr. Cleve’s computations of departmental gross profits for the three
groups are shown in Schedules I, II, and III, which follow.

I—Computation of Gross Profit from Sales of Parts,
Airplanes, and Gas and Oil—Years 1962 and 1961

Sales—
Parts
Airplanes
Gas and oil

Less cost of sales (per income statements)
Gross profit
% of gross profit

1962

1961

$39,323
4,500
9,935

$31,175
18,475
8,261

$53,758

$57,911

39,674

43,758

$14,084

$14,153

26.2%

24.4%
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II—Computation of Gross Profits from Flight Department
Years 1962 and 1961
Income—
Instruction, including tutoring
Charter
Aircraft rental

Direct expenses—
Salaries—flight
Taxes—payroll
Gas and oil
Insurance
Flight expense
Shop hours @ $4 per hour

Gross profit
% of gross profit

1962

1961

$26,430
23,495
1,035

$36,203
19,807
942

$50,960

$56,952

$15,148
865
5,419
2,626
1,781
5,284

$12,886
700
6,685
3,100
3,616
6,000

$31,123

$32,987

$19,837

$23,965

38.9%

42.8%

III—Computation of Gross Profit from Shop Labor
Years 1962 and 1961
1962

1961

Sales of shop labor

$37,111

$34,085

Direct expenses—
Salaries—shop (after deducting
charges on own aircraft)
Taxes—payroll
Shop supplies
Laundry
Insurance

$23,988
1,669
1,123
736
114.

$19,546
1,400
1,234
751
200

$27,630

$23,131

$ 9,481

$10,954

25.5%

32.1%

Gross profit
% of gross profit

The schedules ( II and I I I ) for the flight department and shop labor
both included expense headings such as insurance and payroll taxes
which had been allocated based on Mr. Cleve’s analysis. In addition,
Mr. Cleve decided to include as a flight department expense the value
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Analysis of Net Earnings, Years 1962 and 1961
1962

1961

Gross profit—
Sales
Flight department
Shop labor

$14,084
19,837
9,481

$14,153
23,965
10,954

Less general overhead, net of moorage*

$43,402
43,897*

$49,072
40,778*

Operating profit
$ (495)
Other income, net of depreciation over $2,000** 7,025**

$ 8,294
3,901**

Net earnings before officer’s salary adjustment
Adjustment to bring officer’s salary to actual
amounts

$ 6,530

$12,195

Net earnings per statements

$ 4,130

$ 9,795

Notes:
* Total general overhead
Less moorage

$50,072
6,175

$46,744
5,964

$43,897

$40,780

$12,580
(7,555)

$13,388
(11,487)

Net general overhead
** Other income, per income statements
Less depreciation as charged
Add depreciation included in
general overhead
Net other income

(2,400)

(2,400)

2,000

2,000

$ 7,025

$ 3,901

of the shop labor performed for the flight department. An analysis of
Greenville’s records showed that 1,321 hours had been spent by the
shop in 1962 on planes owned by Greenville. Mr. Cleve valued these
hours at $4.00, a rough average of the hourly rates actually charged
to commercial customers in 1961 ($4.03 per hour) and 1962 ($3.84
per hour). Because Mr. Vogel’s 1962 estimate of “inside” shop hours
was so accurate, Mr. Morrison accepted the 1,500 hour estimate for
1961 without verification. The amounts thus determined were treated
as an expense of the flight department in Schedule II, and the same
amounts were used to reduce the expense of shop salaries in Schedule
III.
After preparing the departmental gross profit analyses, Mr. Cleve
prepared the schedule ( above) to reconcile departmental gross
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profits with net earnings as reported for the corporation in its 1962
and 1961 income statements. This reconciliation, as will be noted,
shows departmental gross profits, less general overhead net of moor
age (i.e., operating profit), plus other income net of additional de
preciation not included in overhead, less additional officer’s salary not
included in overhead, resulting in the before-tax earnings total as
reported in the financial statements.
Mr. Cleve then turned to an examination of the variability of the
departmental gross margins that he had just computed. He realized
that while the departmental contribution percentages that he had
calculated were accurate guides as to the extent to which present
prices produced margins to cover general corporate overhead, it was
nevertheless true that many of the expenses that he had included in
the departmental statements were fixed rather than variable. This
meant that additional or marginal business could be more profitable
than the calculated gross profit percentages indicated. He reasoned
that it was important for Mr. Vogel to know the marginal profitability
of his different operations, in the event that it was later decided that
price changes might produce greater total contributions and thus
increase profits. As far as the gross profit on merchandise sales was
concerned, it was clear that the margin calculated, roughly 25 per
cent, was reasonably accurate, because all of the costs deducted from
sales were variable with sales. As it appeared in the corporation’s
income statements, “cost of sales” was simply the normal calculation
of purchases less inventory adjustments.
As far as the flight department was concerned, Mr. Cleve concluded
that the only expenses which were truly variable were the following:
gas and oil, flight expense, and shop hour charges. (While the latter
was an internal charge, Mr. Cleve thought it was probably a fair
representation of the costs actually incurred in maintaining the com
pany’s aircraft.) The major “direct expense” for the flight department
was “flight salaries” which could only vary in large steps, depending
on Mr. Vogel’s decision to hire or fire his pilots. Once they were on the
payroll, their salaries were incurred whether or not they flew charters
or provided student instruction. The other major direct flight depart
ment expense, insurance, was definitely fixed, as it related to the
coverage that Mr. Vogel bought each year against the various risks
that were associated with having a flight department in operation.
The three truly variable items totalled $16,300 in 1961 and $12,484 in
1962. These totals were 29 per cent and 24 per cent respectively on
the flight department revenue in each year. This meant that, on the
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average, flight revenue provided a 75 per cent contribution. Mr. Cleve
decided to look into this more deeply, and prepared the following
schedule to show the hourly costs of operating the three different
aircraft which the company owned.
Computation of Estimated Hourly Cost of Operating
Aircraft

Gas consumed (at cost)
Maintenance
Manhours (at $4 per hour)
Material

Champ

Super-Cub

Cessna

$1.26

$1.76

$3.02

1.30
.40

1.92
.50

2.32
1.25

$2.96

$4.18

$6.59

The costs included in the schedule above were the only costs that
varied with actual operation volume. Mr. Cleve contrasted these
hourly costs with the standard hourly rates that the company charged
for the use of its aircraft, This comparison showed the following:
(all figures per hour).
Champ

Super-Cub

Cessna

Revenue
Solo instruction
Dual instruction
Charters

$10.00
15.00
—

$12.00
17.00
16.00

$30.00
35.00
35.00

Costs (previous schedule)

$ 2.96

$ 4.18

$ 6.59

Contribution
Solo instruction
Dual instruction
Charters

$ 7.04
12.04
—

$ 7.82
12.82
11.82

$23.41
28.41
28.41

Contribution %
Solo instruction
Dual instruction
Charters

70%
80%
—

65%
75%
74%

78%
81%
81%

As can be seen from the above, none of the different flying opera
tions offered a substantially different contribution rate to the average
75 per cent referred to above. Perhaps the most notable conclusion
to be drawn from this particular portion of the analysis was that the
Super-Cub appeared to be the least profitable plane on a percentage
contribution basis. One conclusion which Mr. Cleve drew from the
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Combined Results of Flight Department and Its
1962

1961

Flight department direct expenses
Less volume—variable items

$31,123
12,484

$32,987
16,301

Flight department fixed expenses

$18,639

$16,686

Add: Repair Shop fixed expenses:
Direct expenses
$27,630
Less: volume—variable items** 1,859

$23,131
1,985

Gross fixed expenses $25,771
Less: net sales revenue
(net of variable costs) 35,252
Repair shop net fixed
expenses (gain)

$(9,481)

Flight department
net fixed expenses
$ 9,158
Flight department contribution %
76%
Flight department
breakeven volume
$12,000
(Actual volume
$50,960
* Supplies and laundry

Calculations

(1)

$21,146
32,100
$(10,954)

(2)

$ 5,732
71%

(3) = ( l ) + (2)
(4)

$ 8,100
$56,952)

(5) = (3) ÷ (4)

percentage contribution figures was that if Mr. Vogel believed that
the demand for instruction or charter flights was very susceptible to
price reductions, there was plenty of latitude for them.
As far as the repair shop was concerned, Mr. Cleve came to the
conclusion that practically all of the “direct expenses” were in fact
fixed, once the repair shop was set up and in operation. Mr. Vogel in
dicated that he had had many of his mechanics in his employ for a
considerable period of time, and he had told Mr. Morrison that he
had no intention whatsoever of laying them off when business was
slack. As he had told Mr. Morrison, many of his repair customers
came to him because they knew of the reputation of his mechanics.
The second thing that struck Mr. Cleve about the repair shop was
the other statement Mr. Vogel had made to Mr. Morrison; namely,
that as far as he was concerned, it was necessary for him to have a
repair shop in existence in order to cater to the needs of his flight
department. He was thus not particularly concerned if the repair
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shop did not show a profit on the outside repair work that it performed.
(In actual fact, as the schedule included earlier shows, this depart
ment did provide a contribution of between 25 and 30 per cent.) The
important point, however, was Mr. Vogel’s insistence that his having
a repair shop was in no way related to the volume of repair work that
came from outside.
Bearing this in mind, Mr. Cleve prepared the schedule on page 104,
which showed the results for the flight department and the repair shop
combined, with the revenue earned by the latter being deducted from
its total expenses, and the net excess being deducted from the direct
expenses of the flight department. This calculation produced an inter
esting “breakeven” result.
The schedule on page 104 showed that with this reorganization of
the figures, the flight department together with its “subsidiary service
department,” the repair shop, actually had a very low net fixed cost to
be covered from service revenue in 1962 and 1961. As the schedule
shows, the breakeven sales volume for the two years was $12,000 and
$8,100, respectively, compared to over $50,000 realized in each year.
Reverting to the point made earlier that variable expenses in the
repair shop only amounted to a little under $2,000 in both 1962 and
1961, against revenue of $37,000 and $34,000, respectively, Mr. Cleve
noted that the actual contribution percentage in the shop (disregard
ing the treatment in the immediately preceding paragraph) was there
fore 94 per cent. Whether or not repair shop contribution was allo
cated to the fixed expenses of the flight department, Mr. Cleve realized
that the fixed nature of practically all of the repair shop expenses
meant that marginal business was extremely profitable.

Mr. Cleve’s Conclusions
When he had completed the preceding analysis, Mr. Cleve wrote a
memorandum to Mr. Morrison enclosing the various schedules repro
duced on the preceding pages, and commented as follows:
The main accomplishment of my analysis has been to bring out
very forcibly the extent to which Greenville Seaplane’s costs of
doing business are fixed, even at the departmental level. This
means th at additional business in both the flight departm ent and

the repair shop would be extremely profitable; the only department
with “conventional” profit margins is the merchandise sales depart
ment.
I have always felt that one of the most important factors to be
taken into account in pricing decisions is the competition which
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any particular businessman faces. In the case of this particular
business, by Mr. Vogel’s own admission, there is not very much
actual competition. In fact, most of the competition felt by Green
ville Seaplane Service, Inc., is in the instruction field, where land
plane operators are at considerable advantage, compared to Mr.
Vogel. On the other hand, Mr. Vogel experiences little competition
for most of the other lines of his business, simply because his is
the only float aircraft company in the area. For the bulk of his
business, therefore, Mr. Vogel is actually in the position of a local
monopolist. As evidenced by his actions regarding the adjustment
of repair bills, Mr. Vogel in fact demonstrates no intention of acting
like a monopolist. Apparently he believes that repair bills at
“standard” rates or at posted rates are “just too high” for all or
many of his customers. Presumably, Mr. Vogel’s business judgment
tells him that he would suffer more from the alienation or shock
caused by large repair bills than he would gain by the increased
revenue to be gained by full-price billing.
This last point is particularly relevant as far as a pricing recom
mendation is concerned. Despite Mr. Vogel’s local monopoly
(perhaps because of it), he avoids billing excessive charges for
repair work. It may be presumed that he knows what he is doing.
In any event, it was entirely beyond the scope of this particular
study to determine whether Mr. Vogel would in fact lose more
by increasing his repair charges and taking the risk of losing other
business.
As far as merchandise sales were concerned, my conclusion is
that Mr. Vogel is probably in the usual type of retail selling
situation there, namely one in which his selling prices are fairly
well fixed or established, either by custom or by the manufacturers.
In fact, retail prices might even be determined by competition for
items such as gasoline, although it is hard for me to imagine how
anyone dissatisfied with Mr. Vogel’s gasoline price could take his
plane elsewhere to obtain gasoline. Here again, it was primarily
a question of public relations. If the customer knows that because
of Mr. Vogel’s local monopoly, he is being charged excessive or
“above normal” prices for gasoline, oil, etc., it is quite possible
that he would feel alienated and that Mr. Vogel would stand to
lose future business.
The flight department is, in my opinion, the most likely candidate
for price experimentation and changes. As my analysis has pointed
out, the variable costs included in the provision of all of the flight
departments’ services are very small indeed, so that at current
price levels the contribution earned is extremely high. From the
analysis, it is clear that Mr. Vogel could experiment by lowering
his instruction rates, in order to see whether volume would increase
sufficiently, without risking the possibility of not covering variable
costs. My conclusion is that the charges for flight instruction
should probably be reduced, perhaps below that charged by land106
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based flying schools. If the market were price sensitive at all, this
would be likely to increase the instruction volume, either as a result
of expansion of demand, or at the expense of Mr. Vogel’s competi
tion. Suitable experimentation would indicate what the most ad
vantageous reduction would be.
On the other hand, the demand for charter services is probably
insensitive to price changes mainly because it is very much a luxury
type of purchase. I would therefore recommend that Mr. Vogel
experiment by raising his charter prices in an effort to test this
assumption. If it is found that net revenue increases, Mr. Vogel’s
profits would improve. If on the other hand he finds that the
demand for charter services is sensitive to price, he could experi
ment in the other direction. Charter rates are, of course, subject
to the same limitation that Mr. Vogel has already placed upon
repair shop work; namely, that the charges should not be so high
as to alienate customers. In my opinion, Mr. Vogel is the best
judge of the extent to which prices could be raised without in
curring the intangible costs of customer ill will. However, a
conscious program of price experimentation, i.e., 10-lesson prices,
group prices, reduced prices on Mondays, etc., might provide very
useful data about market sensitivity.
The combined effect of raising charter rates and reducing the
rates for instruction may have the additional longer-run advantage
of broadening the market for private seaplane flying. If Mr. Vogel
makes it less expensive for a repeat charter customer to learn to
become his own pilot, he may succeed in converting some charter
customers to pilot-owners, with a resulting increase in Greenville’s
revenues from plane sales, servicing and moorage.

After Mr. Morrison had reviewed Mr. Cleve’s memorandum, he
forwarded it and the supporting schedules to Mr. Vogel, with a note
indicating that he thought that Mr. Cleve’s analysis covered all rele
vant points in adequate detail. Mr. Morrison said that he would call
Mr. Vogel the following week to see whether he wished to discuss
the analysis with him.
When he called Mr. Vogel, Mr. Morrison found that he was well
satisfied with the analysis that had been done. He asked for some
technical explanations on some of the schedules compiled by Mr.
Cleve and told Mr. Morrison that he felt that the study had been very
helpful to him, and that he would give serious consideration to follow
ing the various recommendations. He added that he did not wish to
have any additional work done by Kingsbury, Chase & Co. on the
pricing question at the present time, because he was not certain
whether additional expenditure would produce results that were more
helpful or meaningful to him than the initial report, with which he
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repeated he was extremely pleased. However, he pointed out that he
would be seeing Mr. Edwards of the Augusta office from time to time
in connection with the audit and tax work they performed for him,
and would again make his contact via Mr. Edwards if further reflection
convinced him that additional analysis of the pricing problem was
merited.
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Industrial Heating Equipment
Company, Inc.
Fuller & Co., a local accounting firm in Cleveland, Ohio, numbered
among its clients of long standing the Industrial Heating Equipment
Company, Inc., (HeatCo). HeatCo sold and serviced a wide variety
of industrial heating systems in the Greater Cleveland area. Fuller
& Co. had performed an annual audit for HeatCo and had served as
tax advisers to the company and its owner-president, Mr. Joseph
White, for more than 20 years. A very friendly relationship existed
between Mr. White and Mr. Norman James, the partner in charge of
the HeatCo account.
During the first week of January, 1962, when Mr. James was hold
ing a preliminary tax meeting with Mr. White, the latter mentioned
that he was concerned because his internal record-keeping and re
porting system did not give him information on the costs generated by
the various departments within his company. This concern had ap
parently developed in December, 1961, when Mr. White had tried
to review his pricing schedule for the company’s service department
because he suspected that the department was operating at a loss.
He asked if anyone at Fuller & Co. could help him with this problem.
Upon hearing this, Mr. James suggested that Fuller & Co.’s Manage
ment Services Department might be of assistance and suggested that
a meeting be arranged later that week with the partner in charge of
the department to see what Fuller & Co. could do for HeatCo. Later
that day Mr. James dropped into the office of Mr. Joseph Brooks, the
Fuller & Co. partner in charge of the Management Services Depart
ment, to set up the appointment and tell him some of the background.
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Fuller & Co. had six full partners, including Mr. Fuller, the founder,
Mr. James, Mr. Brooks and three others, and an equal number of junior
partners. In all, Fuller & Co. employed 35 accountants and 10 addi
tional office employees. Its audit clients ranged from a small sevenman specialty manufacturing concern to a heavy equipment builder
with annual sales of $30 million. Most of its clients were companies
with between 50 and 250 employees. Over and above its audit clients,
many of whom were tax clients as well, Fuller & Co. served a number
of companies only as tax counselors. These included companies which
did not wish to be audited or who were audited by small local account
ing firms which had no tax department and which had referred their
clients to Fuller & Co.
The Management Services Department of Fuller & Co. had been
established in late 1956 under the direction of Mr. Joseph Brooks, who
was now a full partner in the firm. Originally management services
work took only a fraction of Mr. Brooks’ time, but by 1962 the depart
ment had grown to the point where not only did he spend most of his
time with management services work, but he also had a young staff
accountant assisting him full time and used a portion of the time of
several other audit staff members. Mr. Brooks expected that by mid1963 the volume of work in the Management Services Department
would support a full-time, five-man staff which would include three
CPAs and two men with general business background who were to be
hired in mid-1962 and put through a 6-12-month training program.
Mr. Brooks’ department currently accounted for about 10 per cent of
Fuller & Co.’s total billings.
Mr. Brooks had joined the firm in 1955, after spending several years
in a U.S. Navy audit office following his graduation from college in
1952. In 1953, while in the Navy, he passed his CPA exams and subse
quently had worked closely with several small and medium-sized
Navy contractors and became quite interested in their operating prob
lems. Upon joining Fuller & Co., he was assigned to the tax depart
ment, where he spent almost two years before Mr. Fuller asked him
to accept responsibility for setting up a Management Services De
partment.
During the first eight months of Mr. Brooks’ new assignment, he
spent almost all of his management services time in improving his pro
fessional competence in his new field. He also continued to spend a
diminishing proportion of his time on the tax problems of clients he
had served previously. His “training program” included reading books
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on management techniques and concepts, attending seminars and trade
shows held by manufacturers of computers, machine tools, and other
equipment, visiting the plants of many of Fuller & Co.’s clients, and
reading on a regular basis all the leading management journals. During
this period, he also talked to each of the firm’s audit and tax partners to
acquaint them with the types of management service jobs he felt he
could undertake. He asked them to look for opportunities to suggest
possible consulting engagements to their clients.
Mr. Brooks’ early management services jobs were concentrated pri
marily in the area of inventory control, and he performed all the work
on each engagement himself. Virtually all of these jobs were referred
to him by the Fuller & Co. audit partners. By 1962, however, the
Management Services Department was being called in for many
different types of tasks.
As of early in 1962, Mr. Brooks was spending his time approximately
as follows:
50%—Analyzing data and developing recommendations for the
management services jobs handled by himself.
30%—Supervising the Management Services Department and the
management services jobs handled by juniors.
10%—Unbilled (new business development, self education, etc.)
5% —Working with other Fuller & Co. partners in connection with
Audit or Tax Department engagements.
5% —Performing tax work for the Fuller & Co. tax department.*
Fuller & Co. billed for management services work in the same
manner as for regular audit or tax work. The fees were set up at the
usual rate for the individuals who worked on a job, and the client was
charged for all actual time spent. There were, however, two excep
tions to this rule (which also occurred occasionally in both tax and
audit work). If a specific engagement took much less time than might
have been expected based on the results, or if the client received far
more value than the fee would indicate, Fuller & Co. would increase
* Primarily connected with the litigation of a specific tax case on which
Mr. Brooks had done much of the initial work prior to the establishment
of the Management Services Department.
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the fee to reflect these factors. On the other hand, if client goodwill or
new account cultivation considerations indicated that a fee smaller
than the amount actually generated should be charged, Fuller & Co.
would reduce the fee appropriately. About 10 per cent of the firm’s
management services work fell into this latter category. Separate
invoices to cover each management services job were sent to the firm’s
clients (even to those which retained Fuller & Co. on an annual basis
for audit and/or tax work). This was done to help establish the man
agement services group in the minds of its clients as a separate de
partment of Fuller & Co. providing a service separate and distinct
from that of the regular audit or tax staff.

Industrial Heating Equipment Company, Inc.
After Mr. James had left Mr. Brooks, the latter called John Park
and asked him to bring in the office file on HeatCo. A summary of
some of the recent financial statements in the file is contained in
Exhibits 1 and 2 (Balance Sheets and Income Statements, respec
tively) which appear on pages 117 and 118. In addition, the file
contained a descriptive memorandum which Mr. James had prepared
some years previously, and which is summarized below:
Industrial Heating Equipment Company, Inc., which is known by
its trademark, HeatCo, is located in [one of the industrial areas
on the outskirts of Cleveland]. The firm sells and services a wide
variety of industrial and institutional heating systems in the Greater
Cleveland area. HeatCo.’s annual sales run between $400,000 and
$500,000. Mr. Joseph White, president of HeatCo., owns 100
per cent of the stock of the firm. He is assisted in the management
of his company by Mr. Buldon Ives, who as sales manager is the
second “key man” at HeatCo. Mr. Ives is thoroughly familiar with
all the statistics and figures of the company’s operations and
participates in all management decisions.
HeatCo performs two distinctly different, although inseparable,
types of activities. The major type, which produces by far the
greater portion of its sales income and takes the majority of its
management’s time, is the sales and installation of industrial
heating systems. ( The phrase “industrial heating systems” as used
here refers to systems for institutions such as hospitals and schools
as well as for industrial plants and office buildings.) HeatCo’s
second type of activity is the servicing of these heating systems.
This service is a necessary and important part of the company’s
activities, because without it the sale of systems would be virtually
impossible.
112

INDUSTRIAL HEATING EQUIPMENT C O ., INC.

The sales activities of the company are, of course, a year-round
activity, but the installation of heating systems is highly seasonal,
reaching a peak during the summer and dropping to almost a
standstill during winter. The company varies its work force in
accordance with these seasonal fluctuations as much as possible,
although it has to maintain its supervisory personnel and a nucleus
of skilled workers on the payroll throughout the year in order not
to lose them.
Service, on the other hand, is a relatively stable activity. The
decline in “repair” types of service calls during the summer months
is compensated for by the annual cleaning and inspection of
customers’ systems. The service force consists of five men who
work under the direction of Mr. “Mac” Fisher. Reporting directly
to Mr. White, Mr. Fisher is responsible for scheduling service calls,
dispatching the men, and maintaining an adequate stock of repair
parts, as well as training and supervising the servicemen. The
entire service department, therefore, operates relatively inde
pendently of the rest of the company.

As he read this description of the service department, Mr. Brooks
wondered why there was no provision in the company’s accounting
and bookkeeping system for the separation of the costs incurred by
the service department. Mr. Brooks knew that it was this fact, and the
suspicion that the service department was being run at a loss, that
prompted Mr. White to ask if Fuller & Co. could help him.

Introductory Meeting
The introductory meeting was held at the office of HeatCo on
January 10, 1962. Messrs. White, Ives, James, Brooks, and Park at
tended. After the usual initial pleasantries, Mr. Brooks suggested that
before any discussion of the problem itself, Mr. White might go into
some detail about the operations of his company in order that the
Fuller & Co. men could develop a mental framework within which to
consider the service department problem.
Mr. White began by explaining that most of HeatCo’s dollar volume
was made up of sales of furnaces, although the company also handled
boilers, controls, and the ductwork or piping necessary in a system.
HeatCo usually would bid on a job and then buy the necessary equip
ment, although it worked on a commission basis for some items. Mr.
White referred to his copy of the 1961 income statement (see Exhibit
2, page 118) to show the breakdown between various types of sales.
He explained that the “parts” figures referred both to parts used in
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connection with servicing and repairing customers’ heating systems
and to parts used for occasional small jobs to change or improve
present systems. (These smaller jobs usually were done on a “time
and material” basis.)
Mr. White stated that HeatCo carried no inventory other than the
most frequently needed repair parts. He said that the equipment
manufacturers gave excellent delivery service on most parts from
regional warehouses, and that manufacturers would give a firm price
commitment to HeatCo for all equipment which it would need for
the contract jobs on which it was bidding.
Mr. White explained that the business of selling and installing in
dustrial heating systems was highly competitive. Entry into the
business was relatively easy because dealers did not have to carry
inventory and did not need a large plant. The equipment manufac
turers would give the same price and delivery commitments to any
reputable firm. Although local competition was not “cutthroat,” it
was certainly severe. Mr. White stated that to win a satisfactory vol
ume of contracts, HeatCo not only had to price its bids quite carefully,
but had to offer warranties and the guarantee of continuing availabil
ity of service for its installations. The pricing of each quote was done
with an eye both to equipment and installation costs, all of which were
quite predictable, and to the market and competition for the job.
Often HeatCo was forced to “throw in” certain “extras” to win a bid.
This kind of competition, Mr. White said, was common whereas actual
price cutting was not considered by those in the trade in Cleveland to
be an acceptable form of competition and was extremely rare. The
“extras” most often used in the bidding were the warranty terms.
Therefore, in “building up” the cost estimate that was prepared prior
to submitting a bid on a job, the cost allowance for the free servicing
that might be required under the warranty clause rarely bore any
close relationship to the expected cost of fulfilling the terms of the
warranty. Mr. White said that the amount allowed for warranty work
was his competitive “fudge factor,” reflecting what he thought could
be charged without jeapordizing the firm’s chances of winning the
contract.
Mr. Ives stated, in response to a question asked by Mr. Brooks, that
the warranty allowances on the past year’s contracts had ranged from
about $100 to $1,500 per contract, with the majority being in the $200
to $450 range. He said that only about 20 per cent of recent contracts
had warranty allowances of over $500 and that he felt on the basis of
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current experience that performing warranty service on most of the
others would cost HeatCo more than had been allowed in their bids
on the contracts. He had no way of confirming this, however.
“The important thing that we want to know,” said Mr. Ives, “is how
much this service operation is costing us. The servicemen spend their
time doing warranty work, other service work for which we can
charge time and materials, a small amount of “free service” when one
of us feels that customer relations considerations call for this, and in
addition they work on making panels for contract installations. At
the present time we have no idea whether or not we are losing a lot
of money on these operations or only a little and, in either event, how
much on each. Although competition for new business means that we
are pretty well stuck with the losses on the warranty work, we can
adjust our pricing for billable service somewhat, and we should be
costing the panel work realistically. What we want you to do is to tell
us what our costs are, how much we are losing in each of these areas,
and then set things up so that in the future our bookkeeper can tell
us how we are doing on a monthly basis.”
After some additional discussion, Mr. Brooks was able to determine
that the two top executives of HeatCo were unable to provide any
further significant information. It was also apparent to Mr. Brooks
that Messrs. White and Ives had already made the decision to retain
Fuller & Co. to examine their problem and were not waiting for a
formal proposal from his department. Mr. Ives’ remark, quoted above,
had convinced Mr. Brooks of this, and he attributed it to the fact that
over the years Mr. James had succeeded in developing an extremely
good relationship with the two men. Apparently, once Mr. James had
suggested that Mr. Brooks’ Management Services Department examine
the problem, there was no question in the minds of Messrs. White
and Ives that this should be done. Now they appeared anxious for
Mr. Brooks to get on with the job. He sensed that he should rapidly
conclude the current conference in order not to risk annoying the two
men with what to them could be boring repetition of “obvious” facts.
Mr. Brooks also sensed that not only was no formal presentation ex
pected, but that at this meeting the two HeatCo executives expected
him to indicate what he expected to do and when he would do it.
When they returned to the office Mr. Brooks informed Mr. Park
that he would have the responsibility of gathering the data and doing
the bulk of the analysis of the HeatCo problem. He suggested that
Mr. Park return to HeatCo the following day to look briefly at the
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bookkeeping system before the two men worked out a plan for the
job. Mr. Park did so, and on the basis of a discussion with HeatCo’s
bookkeeper, Mrs. Sampson, prepared the description of the existing
methods included as Exhibit 3 which appears on page 119. Mr.
Brooks also dictated a short letter to Mr. White in which he recalled
that Mr. White had told him to omit the formalities, but that he never
theless preferred to confirm the terms of the engagement. He added
that he expected that no more than 15 man days of work would be
required, and that HeatCo would be billed at Fuller & Co.’s usual
management services rates for the time actually spent on the job.

Questions
Up to this point, this case contains insufficient data to permit you to
analyze HeatCo’s costs or prices in order to arrive at specific recom
mendations for management. The major problem faced by Fuller &
Co., in fact, is the collection of the necessary data. Before you read
the commentary, therefore, it is suggested that you:
1. Prepare a list of the kinds of information that will need to be
gathered on this engagement.
2. Decide how you would go about getting these data.
3. Consider the form that Fuller & Co.’s recommendations should
take. Specifically, should Fuller & Co. concentrate on analyzing costs
and prices in order to be able to suggest particular changes, or should
they devote their main attention to the creation of an improved re
porting system?
In addition to the above, you should consider the following ques
tions on Fuller & Co.’s relationship with HeatCo.
4. Did Brooks act too hastily in making his brief verbal proposal?
5. Should Brooks’ letter have been sent? If so, should it have con
tained a detailed proposal rather than a repetition of Brooks’ verbal
summary?
6. Did Brooks handle the question of the fee correctly? Spe
cifically, should he have made a point of discussing it with his client?
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Exhibit 1
INDUSTRIAL HEATING EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.
Comparative Balance Sheet
October 31, 1960 and 1961
ASSETS
October 31,
1960
Current assets
Cash
Accounts receivable
Allowance for
uncollectible accounts
Inventories
Fixed assets
Plant and equipment
Accumulated depreciation

2,500

$ 23,402
13,039

LIABILITIES
Equities
Accounts payable
Accrued payroll & bonuses
$
Accrued, withholding, & payroll tax
Accrued profit sharing contribution

Total Liabilities and Equities
*Other assets
Prepaid expenses
W ork in process

Panel inventory
Cash surrender value & accum.
Dividend—life insurance
Total

$ 96,957
66,320

93,457

3,500

13,049

13,455

Total

Equities
Common stock
Retained earnings

$ 41,626

$ 63,647
$ 68,820

Other assets*

Reserve for warranty service

1961

10,363

$ 25,670
14,306

11,364

5,750

5,157

$159,535

$164,653

AND EQUITY
$ 10,237

$ 14,752
16,300
10,702
16,127

43,129

$ 14,206
10,801
15,144

40,151

10,000

10,000

$ 67,881
31,500
60,154

$ 60,388
31,500
72,765

$159,535

$164,653

$ 3,692
256

$

1,800
935

1,802

2,422

$ 5,750

$ 5,157
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Exhibit 2
INDUSTRIAL HEATING EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.
Comparative Statements of Income
For the Years Ending Oct. 31

Sales
Contracts
Service and repair
Parts
Commissions earned
Discounts earned
Miscellaneous
Total sales

1959

1960

1961

$438,577
13,428
38,322
9,326
10

$419,303
12,397
37,828
24,759
984
76
$495,347

$347,972
13,102
34,183
39,796
648
30

$

$499,663

$435,731

Cost of goods sold
Inventory decrease
Freight
Materials & parts
Labor
Total

$ (1,966)
6,419
256,567
45,511
$306,531

$

1,701
4,383
258,406
54,381
$318,871

406
3,844
211,963
55,166
$271,379

Gross profit

$193,132

$176,476

$164,352

$

$

$

Expenses
Office supplies & postage
Telephone & telegraph
Union insurance & pension fund
Fed’l. & state income tax
Uniforms
Blueprints & diagrams
Contract labor
Employee travel
President’s travel
Vehicle expenses
Entertainment
Repair & maintenance
Depreciation
Rent
Salaries (excluding president)
Insurance
Life insurance
Utilities
Payroll taxes
Other taxes
Professional fees
Dues subscriptions
Donations
Interest expense
Miscellaneous
Bad debts
Bonuses
Discounts allowed
Commissions paid
Organization expenses
President’s salary
Profit sharing trust contribution & expenses
Total expenses
Net profit
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1,596
4,016
697
17,515
380
177
1,637
5,574
796
5,155
2,599
163
3,722
6,300
26,092
3,340
253
734
3,010
645
2,275
562
534
5
997
1,643
19,800
224
1,161
249
41,957
14,969
$168,777
$ 24,355

1,793
4,686
769
7,991
384
139
518
5,801
1,329
5,058
3,917
1,725
4,298
6,300
30,313
1,417
253
683
3,421
917
1,650
695
1,200
23
1,119
748
22,400
205
1,084
249
33,994
16,127
$161,206
$ 15,270

2,043
4,979
1,035
6,564
376
255
294
5,129
1,739
6,868
2,272
532
5,269
6,300
28,886
1,893
253
677
3,572
936
1,300
743
1,209
—
681
1,038
17,200
188
150
249
32,175
16,346

$151,151
$ 13,201
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Exhibit 3
INDUSTRIAL HEATING EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.
Notes on Accounting Procedures in Use, 1/11/62
1. Payroll Book
All wages and salaries broken into three accounts:
a. Labor (shown as Cost of Goods Sold)
b. Salaries (shown as an Overhead Expense)
c. President’s Salary (shown as an Overhead Expense)
2. Sales Book
Kept by category; sales made entered under one of the following
columns:
a. Contracts: including all contract installation work
b. Service and Repair: including actual charges billed to customers
for service labor and travel
c. Parts: including actual charges billed to customers for parts
needed for service and repair or other noncontract work
d. Commissions earned: including total commissions received on
equipment sold under this arrangement
e. Miscellaneous
3. Voucher Register
Kept as a chronological record of invoices received by the company.
Distributions made into columnar accounts for end-of-month posting
to ledger accounts.
Distributions include:
. a. All material purchases entered under “Material and Parts” (a Cost
of Goods Sold)
b. All traveling expenses (except President’s Travel) entered under
“Employees Traveling Expenses” (an Overhead Expense)

Commentary on Industrial Heating Equipment
Company, Inc.
The next day, Mr. Brooks called Mr. Park into his office to discuss
a specific approach to the problem which the officers of HeatCo had
posed. It was obvious that the investigation would have to go beyond
the costs of each segment of the service operation, because costs were
only half the picture. While the company’s income statement did
break out service revenue by department, Mr. Brooks wondered
whether this revenue was correctly determined. It was obvious that
there was a connection between prices on installation jobs and the
financial results of the service department (i.e., the losses that Messrs.
White and Ives suspected). Mr. Brooks agreed with their premise
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that if there were losses a review of pricing was appropriate, but he
suspected that further analysis was needed. Mr. Brooks also recog
nized that under the present cost accounting system and contract
pricing methods, while it seemed that the profits from at least some of
the contract installation jobs were being completely wiped out by
losses incurred by performing the warranty service, it was probably
necessary to be more specific in the determination and reporting of
these “losses.” For example, a loss incurred because a warranty allow
ance was too small to pay for average warranty service requirements
was not the same as a loss incurred because an installation required
abnormal and excessive warranty service; and neither of these was the
same as a loss arising out of inefficiency or waste in the service depart
ment. Mr. Brooks wondered what criteria were used in establishing
the so-called profit on a contract installation. He suspected that clari
fication of this point and the provision of better cost figures would
assist Messrs. White and Ives in pricing their bids on installation con
tracts, or would at least give them a better understanding of the effects
of the many variables built into each bid.
Mr. Brooks and Mr. Park agreed immediately that their approach
to the HeatCo problem should have these basic goals:
1. Determine both the direct and the total costs* of operating the
panel work, billable service and warranty service portions of the serv
ice department, or of the department as a whole.
2. Determine the income provided by billable service and the por
tion of the warranty cost allowance included in previous contract
installations which should be considered to offset the warranty service
costs for the period under consideration.
3. Develop a system which would allow HeatCo to monitor both
income and costs in the future.
W ith these goals in mind the two men proceeded to discuss first
the data which were needed in order to determine the costs of oper
ating the service department. They realized that some of the needed
information was necessarily already being collected by HeatCo’s book
keeper and merely had to be segregated from installation contract
costs. Other needed data might not be flowing into the accounting
* Total costs would include both direct costs and appropriate allocations
of HeatCo’s administrative expenses.
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system at present, and systems would have to be developed to provide
these. They proceeded to list the information which would be needed,
and the probable means of obtaining it.
1. Service Department Payroll—can be easily broken out from total
labor costs by establishing a separate account for servicemen’s salaries.
2. Separation of warranty labor from billable service labor and
panel work in order to allocate properly the labor cost between these
areas. This information would have to be provided by the service
department, through time cards to be kept by the servicemen or
through Assignment Records to be kept by the service supervisor,
Mr. Fisher. (The two men speculated that some records of this type
must now be kept by someone in order that the amount which was to
be invoiced for billable service work could be determined. Mr. Park
made a note to check into this on his next visit to HeatCo.)
3. Value of parts used for warranty service work and those used for
billable service and panel work. Again, records must have been kept
previously for billable parts in order to invoice customers. This in
formation should be easy to have recorded and kept if this is not
already done.
4. Travel expenses for servicemen. This information should be
readily available from servicemen’s travel and expense reports.
5. Administrative, occupancy, and other indirect expenses properly
allocable to the service operation. The information needed for this
allocation would have to be developed by Mr. Park in future visits to
HeatCo. The amount of the various overhead items to be allocated
to Service would have to be decided on the most logical basis after
each overhead expense was examined for its contribution to the Service
operation.
6. Breakdown of billable service income into parts charges, travel
charges, and labor charges. This should be available from invoice
worksheets if not broken down on the invoices themselves.
7. Amounts included in contract bids to cover future warranty
work. Should be available from bid worksheets.
At the conclusion of this discussion, Mr. Brooks asked Mr. Park to
visit HeatCo again, investigate the availability of the data outlined
above, and based on what he found, recommend how the HeatCo
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accounting system might be modified to generate service-cost data on
a continuing basis.

Park’s Investigation
Mr. Park spent most of the next week at the HeatCo plant, and
spent the greater part of his time working with Mrs. Sampson. From
her he learned that much of the needed information listed on the
outline he had drawn up with Mr. Brooks was available in raw form
from the company’s basic records; when it came to be recorded in
the books, it was not kept separate, however, which was why Mr.
White had claimed that he could not get departmental costs. All that
would be required, therefore, to make it available was to refine the
chart of accounts. The formal monthly reports, if redesigned, would
then automatically provide the breakdown the HeatCo executives
needed. The only facts on Mr. Park’s list which Mrs. Sampson could
not provide were the breakdown of service hours between billable,
panel, and warranty work, although total Service Department payroll
was easily taken from the payroll book.
Parts used and travel expenses incurred were reported to Mrs.
Sampson for each customer call by the servicemen. Mrs. Sampson
maintained a perpetual parts inventory record, based on material
usage cards which were made out by all men drawing parts and which
indicated the job for which the material or parts were being drawn.
Travel and expense reports indicated which customers were visited as
part of the information required. Similarly, special parts purchase
order requests gave the name of the intended customer. As a matter
of routine, Mrs. Sampson had been keeping a record of parts used and
expenses incurred for each service customer, both billable and war
ranty. She told Mr. Park that she had thought these records might
be useful at some later time but that no one had ever asked to see
them as yet.
Mrs. Sampson kept a list of all warranty customers, including the
warranty dates. She stated that she billed for all service to customers
not on the warranty list except when Mr. Ives told her not to do so.
She reported that from time to time he would tell her not to charge a
customer for certain service work—this was usually either for rela
tively minor work on a large installation, or for a major installation
customer, or on an installation where the warranty had barely run out.
Mrs. Sampson stated that Mr. Ives kept track of all service requests.
Mrs. Sampson showed Mr. Park the price list which she used to
invoice service customers. It listed a rate per hour for labor, a standard
mark-up to be used on all parts, and a rate per mile for all travel in
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curred by servicemen. The information concerning labor came from
Mr. Fisher who told her how many hours were spent on each “billable
service” job when it was completed. She said that when she invoiced
a service customer, she listed each of these items separately. Mr. Ives
had given her these prices several years previously.
Mr. Park also talked with Mr. Fisher, the service supervisor. Mr.
Park learned that he was compiling, on a regular basis, the last piece
of information needed for a determination of service costs. In a pocket
notebook, Mr. Fisher maintained a record of the time spent by each
of his servicemen. He explained that this diary was used to plan the
work of his men, to keep track of their work for pay purposes, and to
maintain the records necessary to provide Mrs. Sampson with the labor
hours spent on service to billable customers. Mr. Fisher stated that
he met regularly with Mrs. Sampson to tell her of the hours spent by
his men performing service work for each customer and that she kept
him informed as to whether they were warranty, free service, or billable customers. Mr. Fisher showed this diary to Mr. Park, and the
latter noted that it was detailed enough to provide the information
required for his present assignment. With Mr. Fisher’s assistance, he
made a summary of these data for the 1960-61 fiscal year. (See
Exhibit 4, page 124.)
At this stage Mr. Park felt that it would be a relatively simple matter
to set up procedures to segregate direct costs for the service depart
ment. He drafted the following notes for eventual inclusion in
HeatCo’s accounting procedures.

Accounting Procedures for Direct Costs
1. Present account numbers will be maintained. However, suffixes
will be used to indicate departmental allocation, as follows:
.1 —Contract Installation
.2 —Service Department
.21—Warranty
.22—Free Service
.23—Billable
.24—Panel Work
2. Direct expenses will be accumulated by customer from source
data. All source data presently include customer identification. “Cus
tomers” will include work done on contract installation and panel work
(each being regarded as a customer with that name). These “cus
tomer” records are quite separate from accounts receivable records.
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22
20
21
20
23
20
21
22
20
23
20
22
254

880
800
840
800
920
800
840
880
800
920
800
880
10,160
100%

320
410
298
259
209
164
44
94
244
226
188
275
2,731
26%

301
363
287
199
156
86
147
103
151
316
379
593
3,081
30%

48
17
33
9
25
18
50
14
65
11
41
32
363
4%

Free
Billed Warranty Service
Hours
Hours
Hours
—
—
—
—
138
81
86
111
50
83
—
—
549
6%

Panel
Hours
669
790
618
467
528
349
327
322
510
636
608
900
6,724
66%

Total
Hours
Worked

34%

211
10
222
333
392
451
513
558
290
284
192
(20)
3,436

Differ
ence

20%

176
160
168
160
184
160
168
176
160
184
160
176
2,032

Miscel
laneous*

4%

360

180
180

Vaca
tion
Hours

10%

35
(150)
54
173
208
111
165
382
130
100
32
(196)
1,044

Net
Differ
ence

* Miscellaneous time included a variety of tasks ranging from assisting in the office to filling in on an installation job
where help was needed. Mr. Fisher stated that usually Mr. White or Mr. Ives would come to him asking if he could
“spare a man for awhile” to help somewhere else in the company. He did not keep track of this time accurately,
and so estimated it at the equivalent of one full-time employee.

Nov. 1960
Dec.
Jan. 1961
Feb.
Mar.
April
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Totals

Month

Working Working
Days
Hours

Analysis of Service Department Hours, 1960/61 Fiscal Year
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3. Periodically when customers are billed, “customer-direct-ex
pense” records will be summarized and the expense totals debited to
the departmental classification of each functional account, according
to the status of each “customer” from time to time, i.e., warranty serv
ice, free service, or billable service. Intracompany cost transfers for
panel work and installation work will be recognized at the same time.
These customer direct expense records will of course contain all the
information needed to complete actual billings.
4. Specific procedures for each expense type follow.
(a) Payroll: Mr. Fisher, the service supervisor, should formalize
and combine his current practice of keeping time records and notify
ing Mrs. Sampson of hours spent on each customer. This will be
accomplished by his preparing a weekly report listing customers
vertically and employees horizontally, and accounting for all hours
spent. “Customers” will include installation and panel work. There
will be a subtotal in the vertical listing, beneath which will appear
headings for “office work,” “vacation,” “other (specified),” and “not
accounted for.” This report will be used as the basis for allocating
payroll cost by employee, including as expense accounts the four
non-customer accounts previously noted.
(b) Parts: Material usage cards and special purchase orders all
contain customer identifications, and can be used to post to the
customer records. A periodic summary of material usage cards will
be used to obtain a total credit to material and parts inventory.
(c) Travel and expense reports all contain customer identifica
tion, and can be used to post to the customer records. Postings
should include actual expenses incurred (reimbursed) and the total
mileage per customer, on which the charge to the customer is based.
The expense posting is for memorandum purposes only, since ex
penses are not billed to customers for actual reimbursement. How
ever, an allocation of reimbursed expenses is needed by department,
hence this item’s inclusion within this procedure.
Mr. Park noted that most of the procedures he had written out were
simply formalization of work already being done by either Mr. Fisher
or Mrs. Sampson, and were only “new” in that they involved proper
coordination and systematic recording.
Mr. Park next turned to a consideration of overhead expenses (ex
penses other than direct expenses). Reviewing the chart of accounts
with Mrs. Sampson, he compiled a guide to be used for allocation
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Stationery and printing
Office supplies
Telephone & answering service

Union insurance and pension
fund
Federal and state income taxes
Uniforms
Blue prints and diagrams
Contract labor
Contract bonds
Servicemen’s equipment & tools
Traveling expenses—service
Traveling expenses—executive
Vehicle expense (trucks)
Customer entertainment &
promotion
Repairs and maintenance
Depreciation
Rent

601
602
603

604

619
620
621

605
608
609
610
613
614
615
616
617
618

Postage and parcel post

Account

600

Account
No.

Exhibit 5

[.1]

( X-Allocate to Dept. Indicated)
Virtually all adm.—ignore
possible departmental portion
Virtually all adm.—DO—
Virtually all adm.—DO—
Service dept. direct line cost
is minor; treat all as adm.

X
10.0%
X
16.0%
48.8%
16.0%

Contract
Square footage of building
Based upon estimated dep. 1961-62
Square footage of building

X
X
X

(2¼ % of unionized payroll)
Ignore—based upon income
Service
Contract
Contract
Contract
Service
(Treated as direct expense)
Contract
1961 mileage

X

Contract

66.0%
37.2%
66.0%

90.0%

X

X

X

[.2]

Service*

18.0%
14.0%
18.0%

X

X
X
X

[.3]

Admin
istrative

Department and Sub Code
Basis for Allocation

Basis for Departmental Overhead Allocation
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Bad debts
Bonuses
Discounts allowed
Commissions paid
Executive salary
Profit sharing expense
Advertising
Salaries—contracts
Employees benefits—
(Group ins.)
Servicemen’s expendable tools
Traveling expenses—contracts
Interest expense
Bank service charges

634
636
637
638
640
641
642
646
643
Service
Contract
Administrative
Administrative

X

65.0%
X
X
X
54.0%
X
X
X

30.0%
X
33.3%
46.0%
28.1%

[.1]

Contract

( X-Allocate to Dept. Indicated)
All administrative
Based upon 1960-61 expense
Contract
Divided evenly
Based upon 1960-61 taxable payroll
Actual 1960-61 expense ratio
All administrative
All administrative
All administrative
Virtually all adm.—ignore possible
dept. portion
Service
Actual bonuses paid during 1960-61
Contract
Contract
Contract
Based upon participants’ salaries in 1960-61
Contract
Contract
(2% of unionized payroll)

Basis for Allocation

* Service department overhead expenses to be charged to the department as such.

645
647
631
632

Salaries—office
Insurance
Life insurance
Utilities
Taxes—payroll
Taxes—other
Professional fees
Dues and subscriptions
Donations
Miscellaneous expense

Account

622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
633

Account
No.

X
X
X

10.0%
36.0%
X

4.0%

33.3%
16.0%
21.9%
X
X
X

[.3]
X
2.0%

Admin
istrative

X
31.0%

33.4%
38.0%
50.0%

68.0%

[.2]

Service*

Department and Sub Code
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purposes, based on what Mrs. Sampson told him about each type of
expense. Before submitting it to Mr. Brooks he discussed it with Mr.
Ives and made one or two minor changes at his suggestion. The
schedule showing allocations is shown in Exhibit 5 on pages 126-127.
In making this schedule Mr. Park did not attempt to subdivide Service
Department overhead into the four sub-classifications used for direct
expenses. He felt that no empirical basis existed for making such an
allocation since the expenses were incurred for the benefit of the
department as a whole. While some basis for allocation could certainly
be found, he did not feel that this would serve any useful purpose.
Mr. Park’s final inquiries concerned the recognition of revenue. He
found that the notes he had previously made on Accounting Pro
cedures in Use (Exhibit 3, page 119) amounted to a complete de
scription. The total price of completed contracts was taken into in
come as contract sales. Service and Repair and Parts revenue were the
totals billed to customers (service and repair also including mileage
charges for travel). Commissions and Miscellaneous were self-explana
tory. Mr. Park also found that, only minimal additional work would be
required to set up additional allocation columns in the Sales Book to
record the makeup of each invoice. He noted the following as the
breakdown that should be recorded:
Contract Sales:

Installation revenue
W arranty allowance

Service and Repair:

Labor charges
Travel charges

Parts
Commissions
Miscellaneous

no breakdown necessary.

Review with Mr. Brooks
The day after he had completed the investigation described above,
Mr. Park met with Mr. Brooks to report on what he had found out
and to present his notes on suggested procedures and allocations.
Mr. Brooks was quite satisfied with what Mr. Park had done. He
pointed out, however, that the work completed to date was strictly
of a theoretical nature. This was appropriate, because it was obvious
that before costs and revenues could be separated, procedures had to
be determined for that purpose. The next step, he said, was to test
the procedures and at the same time complete the next portion of the
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assignment. He asked Mr. Park if he felt that it would be feasible for
him to prepare a post facto analysis on the company’s transactions
since November 1, 1961 (the start of its current fiscal year). The idea
would be to produce figures for the months of November and Decem
ber, for which records would be complete, and for January, where he
would work with partly complete data and partly current data. Mr.
Park pointed out that by the time he could get started back at HeatCo,
January would be about two-thirds over, and suggested that his as
signment include February on a current basis as well. Mr. Brooks
accepted the suggestion but said that since Mr. Park’s results would
only be completed in six weeks time, he felt he should make an interim
report to Messrs. White and Ives. Within a week Mr. Brooks had con
tacted Mr. White and had visited at HeatCo’s offices with him and
Mr. Ives. The visit was short, with Brooks reporting that his assistant
had developed procedures for separating costs and revenues, and pro
posed to test his procedures by preparing four-month income state
ments through February 28. Ives remarked that this period would
show less than proportionate revenue, particularly for installations,
but agreed that the experiment would be worthwhile because it would
give HeatCo the historical data needed to place the whole of the 1962
fiscal year’s results on a consistent basis, assuming that Fuller & Co.’s
recommendations were accepted for future reporting.

Park’s Analysis of November 1961-February 1962
As Park began his analysis of the period commencing November
1, he realized that the question of warranty service income would be
troublesome. Since very few installations had been made after
November 1, there was very little revenue entered under the “war
ranty allowance” column he had set up in the Sales Book. On the other
hand, his first attempt to analyze payroll costs indicated that warranty
service work was continuing at the normal level. As he thought about
it, it became obvious to him that recognizing warranty service income
on a completed contract basis was illogical. The warranty allowance
on a contract was intended to cover warranty service over the period
of the warranty, usually six months from date of installation. Taking
full allowance into income could only be defended if the dollar value
of warranty allowances each month was approximately constant, and
then only if proper deferrals were calculated at appropriate intervals.
Park discussed this with Mr. Brooks and Mr. James, and the latter
informed him that, in the past, warranty allowances had been ap
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proximately constant on an annual basis, and had been taken into in
come each year as accrued on completed contracts; however, at Fuller
& Co.’s insistence, HeatCo had set up a $10,000 reserve for Warranty
Service some years previously in order to defer the “unearned” portion
of the allowances on current warranties. This reserve had never been
changed, because each year since its creation (as well as in the first
year) Mr. White had insisted that $10,000 was more than adequate
as a deferral. There had never been any attempt to verify the ade
quacy of the reserve because of Mr. White’s insistence that it was
adequate and his disinclination to make annual changes in it.
Messrs. Brooks and Park agreed that warranty allowances (that is,
the expected cost of warranty service) ought to be prorated over the
period of each warranty, and so Mr. Park made a schedule showing all
warranties current at 10/31/61 and all allowances on completed con
tracts since that date. The amount of the allowance was spread out
over the appropriate number of months. This required close to 30
allocation columns, and obviously would require an additional column
each month. Mr. Park therefore devised a series of worksheets that
provided 12 monthly columns to a page, and used a column reference
list on which was stated the contract number, date of completion, and
total warranty allowance. The monthly allowance was first entered
in the month the warranty commenced, and was continued hori
zontally to the right and over onto the same line on succeeding pages
until the last month was reached. Although it took Mr. Park a few
hours to set up the worksheets, he found that keeping them up to
date and totalling the warranty for each month were both speedy
operations. When Mr. Park totalled the extensions for warranties in
force as of 10/31/61, he found that the unexpired dollar value was
$9,842. This meant that the reserve was $158 in excess on that date;
this amount properly belonged in equity, after adjusting for income
tax. Mr. Park summarized his calculations on warranty income for
the 4-month period as follows:

Unearned income,
beginning of month
Add-warranty allowances on
completed contracts
Less-earned income for month
Unearned income, end of month
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11/61

12/61

1/62

2/62

$9,842

$9,667

$9,578

$9,416

840
(1,015)

920
(1,009)

798
(960)

748
(941)

$9,667

$9,578

$9,416

$9,223
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The total warranty allowance income for the 4 months as shown
above was $3,925. This was almost 20 per cent more than the $3,306
total of allowances on contracts completed during that period.
By the end of January Mr. Park had completed his analysis of
November and December, and was finding it no problem to keep
current with January, which he finished during the first week of
February. During February he called regularly at HeatCo for about
half a day twice a week, which was sufficient time for him to keep
his work current. By March 3, therefore, he had completed the in
come statement for the 4 months to February 28. The latter is shown
in Exhibit 6 (page 137), with supporting detail in Exhibit 7 (page 138).
Reviewing the four-month statement it seemed to Mr. Park that a
closer look at two apparent loss areas in the Service Department
would be worth while. These were “time unaccounted for” and “travel
expenses.” He spent approximately a day in investigating these items.
His conclusions are contained in his draft report, which follows below.

Report to HeatCo
After completing the four-month income statement and subsequent
additional investigation, Mr. Park drafted the following report to
HeatCo for Mr. Brooks’ approval.
(Fuller & Co. letterhead)
March 00, 1962
Mr. Joseph White, President
Industrial Heating Equipment Co., Inc.
Cleveland, Ohio
Dear Mr. White:
We have completed the study of revenues and costs in your
Service Department which we were engaged to carry out in
January. This report will summarize the work we performed, and
our findings. We would be happy to discuss these with you at
your convenience. Furthermore, our Mr. Park is ready to install
the proposed new system at once, if it meets with your approval.
He will instruct Mrs. Sampson in its operation and be ready to
assist her, if required, in preparing monthly financial statements.
At the start of the engagement we determined that HeatCo’s
existing procedures contain all the information required to separate
the revenue and costs of the different elements of the Service
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Department. As you know, however, the books of account did not
provide the means of keeping this information separate. We
therefore have prepared procedures to make this possible. These
procedures encompass two main steps: (i) provide a sufficiently
detailed framework of ledger accounts, and (ii) provide a formal
ized means of collecting the data required in the form required on
a regular basis. Under (i) within the Service Department we pro
pose to set up separate ledger sections for warranty service, free
service, billable service and panel work, each section containing
accounts that record revenue and expenses for the direct items
“parts, labor and travel.” We have also investigated HeatCo’s
overhead expenses. Some of these expenses can fairly be allocated
between the sales and service department; in some cases, portions
of the expenses, or complete items, are clearly unallocable in that
they represent the cost of administering the company as a whole.
It is not possible to allocate overhead expenses to subdivisions
of the Service Department. Under (ii) we have set up procedures
whereby records that are presently maintained on labor hours,
materials and parts used, and travel expenses, are used to channel
expense data in the required detail to the new ledger accounts.
In addition, we propose that the detail on customer invoices be
shown in the Sales Book in columns provided for that purpose, so
as to provide the required breakdown for revenue items.
The structure and methods briefly described above were next
used to carry out the other portion of our assignment, namely to
determine actual revenue and expenses for the Service Depart
ment. As you know, this exercise was performed for the four
month period through February 28, of which February was carried
out on a current basis to test the system as it would be used by
you. No obstacles were found in the system’s operation, and the
February figures were complete by March 3. The figures for the
four months are contained in the appendix to this report (see
Exhibits 6 and 7). You will observe that the structure of the
main report, The Income Statement, is such that it clearly indicates
variable revenue, expense and profit or loss, item by item, within
each subdivision of the Service Department. (For completeness
we also included figures for the Sales Department and for Ad
ministrative Overhead, many of which were actually computed at
the same time and in the same operation as figures for the Service
Department.) We have a number of comments on the Income
Statement.
(1) Sales Department. The item “sales” represents the dollar
value of completed installations, less the warranty allowance con
tained in each, which has been dealt with in the Service Depart
ment (discussed below). No “income” is shown against labor and
travel expense; the latter are deducted from the so-called gross
profit, which is sales less cost of goods sold (i.e., less material cost
of installation).
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(2) Warranty Service. The only revenue item here is shown
under “labor,” and represents the pro rata warranty allowance
on all warranties presently in existence. This treatment differs
from your previous policy of taking warranty allowances into
contract sales income when contracts were completed, and main
taining a deferral of $10,000 representing unexpired warranties.
We computed the actual unexpired warranty value at 10/31/1961
and found it to be $9,842. This figure was obtained from work
sheets we set up for proposed future use in allocating warranty
allowances pro rata over the time periods involved. It is your
practice in many cases to offer more actual warranty service than
the cost allowance would indicate. Given that this is a competitive
necessity, we recommend including the true full prospective war
ranty cost in warranty service income and showing the difference
between this full cost and the actual dollar allowance in the bid,
as an expense (“warranty price concession,” perhaps) in the sales
department income statement. This would unquestionably provide
more meaningful financial results than are available at present.
The warranty service is showing a direct loss at least in part
because the sales department is underestimating the cost of fulfill
ing the warranty in preparing its original bid on the contract.
The service department is not responsible for this loss, although
in effect it is being charged to them.
(3) Billable Service. It was the suspicion that prices on billable
service were too low which prompted you to engage us to perform
this study. However, the Billable Service Income Statement shows
a substantial contribution to overhead and markups over cost of
approximately 58% on parts and 19% on labor. This does not
imply that prices are too low or too high; billable service is the
major portion of the Service Department, and the department as
a whole shows a net loss after overhead. Although Billable Service
shows a profit on travel, there may be hidden losses here; see
further comments in paragraph 6 below.
(4) Total Service Department. The total service department
shows a net loss after overhead of $4,828 for the 4 months. Of
this, perhaps $2,300 (approximately) is accounted for by inade
quate revenue on warranty service (i.e., this amount was credited
to the sales department instead of warranty service). This leaves
a deficit of some $2,500. Reference to the schedule of Overhead
Expenses [Exhibit 7] will show that the service department is
charged almost $1,900 for “time unaccounted for” (see paragraph
5 below). This therefore could be said to be the bulk of the
$2,500, leaving only $600 unexplained; at least part of this could
be travel expenses (see paragraph 6 below) or perhaps general
inefficiency that is impossible to measure without cost standards.
However, your expectation is undoubtedly that the service depart
ment should make a profit, so that the shortfall is $600, plus
whatever minimum profit expectations you have, plus $1,900
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which, while explained, is still a cost. It is conceivable that price
increases on billable service could make good part or all of this
loss. This analysis does not and cannot indicate the extent to
which prices should be raised, but it does indicate the magnitude
of correction desired.
(5) Time Unaccounted For, and Office Use of Service Labor.
These items, $1,900 and $2,400, have been charged respectively
to service overhead and administration overhead. Both represent
part of the payroll cost of the service department labor force.
Approximately 20% of the hours worked by the service department
labor force are devoted to miscellaneous tasks in the office. This
is the equivalent, more or less, of one full-time employee; in effect,
the service department is overstaffed by one man and the office
understaffed by one. We recommend that you consider hiring an
additional clerk for the office, and discharging one of the five serv
ice department employees, unless his continued availablity is
desired as a policy matter.
In addition to this office work, however, approximately 15%
of the service department’s total hours were not accounted for
by the department’s time records (Mr. Fisher’s diary). We dis
cussed this in some depth with Mr. Fisher and the men in the
service department. Mr. Fisher’s estimates that 80% of the time
not accounted for (i.e., about $1,500 worth) is travel time. About
⅔ of this is on billable service work (because the average service
job is of less magnitude in billable work than in warranty work,
so that travel time is proportionately higher). Thus billable
service labor cost should be increased by $1,000 to approximately
$3,700, by adopting a “portal to portal” billing policy. We recom
mend that such a policy be adopted.
(6) Travel Charges. Travel expenses are recovered through
“per mile” charges on billable service (and possibly through allo
cation of part of the warranty allowance, as suggested in paragraph
(2) above). In the case of billable service, there appears to be a
small profit ($1,334 charged, and $998 paid out). This is illusory,
however. Reference to the schedule of overhead expenses will
show that a total of $2,400 is allocated to the service department
for truck operating expenses and depreciation. No means presently
exists of allocating this among the subdivisions of the service
department, although records of total service mileage travelled
are available. (However, some mileage travelled is undertaken
in employees own automobiles, for which they are reimbursed, and
some of the truck mileage is for travel not connected with any
specific job.) Despite these uncertainties, however, the magnitude
of the figures suggests that HeatCo. is incurring a loss on travel
mileage. Further study of travel expenses seems to be indicated;
this subject is referred to again, below.
(7) Panel W ork and Free Service. Both of these portions of
the service department have only actual costs assigned to them.
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These actual costs are then shown (in the Sales Department and
the Service Department, respectively) as the cost of performing
these particular functions. Service department reporting might
be simpler, and more meaningful, if work done under these head
ings were actually billed at regular or agreed rates. The Sales
department would then show, as a cost, the full price of panel
work as if it had been done by an outside contractor (and this
will help the sales department in deciding whether or not to sub
contract panel work). In addition, the Service Department will
show (as an overhead expense) the full cost of free work, while
showing all work other than warranty work as regular billed work
on the upper portion of its income statement. It is true that some
of the cost and income figures will be “inflated” by the nominal
profit that the (billable) service department charges on internal
work, but the “inflated” figures do have meaning as a true economic
representation of costs and revenues. (The same proposition could
also be applied to warranty service work, but here the concept
becomes less clear, because the availability of services of the service
department is an inseparable part of the “product” of the sales
department. The alternative of subcontracting warranty service,
while it does exist in theory, is not available in practice, as a matter
of basic policy. This does not mean that warranty service should
not be billed internally at full rates, but makes it less meaningful,
since one of the premises when a bid is made is that $X amount
[cost] of service will be provided.)
Possibilities for Further Work
As has been pointed out in various places above, the completion
of this project has indicated a number of instances where further
study would be of value to you. We would be pleased to make
a proposal to carry out this work for you. The work we have in
mind is summarized below, for your convenience.
(a) Determine proportions of warranty allowance applicable
to parts, labor and travel.
(b ) Set up procedures to recognize full prospective warranty
cost and treat as an expense the “warranty price concession.”
(c) Determine standard costs for service work; set up pro
cedures to report against standards and to keep standards
up to date. (Note: Some standards in any event will have
to be computed for item (b ), although they can be esti
mated and be less detailed than full work cost standards.)
(d ) Improve service department timekeeping procedures and
accounting for time spent.
(e) Investigate incidence of travel expense and determine what
rates should be charged to recover costs.
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We would like to acknowledge the helpful assistance we received
at all times from HeatCo’s employees, particularly Mrs. Sampson
and Mr. Fisher whom we called on repeatedly for information.
We, of course, take full responsibility for the analysis and con
clusions herein presented.
Very truly yours,
FULLER & CO.
by Joseph Brooks
Management Services Department
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(2,925)
3,983

5,753

Total Contribution to
Overhead and Profit

10,245

(234)

(122)

27
(27)
____

(489)

316

1,334

2,688

____

1,018

5,142

2,958

(12,108)

(40,071)

(23,135)

(4,828)

_______
__________________

_______

11,947

(2,589)
3,983

(2,294)

12,847

Net P rofit/( Loss) After
Overhead

3,923

1,334

14,049

11,755

(52,018)

6,194

336
___

3,256

2,602

(12,108)

998

1,334

8,499

11,755

(11,022)

(2,286) __________ (638) _________ 9,118

(655)
_____

-

489

7,830

40,546

53,393

Combined Total
Profit
Item ( Loss)

(28,888)

655

-

(1,397)

-

5,344

Admin.
Overhead

Exhibit 6

Departmental Overhead
See Schedule
(Exhibit 7)

2,925

-

5,322

5,550

(5,550)

3,925

-

4,988

122

34,629
573
35,202
234

7,946

7,946

_______________SERVICE DEPARTMENT ________________
Warranty__________Free _________ Billable_________Total
Profit
Profit
Profit
Profit
Item ( Loss)
Item ( Loss) Item ( Loss)
Item ( Loss)

45,447

Sales —Materials &
Parts
Cost of Goods Sold
Outside Purchases
Panel Labor
Total Costs
Profit on Material
& Parts
Labor - Charges
—Payroll
Cost
Profit on Labor
Travel —Mileage
Charges
—Expenses
Reimbursed
Profit on Travel
Commissions

Item

Profit
( Loss)

SALES DEPT.

For Period Nov. 1, 1961 to Feb. 28, 1962

INDUSTRIAL HEATING EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.
Statement of Income
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Exhibit 7
INDUSTRIAL HEATING EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.
Schedule of Departmental Overhead Expenses
For Period Nov. 1, 1961 to Feb. 28, 1962

Salaries and wages—engineers
Salaries and wages—office
Salaries and wages—executive
Salaries and wages—office use of service labor
Bonuses
Profit-sharing expense
Payroll taxes
Employees’ benefits
Commissions paid
Union insurance and pension fund
Blue prints and diagrams
Contract labor
Contract bonds
Customer entertainment and promotion
Repairs and maintenance—building
Rent
Insurance
Life insurance
Utilities
Other taxes
Group insurance
Expendable tools
Uniforms
Depreciation shop equipment & office furniture
Advertising
Postage and parcel post
Stationery and printing
Office supplies
Telephone and answering service
Professional fees

Service
Sales
Dept.
D ept.
$10,615

$3,843
8,000
2,340
3,024
781
111
125
68
187
(68)
1,082
38
336
96
240
55
54
94

$ 1,116
2,016
645
256

Totals
138

2,407
144
560
271

288

155
1,386
218

42
378
6

55
96
63
246
113
72

55
42

336

363
239
357
233
1,783
771
28
300

Dues and subscriptions

Donations
Truck operating expenses
Depreciation (trucks)
Depreciation (auto)
Miscellaneous expenses
Time unaccounted for

Admin.

176
547
624

1,579
821
313
1,897

$28,888

$11,022

$12,108

